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Document 1: United States Embassy in Turkey Cable from Richard W. Boehm to the Department of State. “Back Up of Transshipment Cargos for Iraq,” November 21, 1980.
Shortly after the beginning of the Iran-Iraq war, the U.S. embassy in Ankara reports that Turkish ports have a backlog of goods awaiting transshipment to Iraq, and that a substantial amount of Israeli goods transit Turkey for “Islamic belligerents,” including Israeli chemical products for Iran. It remarks on “Israeli acumen” in selling to both Iran and Iraq.
The Iran-Iraq war was a tragedy for Iraqis and Iranians, resulting in hundreds of thousands of casualties and immense material damage. It was sustained by an arms bazaar made up of a broad spectrum of foreign governments and corporations: British, Spanish, Italian, French, German, Brazilian, Argentinean, Chilean, North Korean, Chinese, South African, Eastern European, Israeli, American, etc., who found both combatants eager consumers of weapons, ammunition, and military technology. Iran needed U.S.-origin weapons compatible with the military infrastructure created by the U.S. during the shah’s reign, could not buy them directly, and had to rely on third-party suppliers like Israel.
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act

Document 2: United States Embassy in Israel Cable from Samuel W. Lewis to the Department of State. “Conversation with [Excised],” December 12, 1980.
A source says Israel will refrain from selling arms to Iran while Americans are held hostage in Tehran, but that European arms dealers were providing it with weapons with or without government approval.
(Iranian demonstrators seized the U.S. embassy in Tehran in September 1979 to protest the admission of the exiled shah to the U.S. for medical treatment, and held 52 Americans hostage. In response, the Carter administration froze Iranian assets and imposed other sanctions. The hostages were not released until January 20, 1981, the inauguration day of newly elected President Ronald Reagan.)
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act

Document 3: Department of State Cable from Alexander M. Haig, Jr. to All Near Eastern and South Asian Diplomatic Posts. “Military Equipment for Iran and Iraq,” February 16, 1981.
A State Department cable delineates official U.S. arms export policy for Iran and Iraq as it stood in early 1981: the “U.S. position has been to avoid taking sides in an effort to prevent widening the conflict, bring an end to the fighting and restore stability to the area.”
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act

Document 4: United States Interests Section in Iraq Cable from William L. Eagleton, Jr. to the Department of State. “Prospects for DAS [Deputy Assistant Secretary] Draper’s Visit To Baghdad,” April 4, 1981.
The U.S. interests section (since the U.S. and Iraq did not have formal diplomatic relations at this time – they were restored in November 1984 – they were represented in each other’s capitol by interests sections) says that the U.S. now has “a greater convergence of interests with Iraq than at any time since the revolution of 1958” (when Iraqis overthrew the conservative Hashemite monarchy that had been imposed under British colonialism.) Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Morris Draper is to visit Baghdad, “the first visit by a senior department official since Phil Habib stopped by in 1977.”
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act

Document 5: Department of State Cable from Alexander M. Haig, Jr. to the United States Interests Section in Iraq. “Secretary’s Message To Iraqi Foreign Minister,” April 8, 1981.
Secretary of State Alexander Haig sends a personal message to Iraqi Foreign Minister Saadoun Hammadi, noting that it is important that “our two countries be able to exchange views, freely and on a systematic basis,” paving the way for Deputy Assistant Secretary Morris Draper’s meetings in Baghdad.
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act

Document 6: United States Interests Section in Iraq Cable from William L. Eagleton, Jr. to the Department of State. “Meetings in Baghdad with Foreign Minister Hammadi,” April 12, 1981.
As the Reagan administration continues efforts to improve relations with Iraq, the U.S. interests section in Baghdad asks for more information from Washington “so as to be able to take up with the Iraqis on suitable occasions a wide array of issues of mutual interest.”
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act

Document 7: Iraq Ministry of Foreign Affairs Letter from Saadoun Hammadi to Alexander M. Haig, Jr. [Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs Praise for Visit of Under Secretary Draper], April 15, 1981.
Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs Saadoun Hammadi thanks Secretary of State Alexander Haig for Under Secretary Draper’s visit, supports discussion of strengthened trade relations, and welcomes assurances that the U.S. will not sell arms to Iran.
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act

Document 8: United States Interests Section in Iraq Cable from William L. Eagleton, Jr. to the Department of State. “Letter to the Secretary from Iraqi Foreign Minister Hammadi,” April 20, 1981.
After reading a “friendly and non-contentious letter” from Iraqi Foreign Minister Hammadi to Secretary of State Haig, the head of the U.S. interests section agrees with foreign ministry official Mohammed al-Sahhaf that a useful two-way correspondence had been established between the U.S. and Iraq.
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act

