Look out, look up! A lot of crews doing outdoor parties now use scaffolding of some sort - either as deck / lighting stands or even as "anti-mosh" defences (so the stack doesn't get sent over by moshers!)
these long metal poles are sometimes carried across fields late at night.
In most rural areas across the world electricity is distributed on bare overhead wires carried on wooden poles, at voltages ranging from 230/400V to 33,000 volts!
In some cases a metal object need only be within 50cm-1m of the wire to flash over and conduct electricity; and many people across the world have suffered injury or even been killed when metal poles have been brought into contact with overhead cables.
So look out, look up before moving poles around - check your surrounding area for cables!
Antiworld & Teknoworld Room One...
The Antiworld Vs Teknoworld Stage:
Music Style : "Uplifing Atmospheric Hard Trance, Hi Energy Hard Dance & Tekno!!!!
08.00 - 09.00 : Grazer Vs Zeus
09.00 - 10.00 : Eduardo Herrera Vs Clodagh (Brazil Vs Uk)
10.00 - 11.00 : Fabry Vs Dj Peace
11.00 - 12.00 : P.A.R.A.D.O.X (Germany) ***
12.00 - 01.00 : K-90 (Live)
01.00 - 02.00 : Nuw Idol (Live)
02.00 - 03.00 : Beamish Vs Oberon
03.00 - 04.00 : Lab 4 (Live)
04.00 - 05.00 : Nu Energy Collective (Live)
05.00 - 06.00 : Chris Liberator Vs Andy Farley
In conjunction with:
www.lab4.com www.k90.co.uk www.nuenergy.co.uk www.wellwicked.com www.chrisliberator.com www.spiritualised.co.uk
Special Thanks To:
P.A.R.A.D.O.X Direct From Binary State Germany!!!
The Man behing the release "BASS!!!"
More info & Track on www.antiworld.net
Andy Farley for a wicked back to back with our Teknoworld Resident Chris Liberator!
The King of Hard House Vs The King Of Tekno!
What a way to close the Stratford Rex Third Birthday!!!!
Room Two...
The Hard Dance Stage:
Music Style: "Hard House & Hard Dance"
08.00 - 09.00 : Brendon Currie (Antiworld Debut)
09.00 - 10.00 : Yazon (Zebedee - Antiworld)
10.00 - 11.00 : Dj Centurian
11.00 - 12.00 : Soylent
12.00 - 01.00 : Simon Eve
01.00 - 02.00 : Eduardo Herrera (Brazil)
02.00 - 03.00 : Phil Able
03.00 - 04.00 : Oberon
04.00 - 05.00 ; Anthony Atcherley
05.00 - 06.00 : Sol Ray
In Collaboration With:
www.cyberdog.net
www.simoneve.com
www.eduardoherrera.com
www.tastyevents.com
www.honeypotrecords.com
Room Three...
The Techno Stage:
Acid Park Present:
Music Style : "London Undergroun Hard & Acid Techno"
08.00 - 09.00 : Moni
09.00 - 10.00 : Grazer
10.00 - 11.00 : Zeus
11.00 - 12.00 : Dj Gas
12.00 - 01.00 : Dj Van Bass (Technoelement, Linz, Austria)
01.00 - 02.00 : Dj Jerry (Czech Republic) ***
02.00 - 03.00 : Mikelangelo
03.00 - 04.00 : Chris Liberator (Teknoworld)
00.00 - 05.00 ; Eduardo Herrera (Brazil)
05.00 - 06.00 : Dj Animatek Matt Handy (Hands On Records)
*** DJ JERRY, CZECH REPUBLIC BE RECORDS
resident DJ at PERPETUUM BRNO & APOKALYPSA
www.perpetuum.cz www.apokalypsa.cz www.djjerry.cz
www.technoelement.net www.chrisliberator.com
Room Four...
The Psygate Stage:
Music Style: "Progressive & Full On Psychedelic Trance"
08.00 - 09.00 : Feather (Clockwork Prism)
09.00 - 10.00 : Greg (Clockwork Prism)
10.00 - 11.00 : Sexstasy Vs Green Vapour (Destroyers)
11.00 - 12.00 : Grazer Vs Zeus
12.00 - 01.00 : Dj Druid
01.00 - 02.00 : Peace
02.00 - 03.00 : Mr Raz (Ajuca Productions / Sphere / Optica recs)
03.00 - 04.00 : Metaphase
04.00 - 05.00 ; Simo
05.00 - 06.00 : Kristian
In Collaboration with:
www.alchemyrecords.co.uk
Www.clockworkprism.com
www.infinitysounds.com
www.ajucaproductions.co.uk
www.chichime.co.uk
www.transient.com
www.fairytales-london.com
Room Five...
The Chill Out stage:
Clockwork Prism Present:
Music Style : "Chilled Groovy Beats"
Open Decks:
Jonty
Mandy More
Greg Prism
Nautilus
AMBIDEXTROUS (LIVE)!!!
GENERAL PARTY INFO:
Crew:
45 Main Room Djs, 5 International Live Acts, 200 k Of Booming Sound Systems,
5 Main Arenas of Different Music & Vibes! Bars, Stalls, Chill - Out Space, Massage,
Healing, Hippies, Cyberpunks and all the un-usual Magic Things!
Performers: Kwalilox & Headfunk Pyro Circus & Steph!!!
3000 CAPACITY!!! 10 HR OF MUSIC!!!
Main DJs & Lives Acts from Germany-Austria-Italy-UK-Denmark-Brazil-Russia-Poland-South Africa!!!
Longest Running Party at the Stratford Rex "Ever"!!!
PURE ENERGY presents FUNK DOWN Bank Holiday A little different from our normal style.........
Bank Holiday sunday 29th Aug at The Three Cocks pub in Kettering, Northants.
Starts at 5pm till late.
Donations on the door, all dontations will go towards venue hire and buying a fatter system.
70's fancy dress !!
MUSIC = Funky House and Techno sounds from....
DJ's
DAVE NAYLOR
STEVE B
STU PAILING
MIKEE+STORY
dea.gov: THE CHANGING FACE OF EUROPEAN DRUG POLICY APRIL 2002
http://www.dea.gov/pubs/intel/02023/02023.html
OVERVIEW
Drug policy in Western Europe has always been experimental, but, in recent years, several countries have joined the Netherlands and Switzerland in their pursuit of alternative methods for dealing with the drug epidemic. Many Western European nations are refocusing efforts on the social welfare aspect of drug use and reducing their focus on the law enforcement response, while imposing stricter penalties on those organizations that supply illegal drugs. Some of the alternative measures that are gaining momentum in Western Europe include legalization, decriminalization, and harm reduction.
The U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) defines “legalization” as “making legal what is currently illegal.” At present, drug use is not a criminal offense in Austria, Belgium, Germany, Ireland, and the United Kingdom with only minor exceptions.1 While some nations have taken steps authorizing referendums on the issue of legalization, as Switzerland did in 1998, most have preferred to approach the drug legalization issue by focusing on decriminalization.
DEA defines “decriminalization” as “the removal of, or reduction in, criminal penalties for particular acts.” Decriminalization of drug use and/or possession is a policy that is widely supported in most of Western Europe. Many nations’ drug policies have been a policy of de facto decriminalization for many years, but it is only recently that governments are changing their legislation to officially reduce or remove criminal penalties for acts such as drug use and possession. In several Western European nations, possession of small quantities of drugs will no longer result in a prison sentence, but rather in administrative sanctions that could include a fine and/or confiscation of driver’s license or passport.
Harm reduction is another policy option finding increasing popularity in Europe. Harm reduction can take on many forms and, according to DEA, “is often used to describe specific programs that attempt to diminish the potential harmful consequences associated with a particular behavior.” Some of those programs include needle exchange, substitution treatment, maintenance treatment, and injection rooms. The degree to which these programs are incorporated into society depends on the country in question, with many nations developing pilot programs in an attempt to ascertain the advantages of such programs.
DRUG POLICY
While there are many similarities between drug policies, there is currently no consistent policy or law throughout Europe. The variety of laws and policies in place at the national levels makes it difficult to create a uniform European drug policy for the European Union (EU). 2 The EU has served as more of a forum of discussion or exchange of ideas rather than a resource or guide for individual government policy.
All EU member nations are signatories of the 1961, 1971, and 1988 United Nations (U.N.) Conventions. 3 Additionally, non-EU member nations, such as Norway and Switzerland, incorporate the regulations set out in the U.N. Conventions. However, through decentralized drug policy, decriminalization, and harm reduction measures, many nations have been able to relax drug laws without directly violating the conventions.
TRENDS IN DRUG POLICY
Decriminalization
While there are a variety of drug laws and policies in Western Europe, several trends are noteworthy. The trend toward the decriminalization of drug use and possession has become an important force in Europe. Although some countries, such as Belgium, Greece, Luxembourg, and Switzerland, took steps to remove criminal penalties for cannabis possession in the past year, other countries, such as Portugal, decriminalized all drug use and possession for personal use.
The decriminalization of minor drug offenses has resulted in much international criticism from organizations, such as the DEA, and the United Nations International Narcotics Control Board. However, decriminalization is not as radical a concept in Europe as may appear at first glance. A common misconception is equating decriminalization to legalization. In the Netherlands, for instance, cannabis possession is not legal, only tolerated by Dutch authorities. Based upon the concept of the separation of markets, 4 “coffeeshops” began to emerge throughout the Netherlands in 1976, offering cannabis products for sale. While possession and sale of cannabis are not legal, coffeeshops are permitted to exist under certain restrictions. 5
In 2001, Belgium, Finland, Greece, Luxembourg, Portugal, and Switzerland drafted, proposed, or approved legislation for the decriminalization of minor drug use and possession offenses ¾ in most cases, for cannabis. The United Kingdom debated reclassification of cannabis in 2001, to lower penalties for cannabis possession. That same year, the Lambeth and Brixton areas of South London implemented a pilot program decriminalizing minor cannabis possession. Several other countries including Austria, France, and Italy decriminalized minor drug use and possession in the past decade. Ireland was one of the first countries to decriminalize drug possession with the inception of the Misuse of Drugs Act in 1977, which decriminalized minor cannabis possession. While not all European countries have changed their laws to reduce or remove penalties for minor offenses, all have taken steps to offer a variety of treatment and harm reduction measures.