Document 9: Department of State Cable from Alexander M. Haig, Jr. to the Iraqi Interests Section in the United States. “Meeting with Iraqint Chief al-Omar” [For Eagleton from Draper], April 22, 1981.
Upon returning to Washington, Under Secretary Draper assures the head of the Iraqi interests section that he was extremely pleased with his visit to Baghdad and prospects for improved relations and increased trade. He takes the opportunity to make a “strong pitch” for a U.S. company bidding on an Iraqi Metro project.
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act

Document 10: United States Interests Section in Iraq Cable from William L. Eagleton, Jr. to Department of State. “Meeting with Tariq Aziz,” May 28, 1981.
Following consultations in Washington, the head of the U.S. interests section in Baghdad, William Eagleton, meets with Revolutionary Command Council representative Tariq Aziz, the “highest level in the Iraqi government our Baghdad mission has met with since the 1967 break in relations.” Eagleton informs Aziz of “the U.S. government’s satisfaction with the positive trend in U.S.-Iraqi relations.” After the meeting, he tells Washington that “we are in a position to communicate directly with the leadership should we have any sensitive or particularly important message to convey.”
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act

Document 11: Department of State Cable from Alexander M. Haig, Jr. to the United States Interests Section in Iraq. “U.S. Policy on Arms Sales and Transfers to Iraq and Iran,” June 3, 1981.
Washington tells the U.S. interests section in Baghdad that it “has no specific information” regarding Iran’s reported acquisitions of U.S. arms and spare parts, and asks the interests section head to assure Iraqi officials that “the U.S. has not approved nor condoned any military sales to Iraq or Iran.”
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act

Document 12: United States Interests Section in Iraq Cable to the Department of State. “Staffdel [Staff Delegation] Pillsbury’s Visit to Baghdad,” September 27, 1981.
A member of a staff delegation touring the Middle East on behalf of Senator Orrin Hatch (R-UT) visits Iraq’s parliament, and has discussions during which “the atmosphere was pleasant and friendly,” reflected in expressions of support for improving U.S.-Iraqi relations.
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act

Document 13: Department of State Cable from Alexander M. Haig, Jr. to the United States Interests Section in Iraq. “De-designation of Iraq as Supporter of International Terrorism,” February 27, 1982.
The State Department provides press guidance to regional missions regarding removal of Iraq from its list of countries that support international terrorism. The guidance says that the decision has no implications for U.S. policy toward the Iran-Iraq war.
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act

Document 14: National Security Study Directive (NSSD 4-82) from Ronald W. Reagan. “U.S. Strategy for the Near East and Southwest Asia,” March 19, 1982.
President Reagan calls for a review of policy for the Middle East and South Asia, to prepare for decisions regarding procurement, arms transfers, and intelligence planning. Revised guidelines are needed because of regional diplomatic and global oil market developments.
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act

Document 15: United States Interests Section in Iraq Cable from William L. Eagleton, Jr. to the Department of Commerce. “Helicopters and Airplanes for Iraqi Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform,” September 20, 1982.
Iraq’s director of agricultural aviation invites U.S. crop-spraying aircraft manufacturers to provide information about helicopters and pilot training, noting problems with its existing equipment because pilots have been inhaling insecticide fumes.
Iran was reporting chemical weapons use against its forces by this time. According to a 1991 article in the Los Angeles Times, American-built helicopters were used by Iraq for some of its chemical weapons attacks; according to the Central Intelligence Agency, Iraq experimented with using commercial crop sprayers for biological warfare.
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act

Document 16: Department of State Cable from George P. Shultz to the United States Interests Section in Iraq. “Visit of Iraqi Foreign Minister,” January 15, 1983.
The State Department asks the U.S. interests section in Baghdad to inform Iraqi officials that Secretary of State George Shultz would welcome a visit by Foreign Minister Saadoun Hammadi, but notes congressional criticism of Iraq and the “sensitivity of the terrorism issue” (Iraq supported several Palestinian nationalist factions.) The department suggests Iraq “contribute to the positive atmosphere of the visit” by curtailing its support for terrorism, mentioning specifically the Palestinian groups Black June and May 15.
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act

Document 17: Department of State, Office of the Secretary Delegation Cable from George P. Shultz to the Department of State. “Secretary’s May 10 Meeting with Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz,” May 11, 1983.
Secretary of State Shultz tells Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz that the U.S. wants the Iran-Iraq war to end. He says that the U.S. is neutral toward the war but observes that Aziz knows that “we had been helpful to Iraq in various ways.”
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act

Document 18: Department of State Cable from George P. Shultz to the United States Interests Section in Iraq. “Message from the Secretary for FON MIN Tariq Aziz: Iraqi Support for Terrorism,” May 23, 1983.
Secretary of State George Shultz writes to Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz, commenting on the “very important common interests” between Iraq and the U.S. Shultz obliquely encourages Iraq to disassociate itself from the Palestinian groups it supports by evoking conservative Shiite militants opposed to both the U.S. and to Iraq’s secular government: it “appears that at least the inspiration for certain terrorist acts against Iraq and against the U.S. emanates at times from the same sources. By working together to combat terrorism, our efforts should be more effective. In observing Iraqi policy, it had begun to appear to me that Iraq was approaching the conclusion that its national interests are never served by international terrorists.”
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act

Document 19: Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence Appraisal. “The Iraqi Nuclear Program: Progress Despite Setbacks,” June 1983.
In its assessment of Iraq’s nuclear program, the Central Intelligence Agency indicates that Iraq probably plans to eventually obtain nuclear weapons. The CIA says it has not identified such a program, but remarks that Iraq “has made a few moves that could take it in that direction,” while noting the difficulty of clandestine research and development and procurement of the necessary technology and fissile materials.
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act

Document 20: United States Interests Section in Iraq Cable from Barbara K. Bodine to the Department of State. “Militarization of Hughes Helicopters,” June 8, 1983.
Tells the State Department that a government official from (presumably) South Korea reported that Iraq asked his government to militarize Hughes helicopters that were sold and delivered earlier in 1983. The request was turned down.
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act

Document 21: National Security Decision Directive (NSDD 99) from Ronald W. Reagan. “United States Security Strategy for the Near East and South Asia” [Attached to Cover Memorandum; Heavily Excised], July 12, 1983.
Outlines U.S. regional objectives, strategies, and action plans for the Middle East (most content is excised).
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act

Document 22: Department of State, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Information Memorandum from Jonathan T. Howe to Lawrence S. Eagleburger. “Iran-Iraq War: Analysis of Possible U.S. Shift from Position of Strict Neutrality,” October 7, 1983.
Discusses the feasibility of a U.S. “tilt” toward Iraq in the Iran-Iraq war and related practical concerns. The analysis notes that the U.S. “policy of strict neutrality has already been modified, except for arms sales, since Iran’s forces crossed into Iraq in the summer of 1982. (We assume that other actions not discussed here, such as providing tactical intelligence, would continue as necessary.)”
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act

Document 23: Foreign Broadcast Information Service Transcription. “IRNA Reports Iraqi Regime Using Chemical Weapons to Stop Val-Fajr IV,” October 22, 1983.
Iran says that Iraq has been using chemical weapons against Iranian troops.

Document 24: Department of State, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs Information Memorandum from Jonathan T. Howe to George P. Shultz. “Iraq Use of Chemical Weapons,” November 1, 1983.
Officials from the State Department’s Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs tell Secretary Shultz that the department has additional information confirming Iraq’s “almost daily” use of chemical weapons. They note, “We also know that Iraq has acquired a CW production capability, presumably from Western firms, including possibly a U.S. foreign subsidiary.” The issue is to be added to the agenda for an upcoming National Security Council meeting, at which measures to assist Iraq are to be considered. The officials note that a response is important in order to maintain the credibility of U.S. policy on chemical warfare.
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act

Document 25: Department of State, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Action Memorandum from Jonathan T. Howe to Lawrence S. Eagleburger. “Iraqi Use of Chemical Weapons” [Includes Cables Entitled “Deterring Iraqi Use of Chemical Weapons” and “Background of Iraqi Use of Chemical Weapons”], November 21, 1983.
State Department officials recommend discussing the use of chemical weapons with Iraqi officials soon, in order to deter further use and “to avoid unpleasantly surprising Iraq through public positions we may have to take on this issue.” A background cable says that Iraq used lethal chemical weapons in October 1982 and, reportedly, against Iranian forces July and August 1983 “and more recently against Kurdish insurgents.”
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act

Document 26: National Security Decision Directive (NSDD 114) from Ronald W. Reagan. “U.S. Policy toward the Iran-Iraq War,” November 26, 1983.
President Ronald Reagan directs that consultations begin with regional states willing to cooperate with the U.S. on measures to protect Persian Gulf oil production and its transshipment infrastructure. The U.S. will give the highest priority to the establishment of military facilities allowing for the positioning of rapid deployment forces in the region to guard oil facilities.
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act

Document 27: Department of State Cable from Kenneth W. Dam to the United States Interests Section in Iraq. “Rumsfeld Visit to Iraq,” December 7, 1983.
Reports that Donald Rumsfeld wants to visit Iraq during his tour of Middle Eastern countries as an envoy for President Reagan, but notes that he does not think his visit will be worthwhile unless he meets directly with Saddam Hussein.
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act

Document 28: United States Interests Section in Iraq Cable from William L. Eagleton, Jr. to the Department of State [et al.]. “Rumsfeld Visit to Iraq,” December 10, 1983.
The head of the U.S. interests section in Baghdad tells Iraqi Under Secretary Mohammed al-Sahhaf that “perhaps the greatest benefit” of Donald Rumsfeld’s upcoming visit to Baghdad “will be the establishment of direct contact between an envoy of President Reagan and President Saddam Hussein.” The planned topics of discussion are the Iran-Iraq war, the Arab-Israeli conflict, Lebanon, Syria, and any other issues that the Iraqis might want to raise.
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act