Treatment and Harm Reduction
The prevailing belief in Europe is that drug addiction is an illness, not a crime. European countries, including those that have not formally decreased criminal penalties for offenses, are searching for alternatives to prison. In many cases, addicts have an option for treatment instead of penalties. Even Sweden, which has some of the most stringent policies against drugs, offers a suspension of sentence for minor drug offenses in return for treatment under a treatment contract.
Treatment options are no longer limited to detoxification or methadone reduction. Several European nations, including Switzerland, offer maintenance programs. While the ultimate goal of treatment is abstinence, maintenance treatment, like other harm reduction measures, is designed to regulate the drug use of those who are not willing to seek traditional forms of treatment. Maintenance programs can consist of methadone, morphine, heroin, or another opiate. Methadone maintenance is the most common, but several countries, including Germany, are experimenting with distributing heroin itself.
In the 1970s, Switzerland pioneered methadone treatment for opiate addicts. Today, treatment for opiate addiction has expanded to include morphine treatment and, in 1994, heroin distribution for addicts. While Swiss heroin distribution has received international criticism, the Swiss public supports the program and, in 1999, overwhelmingly supported the program in a national referendum.
The rapid spread of the HIV virus among intravenous drug users in the 1980s forced governments to look for measures that would reduce the harmful effects of drug use for those who refused treatment. A wide variety of harm reduction measures have developed throughout Europe. Some of the most common measures include needle-exchange programs and consumption rooms. Countries, such as Germany and Switzerland, have created extensive harm reduction programs to include social reintegration skills for the addict; however, even the more conservative country of Finland is beginning to experiment with harm reduction measures.
The increased focus on health issues related to drug use has resulted in a flurry of proposals and programs to increase harm reduction measures across Western Europe. All regions in Belgium are implementing drug hotlines and HIV and hepatitis prevention programs. Needle exchange programs are widely used in France. In 1991, the French Government approved an experiment allowing for the testing of 3, 4-methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA), commonly known as Ecstasy, and other synthetic drugs at “rave parties.” In Luxembourg, substitution treatment, needle exchange, and consumption rooms now have a legal basis since the passage of the law of April 27, 2001.
Since 1958, Norwegian law has allowed treatment as an alternative to prison for those convicted of drug offenses and, in 1991, introduced compulsory treatment for offenders. In 1996, the Norwegian Government went a step further to include compulsory treatment for pregnant drug or alcohol users. Under the new provisions, the unborn child’s safety and health are placed above the abuser’s freedom to choose whether to seek treatment. To reduce the potential harm to the unborn child, a user may be kept in treatment for the duration of the pregnancy without her consent, provided voluntary treatment is not an option.
In 1988, Swedish law changed to allow for compulsory treatment of addicts. Under this law and the Care of Young Persons Special Provisions Act of 1990, the court may order treatment in the case of adult and juvenile offenders. In 2001, Dutch legislation went into effect regulating the Penal Care Facility for Addicts, a compulsory treatment facility for repeat offenders. The facility is based upon research favoring mandatory confinement for treatment, when voluntary treatment has failed.
Greek law also allows for detained compulsory treatment for addicts, but, in practice, the facilities do not exist, so addicts remain in prison. The criminal justice system also seems to be reluctant to order mandatory treatment, so many of Greece’s harm reduction methods remain underutilized.
ALTERNATIVES FOR THOSE IN THE PENAL SYSTEM
Removing addicts from penal institutions is only part of the problem. Dealing with the addict population already inside penal institutions is another problem. Spain, among other European countries, has implemented many of the same treatment and harm reduction measures ¾ inside penal institutions as well as outside ¾ to combat the drug epidemic. Methadone treatment and needle exchange programs are now available inside the Spanish prison system to address the inmate addict population.
Attempting to address drug issues in all strata of society, the Swiss Government is taking steps to combat drug addiction inside the prison system. According to the Swiss Federal Office of Public Health, approximately one quarter of those in prisons or jails inject drugs. Some prisons have established drug-free wings, where inmates are voluntarily segregated from the prison populace and refrain from drug use; other prisons have installed methadone treatment programs; and some are experimenting with medically supervised heroin use. For addicts who do not seek treatment, the prison system offers several harm reduction measures including needle exchange, materials to disinfect needles, and distribution of condoms.
A pilot program, similar to the program in Switzerland, is underway in Belgium’s prison system. Under this program, “drug free” sections or wings are established in prisons to segregate non-users in an attempt to prevent an increase in users in the penal system. Harm reduction measures are also imposed in prison facilities throughout Italy, where inmates with substance abuse problems may apply for treatment in place of their prison sentence. This measure can be used for inmates to start or re-start treatment.
Other countries, such as Portugal, are only looking at the feasibility of implementing programs in the prison system. Currently, there are no harm reduction measures available in the Portuguese prison system. A review of the Spanish prison system, and the harm reduction measures in place there, has forced the Portuguese Government to review the possibility of implementing a needle exchange program within its prison system.
INCREASED PENALTIES FOR TRAFFICKING
Maximum Trafficking Penalties*
Country Penalty
Austria Life
Belgium 20 years
Denmark 10 years
Finland 10 years
France Life
Germany 15 years
Greece Life
Ireland Life
Italy 20 years
Luxembourg Lifelong forced labor
The Netherlands 16 years
Norway 21 years
Portugal 25 years
Spain 23 years
Sweden 18 years
Switzerland 20 years
United Kingdom Life
* The maximum penalities may not be applicable in all cases. In many cases, the maximum penalty applies to extenuating circumstances, such as the death of a user
While focusing on treating and reducing the harm to the addict population, European nations are also focusing effort and funds against the supply of illicit drugs, increasing penalties against those who traffic in illicit substances. In countries, such as Austria, France, Greece, Luxembourg, and the United Kingdom, drug trafficking can result in sentences up to life imprisonment. Europeans, while relaxing penalties against addicts, are focusing their attention on the dismantlement of organized drug trafficking organizations.
Drug trafficking is a serious offense in Western Europe resulting in a wide range of penalties. Leaders of drug trafficking organizations in Austria could be sentenced to 10 to 20 years in prison, but with the implementation of new legislation in 2001, they will now face the possibility of life imprisonment. In Luxembourg, if a trafficker supplies drugs to minors, the law allows for penalties up to lifelong forced labor, and in Norway, the most serious drug offenses are classified as those having “very aggravating circumstances.” This categorization is usually reserved for the leaders of large international trafficking organizations; it contains a penalty ¾ equivalent to murder ¾ of up to 21 years in prison.
Over the past decade, the United Kingdom has continued to increase penalties for drug trafficking. In 1995, the 1994 Drug Trafficking Act was implemented and replaced the Drug Trafficking Offenses Act of 1986. While this Act applies only to England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland have similar laws. 6 Under the Drug Trafficking Act, the court assumes that all current assets, including any owned by the offender during the previous 6 years, are the result of trafficking offenses. Unless the offender can prove otherwise, the court may seize these assets. The penal procedure (summary judgment or indictment) and the drug classification determine the trafficking penalties in the United Kingdom. The 1971 Misuse of Drugs Act divides controlled substances into three classes, A, B, and C. 7 Class A drug trafficking is punishable by up to life imprisonment and, in 2000, the Powers of the Criminal Courts Act established a minimum 7-year sentence for a third conviction of Class A drug trafficking. In 2001, the Criminal Justice and Police Act enabled the courts to strengthen controls on convicted traffickers. Through this act, the court can place a ban on all overseas travel of a convicted trafficker for up to 4 years, in an attempt to reduce his opportunity to re-engage in trafficking activities.
France has also consistently increased penalties for drug trafficking offenses. A 1986 law distinguished between penalties for trafficking and low-level drug dealing or selling, and a 1987 law increased the penalties for those who sell drugs to minors. This law expanded the focus of those prosecutable for drug trafficking offenses to include those who launder drug money. In 1994, the new Penal Code imposed the possibility of life in prison for leaders of organized drug trafficking organizations and up to 30 years for other members of the organization. The French Government continued to expand its attack on drug trafficking with the imposition of a 1996 law that allows the boarding and inspection of vessels on the high seas that are believed to be involved in drug trafficking.
CONCLUSION
In several European countries, such as Germany, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom, drug policy is implemented at the regional level, resulting in a diverse system throughout the country. Many of these alternative policies are relatively new and require more time to evaluate their effectiveness. Nevertheless, the trend throughout Europe continues to be a relaxation of criminal penalties for minor drug offenses and an increase in penalties for trafficking, while improving treatment and harm reduction. According to Dutch authorities, harm reduction measures have resulted in significantly lowering their HIV infection rate and drug-related death rate. Unless time shows that these alternative policies have failed, Europe will continue to look toward decriminalization, harm reduction, treatment, and increased trafficking penalties to combat its current drug problems.
1 In Belgium private drug use is not an offense, unless it occurs within a group. In Ireland and the United Kingdom, drug use becomes an offense only in reference to prepared opium.
2 Current EU member nations are: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.
3 The 1961 U.N. Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs places international control on more than 116 narcotic drugs. The 1971 U.N. Convention on Psychotropic Substances was designed to create a universal control on psychotropic substances, or mood-altering synthetic substances. The 1988 U.N. Convention against Illicit Trafficking in Narcotics and Psychotropic Substances was designed to combat trafficking in illicit substances.
4 Under the concept of the separation of markets, the Dutch Government is attempting to separate the hard drug market from the soft drug market to prevent soft drug users from interacting with hard drugs.