Document 29: United States Interests Section in Iraq Cable from William L. Eagleton, Jr. to the United States Embassy in Jordan. “Talking Points for Amb. [Ambassador] Rumsfeld’s Meeting with Tariq Aziz and Saddam Hussein,” December 14, 1983.
A U.S. interests section cable notes that presidential envoy Donald Rumsfeld’s upcoming meeting will be Saddam Hussein’s first with a representative of the U.S. executive branch; therefore, a major goal will be “to initiate a dialogue and establish personal rapport.” In the meeting, “Rumsfeld will want to emphasize his close relationship with President Reagan . . .” Talking points for the meeting include the Iran-Iraq war (the U.S. “would regard any major reversal of Iraq’s fortunes as a strategic defeat for the West”), expansion of Iraqi pipeline facilities, Lebanon, Syria, strengthening of Egyptian and Iraqi ties, and the threat of terrorism, which targets both countries.
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act

Document 30: United States Embassy in Italy Cable from Maxwell M. Rabb to the Department of State. “Rumsfeld’s Larger Meeting with Iraqi Deputy PM [Prime Minister] and FM [Foreign Minister] Tariz [Tariq] Aziz, December 19,” December 20, 1983.
During a meeting with Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz and other Iraqi officials, Donald Rumsfeld notes that the U.S. and Iraq have both differences and “a number of areas of common interest.” Aziz says that he was heartened by a line in President Reagan’s letter to Saddam Hussein stating, “The Iran-Iraq war could post serious problems for the economic and security interests of the U.S., its friends in the region and in the free world.”
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act

Document 31: United States Embassy in United Kingdom Cable from Charles H. Price II to the Department of State. “Rumsfeld Mission: December 20 Meeting with Iraqi President Saddam Hussein,” December 21, 1983.
At a 90-minute meeting with Donald Rumsfeld, Saddam Hussein evinces “obvious pleasure” at a letter Rumsfeld brought from President Ronald Reagan. The two discuss common U.S.-Iraqi interests, including Lebanon, Palestine, opposition to an outcome of the Iran-Iraq war that “weakened Iraq’s role or enhanced interests and ambitions of Iran,” and U.S. efforts to cut off arms sales to Iran. Rumsfeld says that the U.S. feels extremely strongly about terrorism and says that it has a home – in Iran, Syria, and Libya, and that it is supported by the Soviet Union. He encourages arrangements that might provide alternative transshipment routes for Iraq’s oil, including pipelines through Saudi Arabia or to the Gulf of Aqaba in Jordan. The State Department calls the meeting a “positive milestone.”
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act

Document 32: United States Embassy in the United Kingdom Cable from Charles H. Price II to the Department of State. “Rumsfeld One-on-One Meeting with Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister,” December 21, 1983.
Presidential envoy Donald Rumsfeld and Tariq Aziz meet for two and one-half hours and agree that “the U.S. and Iraq shared many common interests,” including peace in the Persian Gulf, the desire to diminish the influence of Iran and Syria, and support for reintegrating Egypt, isolated since its unilateral peace with Israel, into the Arab world. Rumsfeld comments on Iraq’s oil exports, suggests alternative pipeline facilities, and discusses opposition to international terrorism and support for a fair Arab-Israeli peace. He and Aziz discuss the Iran-Iraq war “in detail.” Rumsfeld says that the administration wants an end to the war, and offers “our willingness to do more.” He mentions chemical weapons, possible escalation of fighting in the Gulf, and human rights as impediments to the U.S. government’s desire to do more to help Iraq, then shifts the conversation to U.S. opposition to Syria’s role in Lebanon.
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act

Document 33: Department of State, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Action Memorandum from Richard W. Murphy to Lawrence S. Eagleburger. “EXIM [Export-Import] Bank Financing for Iraq” [Includes Letter From Lawrence S. Eagleburger to William Draper, Dated December 24, 1983], December 22, 1983.
Pursuant to the Reagan administration’s policy of increasing support for Iraq, the State Department advises Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Lawrence Eagleburger to urge the U.S. Export-Import Bank to provide Iraq with financial credits. Eagleburger signs a letter to Eximbank saying that since Saddam Hussein had complied with U.S. requests, and announced the end of all aid to the principal terrorist group of concern to the U.S., and expelled its leader (Abu Nidal), “The terrorism issue, therefore, should no longer be an impediment to EXIM financing for U.S. sales to Iraq.” The financing is to signal U.S. belief in Iraq’s future economic viability, secure a foothold in the potentially large Iraqi market, and “go far to show our support for Iraq in a practical, neutral context.”
Source: Declassified through Congressional investigation