5 Coffeeshop restrictions include a limit of no more than 5 grams sold to a person at any one time, no alcohol or hard drugs, no minors, no advertising, and the shop must not cause a nuisance.
6 Similar regulations are contained in Scotland’s Proceeds of Crime Act 1995, the Criminal Law (Consolidation) Scotland Act 1995, and Northern Ireland’s Proceeds of Crime Order 1996.
7 Under the Misuse of Drugs Act, substances are divided into 3 classes, A, B, and C. Class A substances are those considered to be the most dangerous, including opiates, cocaine, Ecstasy, and LSD. Class B substances are considered to be less dangerous and include cannabis, sedatives, less potent opiates, and synthetic stimulants. Class C substances are the least regulated and include tranquilizers and some less potent stimulants.
This report was prepared by the DEA Intelligence Division, Office of International Intelligence, Europe, Asia, Africa Strategic Unit. The report reflects information prior to February 2002.
dea.gov: Anatomy of a Southeast Asian Heroin Conspiracy August 2002
http://www.dea.gov/pubs/intel/02026/02026.html
Overview
In 2001, 80 percent of Southeast Asian (SEA) opium and heroin was produced in Burma; and Southeast Asia and Southwest Asia accounted for 93 percent of the opium produced in the world. The other 7 percent was produced in South America (Colombia) and Mexico. Although high-purity SEA heroin is still available in the eastern United States, which has the nation’s highest concentration of heroin users, it had dominated that market during the late 1980s and early 1990s. Since then, however, heroin from South America has become the most widely available type in the East. In the West, Mexican heroin has been and continues to be the predominanttype available. Although no significant seizures of SEA heroin have been made in the United States in recent years, numerous SEA heroin seizures have occurred in both Australia and Canada.
Southeast Asian (ethnic Chinese) drug traffickers are known to engage in complex conspiratorial limited partnerships for the purpose of accomplishing specific goals. After the goals are met, the partnerships are dissolved. The objective of these partnerships may be one drug transaction, a series of transactions, or a specific smuggling venture, involving a number of original conspirators as well as a number of shareholders or investors. At other times, limited partnerships are formed for no reason other than the traffickers need each other’s services.
An investor in a Southeast Asian heroin smuggling partnership pays for a specific number of shares or heroin units (each unit is 700 grams). He also pays a transportation fee, a selling fee, and a remittance fee for returning the proceeds back to Southeast Asia. The investor will receive a set amount of the profits for his initial investment. The investor will at least double his money in a short period of time, while taking very little risk.
This brief describes a hypothetical scenario of six individuals who form a limited partnership to complete a SEA heroin smuggling venture to New York.
The Roles of the Partners in the Conspiracy
Conspirator #1 Is the Originator of the Partnership. He knows that money can be made by obtaining pure heroin at the refinery-level price of, for example, between US$3,000 to US$4,000 per 700-gram unit. This same unit of heroin—a unit of heroin with purity of between 85 and 90 percent—would sell in New York at a wholesale price of between US$60,000 and US$65,000. He brings together other individuals with money and connections to help him make a large amount of money in a relatively short period of time. After this smuggling venture is concluded, the first conspirator, most likely, will no longer be involved with the other five associates; the other associates now have direct access to each other and can put together future ventures without him. The first conspirator may take his proceeds from this venture and find others to form another limited partnership. Conspirator #1 is the only partner who has no opportunity to cheat the others in this venture.
Conspirator #2 Has Access to Heroin. The second conspirator knows high-level traffickers (possibly relatives) or associates who have access to heroin at the refinery level. If he does not personally know, or have direct access to a refinery, he may go through an associate who is a sales representative for a particular heroin organization. At this point, Conspirator #2 may gain more profit by skimming an amount off the price of each unit purchased; that is, he purchases the heroin for a certain price and quotes a higher price to the remaining conspirators. By skimming money off the cost of each unit, the second conspirator may acquire additional units of the entire shipment. Conspirator #2 can also negotiate the profit margin the original shareholders will receive. If the second conspirator does not divulge his source of supply (SOS) to the others, his usefulness has not been diminished and he remains a valuable component to any future smuggling conspiracies.
As part of the agreement to furnish heroin to the original group of six, the SOS may want to be included in the smuggling venture. For this inclusion, he may sell the heroin to the group at a lower-than-wholesale price. The SOS may be willing to become a partner with the second conspirator and a shareholder in the entire shipment. This silent partner could become the largest shareholder in the smuggling venture, unbeknownst to the others in the original group.
Conspirator #3 Has Access to Money. The third conspirator knows an individual or individuals with access to large amounts of money. He quietly advertises that he is looking for anyone willing to invest money with him, and tells them that they can double their money in a relatively short period of time (3 to 4 months). The third conspirator, like the second conspirator, accepts silent partners who are unknown to the other five, and he may also negotiate the profit margin of each shareholder. The third conspirator may well be one of the largest share holders of the original six conspirators. The role of Conspirator #3 is important only if the other five conspirators do not have the capital for the necessary business expenses to undertake the smuggling venture.
Frequently the investor in a drug smuggling conspiracy does not know, or want to know, the details of how his money is used; he does not know that his money is invested in an illegal smuggling venture.
Conspirator #4 Has Knowledge of a Proven Smuggling Method. The fourth conspirator knows a proven method of smuggling heroin to New York from Southeast Asia. This method may include commercial air cargo, commercial maritime cargo, merchant seaman, and/or couriers. The most successful method for shipping heroin in amounts over 25 kilograms is by containerized maritime cargo due to the sheer volume of containerized maritime cargo that enters the United States each day. Canada, Mexico, and countries in Asia, especially China, export large amounts of commercial cargo into the United States and Canada on a monthly basis. The vast amount of cargo imported from China alone provides an excellent opportunity to conceal contraband. Conspirator #4 may have set up a system of bogus export companies in Southeast Asia that send commodities to bogus import companies in thetates or Canada. These companies may exist for the sole purpose of smuggling heroin into the United States and exporting money (proceeds) back to Southeast Asia.
If the fourth conspirator does not have a system of companies, he may have an associate (facilitator) who will smuggle the entire shipment into the United States for a set fee. This facilitator will be paid between US$5,000 and US$10,000 per unit of heroin. If, for example, there were 200 units in the shipment, the facilitator could receive as much as US$2 million. However, all expenses involved in establishing front companies, arranging transportation, and any other business expenses incurred in getting the shipment to New York and the broker are borne by the facilitator. The facilitator is paid in cash, or in units of heroin, or in a combination of both cash and heroin, depending on the agreement with Conspirator #4. The facilitator is a silent partner with the fourth conspirator. The fourth conspirator and the facilitator should be the only individuals who know precisely how the heroin will be smuggled, the exact date of departure from Southeast Asia, and the exact date of arrival in New York. The fewer people who know any details of the smuggling method, the greater the chance for success. The fourth conspirator is vital to any smuggling venture.
Conspirator #5 Has Knowledge of a Heroin Distributor.The fifth conspirator knows ethnic Chinese traffickers in the United States who will agree to purchase heroin for resale in New York. These traffickers may or may not be known to the other conspirators. These ethnic Chinese brokers are willing to purchase SEA heroin #4 for between US$60,000 and US$65,000 per unit, for example, delivered in New York. They will then sell the pure heroin #4 for as little as US$70,000 to US$80,000 per unit. This heroin will be sold within 1 to 3 days of delivery, most likely in less than 24 hours. The approved market price per unit in New York is the determining factor for all profits realized by the original six conspirators and their silent partners.
NOTE: The Chinese broker in New York need only know the fourth conspirator if he (the fourth conspirator) has a SOS and the capital to finance a smuggling operation. The broker could realize an even larger profit of more than US$30,000 per unit if he (the broker) also had the method to smuggle the heroin into the United States. If the broker has the capital, as well as the SOS and the smuggling method, he could sell the heroin for as little as US$55,000 to US$60,000 per unit, not the higher price of US$80,000. In essence, the broker’s profit margin could be higher by selling the heroin at a cheaper price.
Conspirator #6 Has Contacts for Remitting the Proceeds to Southeast Asia. The sixth conspirator may be the actual money facilitator or an associate of the money facilitator. He receives the agreed-upon price for the shipment of heroin at the time of delivery by whatever arrangements were made between the conspirators and the broker. Arrangements are made to pay the facilitator within 1 to 3 days in order to remain in the good graces of this valuable member of the partnership. The sixth conspirator has the knowledge and the contacts for remitting money back to Southeast Asia, possibly through the Chinese Underground Banking System (CUBS), commercial banking system, or by smuggling money via courier or containerized cargo.
The amount remitted to Southeast Asia is determined in advance and forwarded to one account or numerous accounts at banks in Southeast Asia. The money may also be deposited into accounts in the United States, and ultimately sent to Bangkok. Many times, banking institutions in Singapore or Hong Kong are utilized to remit proceeds to Bangkok. Jewelry stores, gold shops, and travel agencies are also favored businesses for laundering money. The amount of money deposited will vary based upon the number of shares (units) held by each of the original conspirators. Each conspirator with silent partners must remit funds to those partners’ accounts as originally agreed. For his services, the remitter will receive an agreed upon percentage of the total amount of funds remitted to Southeast Asia.
The Chinese Underground Banking System
The CUBS is utilized by ethnic Chinese criminals to avoid the commercial banking system when drug-related proceeds are being laundered. This relatively unregulated but organized banking system (based upon family and business associations) makes it very difficult to trace a specific monetary transaction. Minimal records are maintained; the system relies instead on the trust that exists in these largely familial organizations. In essence, the underground banker is given money and the name and phone number of the receiver in Southeast Asia. The sender is given a receipt, which has no legal authority, but serves only as a reminder that CUBS has the sender’s money. Once the money is transferred to Southeast Asia, the receipt is presented and the money is retrieved, minus a nominal fee.