Document 34: Department of State Cable from Kenneth W. Dam to United States Embassy in Jordan. “Rumsfeld Mission: Meeting with King Hussein in London,” December 23, 1983.
Ambassador-at-large and presidential emissary Donald Rumsfeld discusses prospects for improving U.S.-Iraqi relations with King Hussein of Jordan. Rumsfeld reports on his talks with Saddam Hussein and Tariq Aziz and says they had “more areas of agreement than disagreement.” He also reviews the status of a proposed pipeline to Aqaba for Iraq’s oil.
The U.S. promoted the Aqaba pipeline project strenuously for several years during the early to mid 1980s. It would have carried oil from northern Iraq to the Gulf of Aqaba in Jordan, alleviating the disruptive effect on Iraq’s oil output that resulted from Iran’s attacks on oil transshipment facilities in the Persian Gulf and from Syria’s closing of a pipeline that had transported Iraqi oil. The proposed project reflected the U.S.’s extreme nervousness about threats to the world oil supply resulting from the Iran-Iraq war.
The U.S. involved several U.S.-based multinational corporations in planning the project. International financier Bruce Rappaport, a friend of CIA director William Casey, was also a central figure in the proposed deal. (The final report of the independent counsel for the Iran-Contra “arms for hostages” scandal cites reports indicating that Rappaport’s bank in Geneva was the recipient of a mysterious $10 million payment from the Sultan of Brunei to fund the Nicaraguan contras that subsequently disappeared. Rappaport denied this; the final report says that the issue remained unresolved. He was invited to testify in 1999 at a House Banking committee hearing on corruption in Russian financial transactions, but declined.) The project was complicated by demands that the U.S. arrange for ironclad security guarantees from the Israelis, since the pipeline would have been vulnerable to their attack. The Israelis, for their part, demanded guarantees that pipeline facilities would not cause environmental damage.
All involved had their reasons for at least hypothetical interest in the project. For Iraq, it would have been a manifestation of improved U.S.-Iraq relations – they wanted as much U.S. financial and other involvement in the proposed deal as possible. For the U.S., it would have provided an alternative, theoretically secure outlet for oil and created a nexus for entangling Iraqi interests with those of Jordan and Israel, consistent with U.S. plans to create a wider consortium of Arab countries that would cooperate with the U.S. and would be willing to resolve the Palestine-Israel dispute on U.S. terms. Israel would have benefited from new oil facilities in its vicinity, and won points with the Reagan administration. Also, according to internal documents from a friend of Reagan administration Attorney General Edmund Meese, brought in as an intermediary because of his Israeli ties, payoffs would have been skimmed from complex financial guarantee arrangements for the Israeli government and Labor Party.
Attempts to agree on arrangements that would satisfy all parties dragged on, until the several private companies that had been brought in to plan the project backed out, questioning the motives of all involved. Iraq, however, revived the concept in 2000, presumably for its own strategic interests.
Source: Court exhibit

Document 35: United States Interests Section in Iraq Cable from William L. Eagleton, Jr. to the Department of State. “Follow-up on Rumsfeld Visit to Baghdad,” December 26, 1983.
William Eagleton meets with Iraqi Under Secretary Mohammed al-Sahhaf to follow up on Donald Rumsfeld’s visit. Eagleton discusses U.S. efforts to coordinate policy toward the Iran-Iraq war among Persian Gulf states, its campaign to stop arms sales to Iran, and its wish to see Iraq’s oil exports increase. He informs the Iraqi official of the degree of U.S. interest in Iraq’s economic situation, mentioning the “high level policy review which had established the environment and policy positions that had been conveyed to the Iraqi leadership by Ambassador Rumsfeld.”
Eagleton comments, “Ambassador Rumsfeld’s visit has elevated U.S.-Iraqi relations to a new level. This is both symbolically important and practically helpful.”
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act

Document 36: United States Interests Section in Iraq Cable from William L. Eagleton, Jr. to the Department of State. “Meeting With Tariq Aziz: Expanding Iraq’s Oil Export Facilities,” January 3, 1984.
During a meeting following Donald Rumsfeld’s talks, Tariq Aziz tells William Eagleton that President Saddam Hussein was pleased with the visit and with the positive atmosphere it created.
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act

Document 37: United States Interests Section in Iraq Cable from William L. Eagleton, Jr. to the Department of State. “[Excised] Iraqi Pipeline through Jordan,” January 10, 1984.
The head of the U.S. interests section tells Washington, “the Iraqi leadership was extremely pleased with Amb. Rumsfeld’s visit. Tariq Aziz had gone out of his way to praise Rumsfeld as a person . . .”
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act