Conclusions
The scenario described in this brief depicts one drug smuggling venture involving six conspirators who form a limited partnership with each other and, at the same time, sometimes individually with hidden silent partners. On many occasions, when law enforcement officials intervene by seizing the heroin, the most significant members of the group are not immediately identified. For example, if a shipment of heroin containing 486 units of heroin is seized, an arrested conspirator might state that the investors held the following shares in the shipment:
Looking at the above chart, it appears that Conspirators #2 and #3 are the major traffickers in this heroin smuggling venture. However, these individuals could possibly have less than 10 shares apiece, and their hidden silent partners (known only to them) are in fact the most significant individuals involved in the conspiracy. These silent partners have the most to gain and also the most to lose in this venture.
Smuggling ventures by a SEA limited partnership can easily be accomplished in less than 4 months, from an initial meeting or negotiations in Bangkok, to the delivery of the heroin, to the broker in New York. This same scenario could also be accomplished in the manner described above, except the importation of contraband would be via Canada, with the delivery made in Canada or the heroin could be smuggled across the border into the United States in smaller loads.
If anything goes wrong for whatever reason, and the smuggling venture is not successful, all six original conspirators are in danger of harm, not only from each other, but also from the silent investors, who are usually powerful people—extremely violent and/or very wealthy.
There are opportunities throughout the chain of events for money to be made by cheating the other partners. All is well if the smuggling venture is successful; however, if the heroin is seized at some point, it is not unusual for conspirators to be killed for their suspected involvement in the seizure.
This report was prepared by the DEA Intelligence Division, International Strategic Support Section, Europe/Asia/Africa Unit. This report reflects information received prior to April 2002.
dea.gov: DRUGS AND TERRORISM: A NEW PERSPECTIVE September 2002
http://www.dea.gov/pubs/intel/02039/02039.html
Introduction
Prior to September 11, 2001, drug trafficking and terrorist activities were usually addressed by the law enforcement community as separate issues. In the wake of the terrorist attacks in New York City, Washington, DC, and Pennsylvania, the public now perceives these two criminal activities as intertwined. For the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), investigating the link between drugs and terrorism has taken on renewed importance.
Throughout history, various aspects of the criminal world have been linked together, such as drug traffickers with connections to illegal gambling, prostitution, and arms dealing. Perhaps the most recognizable illustration of this linkage is the expansion of the Italian Mafia in the United States during the early 20th century. The links between various aspects of the criminal world are evident because those who use illicit activities to further or fund their lifestyle, cause, or well-being often interact with others involved in various illicit activities. For example, organizations that launder money for drug traffickers also launder money for arms traffickers, terrorists, etc. The link between drugs and terrorism is not a new phenomenon.
Globalization has made the world a smaller place, changing the face of both legitimate and illegitimate enterprise. Criminals, by exploiting advances in technology, finance, communications, and transportation in pursuit of their illegal endeavors, have become criminal entrepreneurs. Perhaps the most alarming aspect of this “entrepreneurial” style of crime is the intricate manner in which drugs and terrorism may be intermingled. Since September 11th , the public’s image of terrorism is magnified. Not only is the proliferation of illegal drugs preceived as a danger, but also the proceeds from drugs are among the sources for funding for other criminal activities, including terrorism.
Narco-Terrorism
The nexus between drugs and violence is not new; in fact, it is as old as drug abuse itself. The mind-altering strength of drugs has always had the power to create violence, but there is another kind of connection between drugs and violence—the use of drug trafficking to fund the violence perpetrated by terrorist groups.1
Within the context of current world events, narco-terrorism is difficult to define. Historically, DEA has defined narco-terrorism in terms of Pablo Escobar, the classic cocaine trafficker who used terrorist tactics against noncombatants to further his political agenda and to protect his drug trade. Today, however, governments find themselves faced with classic terrorist groups that participate in, or otherwise receive funds from, drug trafficking to further their agenda. In this respect, are narco-terrorists actual drug traffickers who use terrorism against civilians to advance their agenda? Or are narco-terrorists first and foremost terrorists who happen to use drug money to further their cause? Perhaps, the correct answer is that narco-terrorism may apply in both situations.
DEA defines a narco-terrorist organization as “an organized group that is complicit in the activities of drug trafficking in order to further, or fund, premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets with the intention to influence (that is, influence a government or group of people).”
The Pablo Escobar Example
One of the most infamous “narco-terrorists” was Pablo Escobar. As leader of the Medellin cocaine cartel in Colombia, he became one of the wealthiest and most feared men in the world. At the height of his success, Escobar was listed in Forbes Magazine among the world’s wealthiest men. While on the surface, he was nothing more than a street thug who became successful by trafficking in cocaine, Escobar had political aspirations and strove to project the appearance of legitimacy, claiming his wealth was the result of real estate investments. He eventually ran for Congress and campaigned for foreign policy changes that would prohibit the extradition of Colombian citizens to the United States.
Escobar had a penchant for violence. He wreaked havoc on Colombia while attempting to persuade the government to change its extradition policy. Due to the numerous assassinations of politicians, presidential candidates, Supreme Court justices, police officers, and civilians, as well as a number of bombings culminating in the bombing of an Avianca commercial airliner in 1989, Escobar enraged both Colombia and the world. These actions resulted in a massive manhunt and his death in 1993.
Escobar was a drug trafficker who used drug-related violence and terrorism to further his own political, personal, and financial goals. Moreover, he funded his terrorist activities with the money obtained from his drug trafficking endeavors. He was the classic narco-terrorist; his cause was simply himself.
Terrorist organizations use a number of sources to garner funds for their activities, such as petty crimes, kidnap-for-ransom, charities, sympathizers, front companies, and drug trafficking. Most of the known terrorist organizations use several of these methods to collect funding, while preferring particular methods to others. Drug trafficking is among the most profitable sources. According to the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), Americans alone spend an estimated $64 billion on illegal drugs annually.
Drug trafficking has always been a profitable means for criminal organizations to further or fund their activities. The complicity of terrorist groups in drug trafficking varies from group to group and region to region. In the broadest sense, some terrorist groups may be involved in all aspects of the drug trade, from cultivation, production, transportation, and wholesale distribution to money laundering. These groups may also provide security for drug traffickers transporting their product through territory controlled by terrorist organizations or their supporters. Finally, in some cases, terrorist groups or their supporters may require a “tax” to be paid on illicit products, or passage through controlled territory. No matter which form it takes, or the level of involvement in drug trafficking, many terrorist groups are using drug money to fund their activities and perpetrate violence against governments and people around the world.
Afghanistan Under the Taliban
As in the case of formerly Taliban-controlled Afghanistan, narco-terrorism was not limited to terrorist organizations. Afghanistan is a major source country for the cultivation, processing, and trafficking of opiates, producing over 70 percent of the world’s supply of illicit opium in 2000. Because of the country’s decimation by decades of warfare, illicit drugs have become a major source of income. The Taliban’s Afghanistan would be an example of a state primarily funded by illicit opium production. Through this drug income, the Taliban were able to support and protect Osama bin Laden and the al Qaeda organization. As in this case, drugs and terrorism frequently share a common ground of geography, money, and violence.
Narco-Terrorism Versus Drug-Related Violence
When looking at the connection between drugs and violence, it is important to differentiate between drug-related violence and narco-terrorism. By definition, terrorism is premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets. With drug-related violence, we see financially motivated violence perpetrated against those who interfere with or cross the path of a drug trafficking organization. While we see drug-related violence on a daily basis on the streets of major cities, narco-terrorism is, in many cases, less visible. Drug-related violence permeates society at all levels and is visible at every stage of the drug trade, from domestic violence to turf warfare between rival drug trafficking gangs or groups. 2 With narco-terrorism, the acts of terror are clearly evident, but the funding source is often well-disguised.
Evolution of Narco-Terrorism
Any region, in which illegal drugs are cultivated, transported, distributed, or consumed, is susceptible to narco-terrorism. Throughout the world, insurgent groups, revolutionary groups, and ideological or spiritual groups, who use violence to promote their political mission may use drug proceeds to fund acts of terror in furtherance of their ideology. Leadership, cultural, political, and economic change may affect the ideology or mission of a group. Internal divisions and splinter groups may result, each seeking to pursue their goals via different avenues, be they legitimate political activity, perpetuation of violence, or criminal activity, such as drug trafficking.
History has shown that narco-terrorist organizations fall into different categories. One category includes politically motivated groups that use drug proceeds to support their terrorist activities; activities that will confer legitimacy upon them within the state. These groups usually call for a ceasefire with the government or take measures to establish a legal political party whereby their political goals are realized through nonviolent, legal means. Groups that fall into this category are generally viewed with skepticism by the state. An example of a group in this category is the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK).
Another category consists of groups that continually pursue their ideological goals while participating in aspects of the drug trade; for example, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia or FARC).
There are notable examples of narco-terrorist groups in almost every corner of the world. Many insurgent and extremist groups are suspected of drug trafficking involvement, such as Hezbollah and the Islamic Resistance Movement (HAMAS) in the tri-border region of Paraguay, Argentina, and Brazil; Sendero Luminoso (the Shining Path) in Peru; and the Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) in Spain. The level of involvement in drug trafficking by actual narco-terrorist groups and the evolution of the groups and their purposes are often very different.
Kurdistan Worker’s Party
The PKK in Turkey was founded in 1974. Developed as a revolutionary socialist organization, the goal of the PKK is to establish an independent nation of Kurdistan. In 1984, the PKK began to use violence against Turkish security forces, gradually escalating the level of violence to include civilians. In the early 1990s, the group added urban terrorism to their repertoire of violent activities.
The PKK, considered a terrorist organization by most Western Governments, is represented in Kurdish immigrant communities throughout the world and is particularly prevalent in Europe.
The PKK is known to benefit from drug trafficking, but the extent of their involvement is often debated. The Government of Turkey consistently reports that the PKK, as an organization, is responsible for much of the illicit drug processing and trafficking in Turkey. Turkish press reports state that the PKK produces 60 tons of heroin per year and receives an estimated income of US$40 million each year from drug trafficking proceeds. According to historic DEA reporting, the PKK may receive funding from a number of illicit means, including kidnap-for-ransom and drugs.
Reporting from the early 1990s indicated that several large drug trafficking families were supporters or sympathizers of the PKK, and that direct funds from their trafficking organizations were provided to the PKK to buy supplies. However, recent changes in the structure of the organization, due in part to the group’s founder declaring a peace initiative in 1999, have led elements of the PKK to strive for legitimacy and possible involvement in Turkey’s political process.
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
The FARC is one of Colombia’s major insurgent groups. The FARC is a pro-Communist group that wants to replace the current Colombian Government with a leftist, anti-U.S. regime. The FARC emerged in 1964 as the military wing of the Colombian Communist Party, with the goal of overthrowing the government and the ruling class of Colombia. The FARC is the largest, best-trained and equipped, and most effective insurgent group in Colombia. Over the past two decades, the FARC has controlled large areas of Colombia’s eastern lowlands and rain forest, which are the primary coca cultivation and cocaine processing regions in the country.
The FARC is an economically self-sufficient organization, supporting its mission through kidnappings, extortion, bank robberies, and the drug trade. Some FARC fronts are promoting coca cultivation, managing cocaine processing, selling drugs for cash, and negotiating arms deals with international drug trafficking organizations to support their broad based weapons procurement program.
Recent DEA reporting indicates that some FARC units in southern Colombia are directly involved in drug trafficking activities, including controlling local cocaine base markets and selling cocaine to international smuggling organizations. At least one FARC front—the 16th Front—has served as a cocaine source of supply for one international drug trafficking organization.
In March 2002, the United States announced its indictment of several FARC members. This case marks the first time that members of a known terrorist organization have been indicted in the United States for their drug trafficking activities, including selling cocaine in exchange for currency, weapons, and equipment.
Despite the differences between the PKK and the FARC, both were initially motivated to take action in furtherance of their ideological goals—the desire for independent homelands or political thought. The drug trade and terrorist activities were the means through which these groups furthered their missions. Changes in leadership, politics, and economics affected the varying outcomes; that is, movement toward political legitimacy for the PKK, and pursuit of an ideological mission through engagement in the drug trade by the FARC.
International Efforts Against Narco-Terrorism
There are three crucial elements to attacking narco-terrorism: law enforcement efforts, intelligence gathering, and international cooperation. Many terrorist groups rarely act within the borders of one state, but tend to have a more global view in regard to their activities and fundraising. This means that combating narco-terrorism requires a global network of law enforcement and intelligence officials tackling this issue wherever it appears. It is the cooperation at all levels of law enforcement and intelligence organizations that will prevent atrocities such as those financed by drug money in South America, Southwest Asia, and the rest of the world.
Several international measures have been taken over the years to combat terrorism. According to the U.S. Department of State, there are 12 major multilateral conventions and protocols on combating terrorism.3 International efforts to combat narco-terrorism are focusing on asset seizure and control of all funding sources used by terrorist organizations. In 1999, the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism was adopted. It required signatories “to take steps to prevent and counteract the financing of terrorists, whether directly or indirectly, through groups claiming to have charitable, social or cultural goals or which also engage in such illicit activities as drug trafficking or gun running.” Under this convention, signatories also were required to hold those who finance terrorism to be criminally, civilly, or administratively responsible for their acts.
In response to the incidents of September 11, 2001, the international community is expanding their efforts to control and extinguish financing that supports terrorism. On September 28, 2001, the United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted an anti-terrorism resolution that called for the suppression of terrorist group financing, and improved international cooperation against terrorists. The resolution, identified as Resolution 1373 (2001), requires all states to prevent and abolish the financing of terrorism, and to criminalize the willful collection and distribution of funds for such acts. Furthermore, the resolution created a committee to monitor the implementation of the guidelines set forth in this resolution. The Security Council noted, “the close connection between international terrorism and transnational organized crime, illicit drugs, money-laundering, illegal arms-trafficking, and illegal movement of nuclear, chemical, biological and other potentially deadly materials, emphasizes the need to enhance coordination of efforts on national, sub-regional, regional and international levels to strengthen a global response to this serious challenge and threat to international security.”
Conclusion
The events of September 11th brought new focus to an old problem, narco-terrorism. These events have forever changed the world and demonstrate the vulnerability to acts of terrorism of even the most powerful nation. In attempting to combat this threat, the link between drugs and terrorism came to the fore. Whether it is a state, such as formerly Taliban-controlled Afghanistan, or a narco-terrorist organization, such as the FARC, the nexus between drugs and terrorism is evident.
Nations throughout the world are aligning to combat this scourge on international society. The War on Terror and the War on Drugs are linked, with agencies throughout the United States and internationally working together as a force-multiplier in an effort to dismantle narco-terrorist organizations. Efforts to stop the funding of these groups have focused on drugs and the drug money used to perpetuate violence throughout the world. International cooperative efforts between law enforcement authorities and intelligence organizations is crucial to eliminating terrorist funding, reducing the drug flow, and preventing another September 11th.
1 According to Chapter 22 of the U.S. Code (USC), terrorism is the premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents. International terrorism involves citizens, or territory, of more than one country. A terrorist group is any group practicing, or that has significant sub-groups that practice, international terrorism.
2 According to the DEA Briefing Book, “one-quarter to one-half of all incidents of domestic violence are drug related”.
3 According to the U.S. Department of State, the United States is party to all 12 conventions and protocols.
This report was prepared by the DEA Intelligence Division, International Strategic Support Section, Europe/Asia/Africa Unit. This report reflects information received prior to June 2002.
dea.gov: TRIPPIN’ ON TRYPTAMINES The Emergence of Foxy and AMT as Drugs of Abuse
October 2002
http://www.dea.gov/pubs/intel/02052/02052.html
Overvue:
The synthetic substances, 5-MeO-DIPT, known by the street name “Foxy” or “Foxy Methoxy,” and alpha-methyltryptamine (AMT), are being reported as new drugs of abuse in limited areas of the United States. These substances, which produce hallucinogenic effects, are part of a class of chemical compounds known as tryptamines. Since 2001, law enforcement authorities in Arizona, Delaware, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, New Jersey, Oregon, Virginia, Washington, and the District of Columbia have seized many samples of AMT and Foxy. Although Foxy and AMT are relatively new drugs of abuse, the abuse of tryptamines is not a new phenomenon in the United States. In fact, the appearance of Foxy and AMT are indicative of a trend where many non-controlled synthetic substances are sold to capitalize on the current popularity of club drugs, especially MDMA. Foxy and AMT are not currently listed as controlled substances in the Controlled Substances Act of 1970 (CSA); however, the DEA has determined that individuals and organizations trafficking these substances with the intent of human consumption can be prosecuted under the federal drug-analog statute.
Hallucinogenic Tryptamines
psilocybin (O-phosphoryl-4-hydroxy-N, N-ethyltryptamine)
psilocyn (4-hydroxy-N, N-dimethyltryptamine)
bufotenine (5-hydroxy-N, N-dimethyltryptamine)
alpha-ethltryptamine (AET)
diethyltryptamine (DET)
dimethyltryptamine (DMT)
alpha-methyltryptamine (AMT)
5-methoxy-N, N-dimethyltryptamine (5-MeO-DMT)
5-methoxy-N, N-diisopropyltryptamine (5-MeO-DIPT)-Foxy
Background
Many analogs of a class of tryptamines are hallucinogenic substances that exist naturally in some plants, fungi, and animals, but also can be produced synthetically. These hallucinogens have been placed in Schedule I of the CSA. These substances include psilocybin, psilocyn, bufotenine, alpha-ethyltryptamine, diethyltryptamine, and dimethyltryptamine. There are numerous types of tryptamines available, including AMT and Foxy, that are not listed under the CSA. In addition to recent seizures of AMT and Foxy, law enforcement authorities have seized other non-controlled tryptamines, such as 5-MeO-DMT, over the past 2 years.
Abuse and Availability
There have been limited reports of abuse of AMT and Foxy, sometimes at raves and clubs, in Arizona, California, Florida, and New York. According to the Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE), reports of teens and young adults using these substances are emerging. The FDLE reports that AMT is now a popular designer drug in South Florida, although no seizures have occurred. In the August 2001 edition of DEA Microgram, the DEA Southwest Laboratory in San Diego reported that Foxy has been seen at clubs in Los Angeles and New York City.
Many tryptamines can be obtained from chemical companies in the United States and overseas, usually via the Internet. On May 2, 2001, two individuals attempted to enter Canada at the Blaine, Washington, Peace Arch port of entry with approximately 1 pound of 5-MeO-DMT powder in their vehicle. The chemical was purchased via the Internet from a chemical company in Naperville, Illinois. AMT, 5-MeO-DIPT, and other non-controlled tryptamine compounds are also available from companies and individuals advertising via the Internet. Prices for these substances are relatively cheap with 500 milligrams (mg) of AMT or 5-MeO-DIPT powder selling for between $80 and $145.
In March 2002, the Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) arrested three men in Norfolk, Virginia, for conspiracy to manufacture and distribute Foxy and AMT. The men were in possession of over 200 grams of 98-percent pure Foxy with 22 pounds of cutting agents. It was estimated that the group would have been able to produce between 9,000 and 14,000 tablets. This estimate was based on the purity of 1,000 tablets previously seized from this group. In addition to the seizures of Foxy, authorities also seized 535 AMT tablets.
On December 29, 2001, the DEA Washington Field Division seized a polydrug laboratory containing chemicals associated with the production of AMT from an apartment in Northwest Washington, DC. A search of the apartment also revealed numerous chemicals, including AMT, and literature on how to manufacture it. The subject, a 55-year-old free-lance journalist, was charged with attempted unlawful manufacture of a Schedule I controlled substance analog. Seized evidence revealed that the subject purchased chemicals through the mail.