Document 38: Department of State Cable from George P. Shultz to the United States Consulate General, Jerusalem. “Follow-up Steps on Iraq-Iran” [Includes Transmittal Sheet], January 14, 1984.
The U.S. intensifies its diplomatic efforts to curtail arms sales to Iran and imposes anti-terrorism export controls on that country. However, it does not plan to prohibit U.S. imports of Iranian oil.
The U.S. was developing plans to liberalize its export policy for Iraq. The revised rules would permit the export of U.S.-origin armored ambulances, communications gear, and electronic equipment for the protection of Saddam Hussein’s personal aircraft. The Reagan administration was continuing efforts to persuade the Export-Import Bank to provide financing for Iraq — a positive Eximbank determination would improve Iraq’s credit rating and make it easier for it to obtain loans from international financial institutions.
Source: Declassified through Congressional investigation

Document 39: Department of State, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Action Memorandum from David T. Schneider to George P. Shultz. “Easing Restrictions on Exports to Iraq,” January 30, 1984.
The State Department presents the case for relaxing controls on exports to Iraq of militarily useful items. The department is concerned specifically with an application to export dual-use heavy trucks, the sale of which to either Iran or Iraq has been banned under the Export Administration Act. Secretary of State Shultz approves the proposed sale.
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act

Document 40: Export-Import Bank of the United States, Country Risk Analysis Division Memorandum to the Export-Import Bank of the United States, Africa and Middle East Division, Board of Directors. “Country Review and Recommendations for Eximbank’s Programs” [Extract; Includes Document Entitled “Appendix I: Iraq”], February 21, 1984.
The Export-Import Bank considers Iraq a bad credit risk because of its very high level of indebtedness and the uncertainty created by the Iran-Iraq war. An appendix lists U.S. companies that would be potential exporters to Iraq if credits were available, including Westinghouse, General Electric, Bechtel, and Halliburton.
Source: Declassified through Congressional investigation

Document 41: United States Interests Section in Iraq Cable from William L. Eagleton, Jr. to the Department of State. “Iraqi Warning re Iranian Offensive,” February 22, 1984.
Between presidential envoy Donald Rumsfeld’s two visits to Iraq to seek ways to improve U.S.-Iraq relations and to identify measures to assist Iraq’s war efforts, the Iraqi military issues a statement declaring that “the invaders should know that for every harmful insect there is an insecticide capable of annihilating it whatever their number and Iraq possesses this annihilation insecticide.”
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act

Document 42: Department of State Cable from George P. Shultz to the United States Interests Section in Iraq. “U.S. Chemical Shipment to Iraq,” March 4, 1984.
Indicates that a shipment of 22,000 pounds of phosphorous fluoride to Iraq was held back at JFK airport because of “concern over Iraq’s possible intention to use the chemical in the manufacture of chemical weapons.” Washington asks the U.S. interests section in Baghdad to remind Iraq’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.’s grave concern about chemical weapons, and to inform it that the U.S. will publicly condemn their use in the near future. The interests section is to reiterate the request that Iraq not use chemical warfare, and to say that the U.S. opposes Iraq’s attempts to acquire chemical weapons related material from the U.S.: “When we become aware of attempts to do so, we will act to prevent their export to Iraq.”
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act

Document 43: Department of State, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Memorandum from James A. Placke to James M. Ealum [et al.]. [U.S. Condemnation of Iraqi Chemical Weapons Use], March 4, 1984.
The State Department circulates for review a draft press statement and guidance for a U.S. condemnation of Iraq’s use of chemical weapons. The statement says that “While condemning Iraq’s chemical weapons use . . . . The United States finds the present Iranian regime’s intransigent refusal to deviate from its avowed objective of eliminating the legitimate government of neighboring Iraq to be inconsistent with the accepted norms of behavior among nations and the moral and religious basis which it claims.”
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act

Document 44: Department of State Memorandum. “Notifying Congress of [Excised] Truck Sale,” March 5, 1984.
The State Department informs a House Committee on Foreign Affairs staff member that the department has not objected to the sale of 2,000 heavy trucks to Iraq, noting that they were built in part in Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, Pennsylvania, New York, and Michigan. The official policy of the U.S. is that it does not export military related items to Iraq or Iran. When asked if the trucks were intended for military purposes, the official responds, “we presumed that this was Iraq’s intention, and had not asked.”
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act

Document 45: United States Interests Section in Iraq Cable from William L. Eagleton, Jr. to the Department of State. “Iraq Reacts Angrily to U.S. Condemnation of CW [Chemical Weapons] Use,” March 7, 1984.
Reports that Iraq’s defense minister denounced the State Department’s condemnation of Iraq’s chemical weapons use. The U.S. interests section comments that “The Iraqis apparently have been stunned by our public condemnation.”
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act

Document 46: United States Embassy in Austria Cable from Helene A. von Damm to the Department of State. “Iranian War Wounded in Vienna,” March 13, 1984.
The U.S. embassy in Austria tells the State Department that a Belgian laboratory found residual amounts of mustard gas and mycotoxin in the blood of Iranian war casualties brought to Vienna for medical treatment.
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act