Effects
Users of tryptamines typically experience a multitude of effects. These effects include hallucinations, euphoria, dilated pupils, empathy, visual and auditory disturbances/distortions, “feelings of love,” and emotional distress. Some users may experience nausea, vomiting, and diarrhea. Tryptamines, like Foxy and AMT, are very dose dependent, which means that the doubling of a moderate dose could result in effects similar to LSD. The duration of effects from 20 mg of AMT usually last between 12 and 24 hours, while the effects from 6 to 10 mg of Foxy reportedly last from 3 to 6 hours.
Seizures
Foxy is found in tablet and capsule form. The capsules usually contain a powder that is blue, green, tan, orange, gray, pink, or gray. Tablets containing Foxy, analyzed by a private laboratory, have been purple in color and embossed with a spider or alien head logo. Foxy tablets analyzed by DEA laboratories have been red and purple. AMT is also found in tablet and capsule form and contains either an orange or off-white powder. Since 2001, federal, state, and local laboratories have analyzed Foxy submissions seized in Arizona, Delaware, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, New Jersey, Oregon, and Washington. Furthermore, tablets containing Foxy, analyzed by a private laboratory, were submitted from sources in Portland, Oregon, and Sacramento and Oakland, California.
In April 2002, a raid at an apartment in Newark, Delaware, resulted in the seizure of 32 tablets of Foxy and the arrest of a 21-year-old man. The tablets were hidden in the freezer and were described as being either red or purple. This was the first seizure of Foxy in Delaware. A few weeks after this incident, the Delaware State Police seized 25 Foxy tablets and arrested a 15-year-old girl at an apartment in Rehoboth Beach. Also seized at the apartment were 7 MDMA tablets, one-half gram of ketamine, 49 grams of marijuana, and dextroamphetamine.
In April 2000, the New York Drug Enforcement Task Force targeted an individual suspected of producing a DMT analog, 5-methoxydimethyltryptamine, at his residence in Maryland. The analog was sold in either liquid or powder (capsule) form for between $80 and $85 per gram.
Conclusion
Although Foxy and AMT are relatively new drugs of abuse, their appearance is indicative of a trend whereby many non-controlled substances are sold to capitalize on the current popularity of club drugs such as MDMA. Since 1996, formerly non-controlled substances, such as 1-benzylpiperazine (BZP), 1-[3-trifluoromethylphenyl]-piperazine (TFMPP), and 2,5-dimethoxy-4-N-propylthiophenethylamine (2C-T-7), all of which produce effects similar to MDMA, have been distributed and abused throughout the United States.1 Deaths associated with the abuse of BZP and TFMPP have not been reported; however, since 2000, there have been at least three 2C-T-7-related deaths in Norman, Oklahoma; Memphis, Tennessee; and Seattle, Washington. In response, the DEA, as of September 20, 2002, has temporarily placed BZP, TFMPP, and 2C-T-7 on Schedule I of the CSA.
Many traffickers believe that by manufacturing and/or distributing non-controlled substances, they are exempt from drug and chemical control laws. Consequently, in the future, more of these substances may appear among club drug users throughout the country. However, the DEA has determined that individuals and organizations currently trafficking these substances with the intent of human consumption can still be prosecuted under the existing federal drug-analog statute.
1 For additional information on BZP and TFMPP, see DEA Intelligence Brief, BZP and TFMPP: Chemicals Used To Mimic MDMA’s Effects, November 2001. This report is available under Intelligence Reports on the DEA website at www.dea.gov.
This report was prepared by the DEA Intelligence Division, Office of Domestic Strategic Unit. This report reflects information received prior to September 2002.
dea.gov: THE EVOLUTION OF THE DRUG THREAT: THE 1980’S THROUGH 2002 http://www.dea.gov/pubs/intel/02046/02046.html
The illicit drug trade in the United States is affected by numerous factors, including consumer demand, sources of supply, the organizational strengths and adaptability of criminal groups, and the ability of law enforcement and interdiction assets to disrupt or dismantle drug distribution systems. Identifying the most significant drug threats to the United States requires the fusion of current intelligence with a historical perspective to fully assess the dynamics of the illicit drug trade.
This report identifies the most significant changes in the drug threat over the past twenty years, as identified in past issues of the National Narcotics Intelligence Consumers Committee Report (NNICC). The first part of the report serves as a historical foundation for a current drug threat assessment, and offers a perspective on the dynamics that will affect the drug threats facing the United States in the near future. The second part of the report provides a summary of the most significant factors shaping the distribution of illicit drugs.
The first-level evaluation of the current drug threat assessment was derived from field division assessments, open-source reports, drug abuse indicators, and reports from the El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC) and Joint Interagency Task Force East. The second-level evaluation involved a survey of Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) field managers who precisely identified the most significant drug problems in the field divisions, and the factors that affected those priorities, such as levels of violence associated with the trade, abuse indicators, and the volume of drugs moved. Rather than a comprehensive study of the drug trade, this report provides a snapshot of a highly dynamic criminal environment, and the challenges facing U.S. intelligence and enforcement agencies.
The 1980's: A Radical Transformation of the Consumer Market
The single most important transformation of the U.S. illicit drug market in the 1980s was the rampant growth of cocaine trafficking and abuse. Fed by the perception that the drug was a benign stimulant, cocaine trafficking and abuse radically transformed the illicit drug environment. The ready supply of cocaine virtually replaced the demand for the synthetic drug, phencyclidine, or PCP. The introduction of crack cocaine, an easily obtained form of smokeable cocaine, increased demand and fueled violent gang wars between rival suppliers.
Although Bolivia and Peru were the largest coca and cocaine base producers, Colombian traffickers dominated the final production of cocaine hydrochloride. Colombian sources supplied at least 50 percent of the cocaine smuggled to the United States, with Colombian distribution organizations firmly entrenched in South Florida. The Caribbean remained the primary cocaine smuggling corridor, utilizing maritime and air smuggling routes through The Bahamas.
Southwest Asia was the primary source of heroin to the United States, supplying approximately 60 percent of the U.S. heroin market. Pakistan was the largest and most accessible heroin producer in the region. Opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan was severely disrupted as a result of the fighting between Soviet forces and the Mujahedeen; however, because interdiction efforts in the country were primarily directed at controlling the flow of weapons to Afghan guerillas, heroin exports continued, albeit at a reduced level. Mexican heroin continued to supply the western United States, although enforcement actions by the Mexican Government severely disrupted heroin sources.
Colombia was the primary source of foreign-produced marijuana in the United States, supplying approximately 80 percent of the marijuana smuggled into the United States. Mexico and Jamaica supplied the balance of the foreign-produced marijuana, with domestic production supplying less than 10 percent of the market. Most of the marijuana from Colombia was smuggled through the Caribbean corridor, using maritime conveyances.
The production and trafficking of synthetic drugs was relatively limited in the 1980s. Domestic clandestine laboratories supplied nearly all of the available synthetic drugs in the United States, with the exception of diverted pharmaceuticals. In 1980, Drug Abuse Warning Network (DAWN) Emergency Room data identified diazepam (Valium) as the most frequently cited cause for admission. Although the majority of clandestine laboratories in the United States produced methamphetamine, PCP was the only clandestinely produced drug that was identified as a significant problem in DAWN Emergency Room data. Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs (OMGs), such as the Hells Angels, the Bandidos, the Outlaws, and the Pagans, dominated the production and trafficking of methamphetamine, as well as marijuana distribution. Lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD) made a comeback in the early 1980s; however, its abuse was limited primarily to California and larger urban areas in the East and Midwest.
The 1980s demonstrated the increasing power of drug trafficking organizations to disrupt civil governance of the cocaine-producing regions. The July 1980 coup in Bolivia, led by Garcia Meza and reportedly backed by the “Santa Cruz Cocaine Mafia,” severely undermined drug control efforts in the country. In 1981, the Colombian paramilitary group M-19 kidnapped Martha Nieves Ochoa, the sister of Medellín cartel head Jorge Luis Ochoa. The cartel responded by organizing a death squad that methodically killed guerillas and their families until Nieves was released. The cartel further directed its squads against journalists and political leaders in an effort to force the repeal of Colombia’s extradition treaty with the United States. In one of the more violent acts of the decade, 95 people, including 12 members of the Colombian Supreme Court, were killed when 42 members of M-19 seized the Palace of Justice in Bogota in 1985. In a common cause with the cartel, M-19 demanded the repeal of the extradition treaty.
The 1980s witnessed substantial changes in the law enforcement and security resources directed against drug trafficking. The resources of the Central Intelligence Agency were brought into the counternarcotics mission by Executive Order in 1982. In 1986, National Security Decision Directive 221 articulated the policy that, “The international drug trade threatens the security of the United States by potentially destabilizing democratic allies.” United States military assets were formally directed to provide support to the counternarcotic mission under the National Defense Authorization Act of 1989.
The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 authorized the Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) to designate regions of the United States as “high intensity drug trafficking areas” (HIDTAs). The diversity of the drug trafficking threat was reflected in the geographic diversity of the initial five HIDTAs: the cities of New York, Los Angeles, Miami, and Houston, as well as the Southwest border (all counties along the United States–Mexico border from San Diego to Brownsville, Texas.
1990's: Supply Shifts
During the 1990s, Mexico emerged as the most significant transshipment corridor for illicit drugs smuggled into the United States. Although cocaine continued to move through the Caribbean corridor, increased radar coverage from Aerostats along the Southeast coast deterred the use of aircraft flights directly to the United States. Traffickers thwarted the increased radar surveillance by combining drug airdrops with high-speed boats operating beyond the range of the new systems. The increased law enforcement and military presence in the Caribbean forced traffickers to explore more elaborate smuggling avenues, including the purchase of Soviet cargo aircraft; a surplus Soviet diesel submarine; and experimentation with semi-submersible vehicles.
Colombian traffickers increasingly relied upon Mexican and Dominican trafficking organizations to smuggle cocaine shipments to the United States. By the mid-1990s, Colombian organizations started paying Mexican transportation organizations with portions of the smuggled cocaine load, with up to half of the load provided to the transporters. This arrangement reduced the need for large financial transactions, and firmly established Mexico-based drug trafficking organizations as significant illicit drug wholesalers in the United States. The Central American corridor was increasingly used for air and overland cocaine shipments to Mexico. Aircraft were used to move cocaine from Colombia to Northern Mexico. Although smaller, twin-engine aircraft were most often used to smuggle cocaine, larger surplus jet aircraft were also used to transport multiton quantities of cocaine.
Drug-related violence continued to undermine government control in South America. Over 150 groups loosely organized in cartels operating out of Medellín and Bogota, dominated the cocaine trade. Colombian insurgent groups such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the Army of National Liberation (ELN) also benefited from the cocaine trade by taxing narcotics profits; protecting crops, laboratories, and storage facilities; and occasionally extracting payment in weapons. Insurgent groups also carried out kidnappings and terrorism in support of traffickers’ aims.
By 1988, Southeast Asian (SEA) heroin dominated the East Coast heroin market, while Mexican heroin was supplied to users in the Western United States. New York was the primary importation and distribution center for SEA heroin, with San Francisco, Seattle, Los Angeles, and Washington also identified as points of entry. SEA heroin continued to dominate the market throughout the early 1990s, all but replacing Southwest Asian heroin. In 1994, however, a joint Royal Thai Government/DEA endeavor—Operation TIGER TRAP—led to the incarceration in Thailand and extradition to the United States of more than a dozen high-level violators who had played key roles in moving SEA heroin to the United States. These successful actions disrupted long-standing SEA heroin trafficking modus operandi, not only in Asia, but also in the United States.
Expanded opium poppy cultivation and heroin production in Colombia in the early 1990s allowed Colombian traffickers to fill the void created by the decreased flow of SEA heroin to east coast markets. During the mid-to-late 1990s, Colombian heroin traffickers easily undermined the SEA heroin market with a readily available supply of high-quality, low-priced white heroin. They also undercut their competitors’ price and used established, effective drug distribution networks to facilitate supply. Since Colombian heroin, often sold on the street with a purity of 90 percent, can be snorted like cocaine, it avoided the stigma of needle usage; thus, Colombian traffickers had a built-in marketing advantage over traffickers from Southeast or Southwest Asia. Throughout the 1990s, Mexico-supplied heroin continued to dominate user preferences in the Western United States.
By 1990, Mexico was the largest supplier of marijuana to the United States. According to the National Household Survey, the number of then current marijuana users (any use within the past 30 days) decreased from 22.5 million in 1979 to 10.2 million in 1990. Despite decreased demand, the profit margin for marijuana not only fueled Mexican trafficking organizations, but led to an increase in domestic marijuana cultivation—particularly indoor-grow operations producing high-potency marijuana.
Synthetic drugs, especially methamphetamine, continued to be primarily produced domestically. In the early 1990s, high-purity “ice” methamphetamine (80- to 90-percent pure methamphetamine with a crystalline appearance) appeared on the West Coast. In addition to domestic production, primarily in California, ice was supplied from laboratories in South Korea and the Philippines. OMGs dominated the production of methamphetamine through the early 1990s. In the mid-1990s, however, Mexican drug trafficking organizations started large-scale production and trafficking of methamphetamine. The introduction of high-quality, low-priced methamphetamine undercut the monopoly once held by outlaw bikers. Some OMGs, including the Hells Angels, reportedly relied upon Mexico-based sources of supply for their methamphetamine, preferring to avoid the risks associated with the manufacture of the drug. A sharp decrease in the purity of Mexican methamphetamine at the end of the 1990s reportedly pushed OMGs back into drug production.
LSD and PCP remained available throughout the 1990s. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA) also called Ecstasy, gained popularity among young, middle-class college students in limited areas of the United States. Ecstasy use and availability greatly escalated in 1997 when clandestine laboratories, operating in Europe, began exporting significant quantities of MDMA tablets to distributors in the United States.
Drug Threat Assessment 2002
Regional Abuse Patterns
Most DEA field divisions continue to identify cocaine as the primary illicit drug of concern, based upon abuse indicators, the violence associated with the trade, and/or the volume of trafficking through their areas of responsibilities. Heroin remains readily available in major metropolitan areas. despite the availability of high-purity white heroin, which can be snorted, abuse appears to have stabilized in recent years. Methamphetamine trafficking and abuse dominate the West Coast and much of the Rocky Mountain and Midwest regions of the country. Polydrug trafficking along the Southwest border continues to tax allocated resources, and cocaine remains the drug of choice along the Atlantic seaboard.
Smuggling Patterns
The Southwest border remains the most vulnerable region of the United States for border security, followed by the Gulf Coast. Interagency assessments report over 60 percent of the cocaine entering the United States moves across the Southwest border. The U.S. Customs Service identified an increase in the movement of drugs between ports of entry over the last several years, as well as a trend toward smaller drug loads. EPIC reports that traffickers have not changed smuggling methods or routes following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. Although the transportation centers are likely to be located near the border, the command and control centers could operate from nearly any location in the United States. Mobile communications and internet encryption allow Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTOs) to operate from remote locations.
Availability
The 9-percent decline in cocaine purity over the past 4 years illustrates a vulnerability of crop-based illicit drugs. One possible explanation for the increased use of cutting agents by Colombian DTOs is the expansion of the non-U.S. drug market beyond the traffickers’ means to maintain world supplies. Cocaine and heroin production are limited not only by the same factors that affect any agricultural product, but also by the traffickers’ abilities to either control production regions or to thwart government crop eradication efforts. Supplies of synthetic drugs, such as methamphetamine, MDMA or Ecstasy, PCP, and LSD are not limited by these same factors. The traffickers’ capability to quickly move production sites of synthetic drugs presents a significant challenge to law enforcement authorities.
Cocaine
Colombian drug trafficking organizations increasingly rely upon the eastern Pacific Ocean as a trafficking route to move cocaine to the United States. Law enforcement and intelligence community sources estimate that 72 percent of the cocaine shipped to the United States moves through the Central America-Mexico corridor, primarily by maritime conveyance. Fishing vessels and go-fast boats are used to move multiton cocaine loads to Mexico’s west coast and Yucatan Peninsula. The loads are subsequently broken down into smaller quantities for movement across the Southwest border. Despite the shift of smuggling operations to the eastern Pacific, the Caribbean corridor remains a crucial smuggling avenue for Colombian cocaine traffickers. Puerto Rico, the Dominican Republic, and Haiti are the predominant transshipment points for Colombian cocaine transiting the Caribbean.
Traffickers operating from Colombia continue to control wholesale level cocaine distribution throughout the heavily populated northeastern United States and along the eastern seaboard in cities such as Boston, Miami, Newark, New York City, and Philadelphia. There are indications that other drug trafficking organizations, especially Mexican and Dominican groups, are playing a larger role in the distribution of cocaine in collaboration with Colombian organizations. Mexican drug trafficking organizations are increasingly responsible for the transportation of cocaine from the Southwest border to the New York market. Mexico-based trafficking groups in cities such as Chicago, Dallas, Denver, Houston, Los Angeles, Phoenix, San Diego, San Francisco, and Seattle now control the distribution of multiton quantities of cocaine.
Heroin
The Office of National Drug Control Policy’s publication, Pulse Check: Mid-Year 2000, reports new heroin users continue to be attracted to high-purity Colombian heroin because it can be snorted rather than injected. Reports of Mexico-produced white heroin continue to surface. Although heroin abuse indicators are stable, the increasing purity of Mexican heroin, as well as ready supplies of high-purity white heroin, may result in geographic “pockets” of overdoses as seen in Chimayo and Espanola, New Mexico, in the late 1990s. The high rate of overdose in these locations served as the initial impetus for Operation TAR PIT, which identified the operations of a Mexico-based heroin distribution organization that operated throughout the western United States and in sections of the Midwest.
Marijuana
Marijuana trafficking is prevalent across the nation, with both domestic and foreign sources of supply. Lax public attitudes regarding marijuana’s effects, the high seizure threshold required for federal prosecution, and various state legalization efforts undermine public support of law enforcement endeavors. The Houston Field Division reports that some Mexican DTOs use marijuana as a “cash crop”; the proceeds are used to cover the expenses associated with the trafficking of other drugs. Multiton seizures of marijuana have had a negligible effect on street prices and availability. Moreover, the increased availability of high-quality sinsemilla and a new generation of marijuana users are threats that cannot be ignored.
Methamphetamine
Methamphetamine, from either foreign or domestic sources, is available in nearly every DEA field division. Large-scale methamphetamine laboratories, located primarily in the western United States, and to a lesser extent in Mexico, provide the majority of the drug. However, even the smaller clandestine laboratories pose a significant public health and safety threat. The majority of the small toxic laboratories are not connected to large-scale drug trafficking organizations. “Super labs” (laboratories capable of producing in excess of 10 pounds of methamphetamine in one 24-hour production cycle), however, are generally funded and supplied by larger DTOs. An increase in the number of super labs in the Midwest suggests an increased demand for methamphetamine. The increased availability of methamphetamine in urban environments, especially the indications that the drug is occasionally sold in conjunction with, or in place of, club drugs such as MDMA, may usher in a new generation and class of drug abuser. The appearance of Southeast Asian methamphetamine tablets in the United States further threatens to introduce the drug as a substitute for, or supplement to, MDMA, although intelligence reporting on this issue suggests the availability of methamphetamine tablets is isolated. Since methamphetamine laboratories can operate in nearly any remote location, either foreign or domestic, identifying production sources poses a substantial challenge for law enforcement assets at the local, state, and federal levels. One response to the growing problem of clandestine laboratories has been the creation of the National Clandestine Laboratory Database maintained by EPIC. Prior to the creation of this database, there was no reliable system capable of obtaining clandestine laboratory seizure information from state or local investigations. EPIC’s database provides a valuable instrument for both strategic assessments and a clearinghouse for investigative intelligence.