Document 47: Department of State Cable from George P. Shultz to the Mission to the European Office of the United Nations and Other International Organizations. “U.N. Human Rights Commission: Item 12: Iranian Resolution on Use of Chemical Weapons by Iraq,” March 14, 1984.
The State Department instructs the U.S. delegate to the United Nations to get the support of other Western missions for a motion of “no decision” regarding Iran’s draft resolution condemning Iraq’s use of chemical weapons. Failing that, the U.S. is to abstain on the resolution.
The U.S. is to emphasize points made in a recent State Department press conference, including the assertion that “The USG evenhandedly condemns the prohibited use of chemical weapons whenever it occurs.”
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act

Document 48: Department of State Cable from George P. Shultz to the United States Embassy in Sudan. “Briefing Notes for Rumsfeld Visit to Baghdad [Page Missing],” March 24, 1984.
A State Department background cable for Donald Rumsfeld’s March 1984 visit to Baghdad notes the distress caused to Iraqi officials by the U.S.’s public condemnation of Iraq’s use of chemical weapons “despite our repeated warnings that this issue would emerge sooner or later.” Most of the cable is concerned with the Reagan administration’s interest in reassuring Iraqi officials that U.S. financing might be available for the proposed pipeline to deliver Iraqi oil to Aqaba, and other U.S. regional interests. The cable notes that Iraqi officials are “confused” by the administration’s “means of pursuing our stated objectives in the region.”
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act

Document 49: United States Embassy in Bahrain Cable from Donald Charles Seidel to the Department of State. “Middle East Mission: U.S. Efforts to Stop Arms Transfers to Iran,” March 24, 1984.
In preparation for his second round of meetings with officials in Baghdad, Donald Rumsfeld asks for a list of the countries that the U.S. has approached in order to persuade them to cut off arms sales to Iran.
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act

Document 50: Mission to the United Nations Cable from Jeane J. Kirkpatrick to the Department of State. “U.N. Report on Chemical Weapons Use in Iran/Iraq War: Consideration in Security Council,” March 28, 1984.
Reports British and Dutch efforts to draft a quick United Nations resolution condemning the use of chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq war, describes evidence regarding Iraqi chemical weapons use, and passes on the observation by a U.N. official that “Iranians may well decide to manufacture and use chemical weapons themselves if international community does not condemn Iraq.”
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act

Document 51: Department of State, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Cover Memorandum from Allen Overmyer to James A. Placke. [United Nations Security Council Response to Iranian Chemical Weapons Complaint; Includes Revised Working Paper], March 30, 1984.
Reports that the U.N. Security Council decided to adopt the text of a draft Dutch resolution on chemical weapons and issue it as a presidential statement. “The statement, by the way, contains all three elements Hamdoon wanted.”
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act

Document 52: Department of State Cable from George P. Shultz to the United States Embassy in Lebanon [et al.]. “Department Press Briefing, March 30, 1984,” March 31, 1984.
The State Department announces it has imposed foreign policy controls on Iran and Iraq for exports of chemical weapons precursors. It responds to questions from the press about U.S. policy regarding the Iran-Iraq war, and a department spokesperson says Iraq’s chemical weapons use will not change U.S. interest in pursuing closer U.S.-Iraq relations.
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act

Document 53: National Security Decision Directive (NSDD 139) from Ronald W. Reagan. “Measures to Improve U.S. Posture and Readiness to Respond to Developments in the Iran-Iraq War,” April 5, 1984.
Ronald Reagan says that action must be taken to increase U.S. military capabilities and “intelligence collection posture” in the Persian Gulf. Secretary of State Shultz, Secretary of Defense Weinberger, and Director of Central Intelligence William J. Casey are to prepare a plan to prevent Iraq’s defeat in the Iran-Iraq war. Reagan directs Shultz to ensure that the U.S. government’s condemnation of the use of chemical weapons is unambiguous, while placing “equal stress on the urgent need to dissuade Iran from continuing the ruthless and inhumane tactics which have characterized recent offensives.”
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act

Document 55: United States Interests Section. Iraq Cable from William L. Eagleton, Jr. to the Department of State. “Bell Discusses Possible Helicopter Sale to Iraq,” April 12, 1984.
The U.S. interests section in Baghdad asks to be kept apprised of developments in ongoing talks between Iraq and Bell Helicopter Textron about its sale of helicopters to Iraq’s Ministry of Defense that “can not be in any way configured for military use.”
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act

Document 56: Letter from Richard M. Nixon to Nicolae Ceausescu. [Regarding U.S.-Romanian Venture to Sell Uniforms to Iraq], May 3, 1984.
Former president Richard Nixon sends a letter to Romanian President Nicolae Ceausescu in support of a deal made by Colonel John Brennan, his former aide and chief of staff, and former attorney general John Mitchell, to buy Romanian-manufactured military uniforms for export to Iraq.
Media and criminal investigations of U.S. companies that had exported weapons-related or dual-use items to Iraq were conducted after Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. Many of these companies seemed to have connections with former U.S. government officials.
Source: Court exhibit

Document 57: Department of State, Special Adviser to the Secretary on Nonproliferation Policy and Nuclear Energy Affairs Memorandum from Dick Gronet to Richard T. Kennedy. “U.S. Dual-Use Exports to Iraq: Specific Actions” [Includes Document Entitled “Dual Use Exports to Iraq” Dated April 27, 1984], May 9, 1984.
An internal State Department paper indicates that the government is reviewing policy for “the sale of certain categories of dual-use items to Iraqi nuclear entities,” and the review’s “preliminary results favor expanding such trade to include Iraqi nuclear entities.”
Source: Declassified through Congressional investigation

Document 58: Defense Intelligence Agency Intelligence Report. “Defense Estimative Brief: Prospects for Iraq,” September 25, 1984.
The Defense Intelligence Agency assesses political, economic, and military conditions in Iraq, predicts that it will continue to develop its conventional and “formidable” chemical capabilities, and will “probably pursue nuclear weapons.” It says that Iraq is unlikely to use chemical weapons against Israel because of certain Israeli retaliation, and that U.S.-Iraqi relations will hinge on U.S. policy toward the Middle East, including its aid for Iraq.
Source: Declassified through Congressional investigation

Document 59: Department of State, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs Briefing Paper. “Iraqi Illegal Use of Chemical Weapons,” November 16, 1984.
Indicates that the U.S. concluded some time ago that Iraq had used “domestically produced lethal CW” in the Iran-Iraq war, developed in part through “the unwitting and, in some cases, we believe witting assistance” of numerous Western firms. The State Department’s Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs thinks that Iraq stopped using chemical weapons in response to a U.S. demarche in November 1983, and resumed their use in February 1984.
Source: Declassified through Congressional investigation

Document 60: Department of State Cable from George P. Shultz to the United States Embassy in Iraq. “Memcon [Memorandum of Conversation]: Secretary’s Meeting with Iraqi DepPrimMin [Deputy Prime Minister] Tariq Aziz, November 26, 1984, 10:00 a.m.,” November 29, 1984.
Following the restoration of formal diplomatic relations between the U.S. and Iraq, George Shultz meets with Tariq Aziz and emphasizes “the U.S. desire to base these relations on the presumption of equality, mutual respect, and reciprocity.” After Aziz says that Iraq’s advantage in weaponry was enabling it to defend itself against Iran, Secretary Shultz comments “that superior intelligence also must be an important factor in Iraq’s defense. Aziz acknowledged that this may be true.” (The U.S. had been secretly providing Iraq with extensive intelligence support for several years.) Secretary Shultz concludes by welcoming the candor of the ongoing U.S.-Iraq dialogue, and remarks that “Iraq can expect the U.S. to maintain its opposition to both the use and production of chemical weapons. This position is not directed specifically at Iraq . . . “
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act

Document 61: United States District Court (Florida: Southern District) Affidavit. “United States of America, Plaintiff, v. Carlos Cardoen [et al.]” [Charge that Teledyne Wah Chang Albany Illegally Provided a Proscribed Substance, Zirconium, to Cardoen Industries and to Iraq], January 31, 1995.
Former Reagan administration National Security Council staff member Howard Teicher says that after Ronald Reagan signed a national security decision directive calling for the U.S. to do whatever was necessary to prevent Iraq’s defeat in the Iran-Iraq war, Director of Central Intelligence William Casey personally led efforts to ensure that Iraq had sufficient weapons, including cluster bombs, and that the U.S. provided Iraq with financial credits, intelligence, and strategic military advice. The CIA also provided Iraq, through third parties that included Israel and Egypt, with military hardware compatible with its Soviet-origin weaponry.
This affidavit was submitted in the course of one of a number of prosecutions, following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, of U.S. companies charged with illegally delivering military, dual-use, or nuclear-related items to Iraq. (In this case, a Teledyne affiliate was charged will illegally selling zirconium, used in the manufacture of explosives, to the Chilean arms manufacturer Carlos Industries, which used the material to manufacture cluster bombs sold to Iraq.) Many of these firms tried to defend themselves by establishing that providing military materiel to Iraq had been the actual, if covert, policy of the U.S. government. This was a difficult case to make, especially considering the rules of evidence governing investigations involving national security matters.
Source: Court case
Notes
1. <http://ednet.rvc.cc.il.us/~PeterR/IR/docs/Geneva.htm>

2. <http://www.cjr.org/year/93/2/iraqgate.asp>
3. <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nsa/publications/iraqgate/iraqgate.html>; <http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com/introx.htm>