MDMA
Both field division and epidemiology reports identify club drugs, most notably MDMA, as a significant threat. The increase in domestic MDMA production, although still limited by stringent precursor chemical controls, further illustrates the profitability of this drug. Although the majority of MDMA production takes place in the Netherlands, and to a lesser extent in Belgium, the transferability of the laboratories adds a dynamic to the drug trade that cannot be addressed at this time. Laboratories can be relocated to any nation in the European Union, Eastern Europe, or the former Soviet Union, as long as precursor chemicals can be obtained and transported.
Post-September 11, 2001 Assessment
The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States introduced a new set of variables to drug threat assessments: the reallocation of law enforcement, intelligence, and military assets from counternarcotics to counterterrorism reduces available enforcement assets, yet brings a concurrent strengthening of national borders. If history serves as a guide, DTOs will continue to identify and exploit vulnerabilities in order to maintain a steady supply of drugs to the illicit drug market in the United States.
This report was prepared by the DEA Intelligence Division, Office of Domestic Intelligence, Domestic Strategic Unit. This report reflects information received prior to May 2002.
dea.gov: CHINA – COUNTRY BRIEF http://www.dea.gov/pubs/intel/03081/03081.html
February 2004
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)
Office Responsible: Beijing Country Office
Type of Government: Communist State
Official Name: People's Republic of China
Capital: Beijing
Population: 1,286,975,468 (July 2003 Estimate)
STATUS IN INTERNATIONAL DRUG TRAFFICKING
Several factors influence the current status of China in international drug trafficking. These factors include history, location, size, population, and current economic conditions. China has one-fifth of the world’s population and a large and expanding economy. Opium has played an important role in Chinese history since before the Opium Wars in the mid-1800s. China’s large landmass, close proximity to the Golden Triangle, and numerous coastal cities with large and modern port facilities make it an attractive transit center to drug traffickers. China’s status in drug trafficking has changed significantly since the 1980s, when the country for the first time opened its borders to trade and tourism after 40 years of relative isolation. As trade with Southeast Asian countries and the West increased, so did the flow of illicit drugs and precursor chemicals from, into, and through China.
Significant Effects of Drug Trafficking in China
China is a transit area for Southeast Asian heroin bound for international drug markets.
China is a key source of crystal methamphetamine that is used by many Southeast Asian and Pacific Rim nations.
China is developing a significant 3, 4 methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA) production, trafficking, and consumption problem.
China is also a major source of precursor chemicals that are necessary for the production of cocaine, heroin, crystal methamphetamine, and MDMA.
China is being forced to develop a complex counterdrug strategy that includes prevention, education, eradication, interdiction, and rehabilitation.
CULTIVATION AND PROCESSING
Cannabis
Cannabis grows naturally throughout southwestern China. Cannabis is licitly cultivated in some areas of China for use in commercial rope manufacturing. Most of the illicit cultivation of cannabis in China appears in Xinjiang and Yunnan Provinces, and is primarily cultivated for domestic use. In 2002, approximately 1.3 metric tons of marijuana were seized in China.
Ephedra
The Chinese Government owns and operates ephedra farms, where ephedra grass (ephedra sinica) is cultivated under strict government control. The active alkaloids, pseudoephedrine and ephedrine, are chemically extracted from the plant material and processed for pharmaceutical purposes. These chemicals are then sold domestically, and for export. China and India are the major producers of these chemicals extracted from the ephedra plant. In addition to government-controlled farms, the ephedra plant grows wild in many parts of the northern areas of China.
Opium
Illicit cultivation of the opium poppy is negligible. The illicitly cultivated opium poppy is grown in provinces such as Yunnan, Ningxia, Inner Mongolia, and the remote regions of the northwest frontier. Opium produced in these areas is not converted into heroin, but is consumed locally by the ethnic minority groups in these isolated areas. Chinese officials report that in the last several years no heroin laboratories have been seized in China.
Licit cultivation of the opium poppy occurs on farms controlled by the Ministry of Agriculture and the National Drug Administration Bureau of the State Council. According to United Nations (U.N.) International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) data, China produces approximately 14 metric tons of licit opium per year for use in the domestic pharmaceutical industry. China reports that none of this opium is exported.
Synthetic Drugs
Manufacture of crystal methamphetamine (ice, shabu, bingdu) is facilitated by the availability of precursor chemicals, such as pseudoephedrine and ephedrine. The unrestricted availability of these chemicals in the country facilitates the production of large quantities of crystal methamphetamine. Seizure information indicates that methamphetamine laboratories are located in provinces along the eastern and southeastern coastal areas. Many of the traffickers for the clandestine crystal methamphetamine laboratories are from organized crime groups based in Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Japan.
Because of its increasing popularity with young partygoers in Beijing, Shanghai, Nanjing, Guangzhou, and Shenzhen, Chinese law enforcement officials report significant increases in the domestic production of MDMA (Ecstasy). Most MDMA production in China is for domestic consumption, but MDMA tablets also are imported from the Netherlands into China to meet the demand.
Some laboratory operators in China mix MDMA powder, imported from Europe, with substances, such as caffeine, heroin, and ketamine, while making the Ecstasy tablets. Given the availability of the precursor chemical needed, open source reporting indicates that MDMA tablets in China cost only US$.06 to produce, while the tablets sell for as much as US$36 in the city of Shanghai.
Trafficing
Trafficking Group
Many of the individuals involved in the international trafficking of Southeast Asian heroin are ethnic Kokang, Yunnanese, Fujianese, Cantonese, or members of other ethnic Chinese minority groups that reside outside of China. These groups reside, and are actively involved in drug trafficking in countries, such as Burma, Cambodia, Canada, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Thailand, and the United States.
Reporting on the activities of drug trafficking organizations in China is sparse. However, Chinese officials report that drug traffickers are dividing their large shipments into smaller ones in order to minimize losses in case of seizure. Chinese officials also report that drug traffickers are increasingly using women, children, and poor, uneducated farmers to body-carry drugs from the Golden Triangle area to Guandong Province and other provinces in China.
In China, many individuals and criminal organizations involved in drug trafficking are increasingly arming themselves with automatic weapons and grenades to protect their drug shipments from theft by rival organizations. Many firefights occur along the Burma–China border, where larger drug shipments are more prevalent. Traffickers also arm themselves to avoid being captured by the police, and some smugglers are better armed than the local police forces. Furthermore, many traffickers believe they have a better chance of surviving a firefight than the outcome of any legal proceedings. In China, sentencing for drug trafficking could include capital punishment. For example, the seizure of 50 grams or more of heroin or crystal methamphetamine could result in the use of the death penalty by the Government.
Heroin
China shares a 2000-kilometer border with Burma, as well as smaller but significant borders with Laos and Vietnam. Chinese officials state that the majority of heroin entering China comes over the border from Burma. This heroin then transits southern China, through Yunnan or Guangxi Provinces, to Guangdong or Fujian Provinces to the southeastern coastal areas, and then on to international markets. Heroin is transported by various overland methods to ports in China’s southeastern Provinces of Guangdong and Fujian.
Heroin is transported to Guangdong Province and to the cities of Xiamen and Fuzhou in Fujian Province for shipment to international drug markets. Traffickers take advantage of expanding port facilities in northeast cities, such as Qingdao, Shanghai, and Tianjin, to ship heroin via maritime routes. Increased Chinese interdiction efforts along the Burma–China border have forced some traffickers to send heroin from Burma to China’s southeastern provinces by fishing trawlers.
In addition to Southeast Asian heroin entering into China, Southwest Asian heroin enters northwestern China from Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Tajikistan. Chinese authorities state that Southwest Asian heroin (mainly originating from Afghanistan) represents as much as 20 percent of the heroin that enters the northwest Province of Xinjiang. This trend is increasing, and is attributed to the continuing development of the infrastructure and economy in the western parts of China.
Synthetic Drugs
Due to the availability of the precursor chemicals, traffickers produce large amounts of crystal methamphetamine. Although much of the crystal methamphetamine is consumed locally, some is available for shipment to other markets throughout Southeast Asia. Several ports in southern China serve as transit points for crystal methamphetamine transported by containerized cargo to international drug markets.
Some MDMA traffickers in China are linked directly to the United States. In June 2001, tablets from seizures in two DEA San Francisco investigations were linked to the same source as a 300,000-tablet seizure in Shenzhen, China that had occurred days before. Although the San Francisco seizures were much smaller than the Shenzhen seizure, the capabilities of these trafficking groups appear to be significant. Chinese officials seized over 3 million Ecstasy tablets in China in 2002.
Precursor Chemicals
China is of paramount importance in global cooperative efforts to prevent the diversion of precursor chemicals. With its large chemical industry, China remains a source country for legitimately produced chemicals that are diverted for production of heroin and cocaine, as well as many amphetamine-type stimulants. China and its neighbor India are the leading exporters of bulk ephedrine in the world. China produces over 100,000 metric tons of acetic anhydride each year, and imports an additional 20,000 metric tons from the United States and Singapore. China is also the second largest producer of potassium permanganate in the world.
To combat the diversion of precursor chemicals, China implemented several regulations on the control of precursor chemicals between 1992 and 1998, including adoption of the 1988 U.N. Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances in 1993. Additionally, the Government further improved regulations to strengthen control of ephedrine during 1999 and 2000.
China fully participates in Operations Topaz and Purple, which are international monitoring initiatives that target acetic anhydride and potassium permanganate, respectively. Acetic anhydride is used to synthesize morphine base into heroin, and potassium permanganate is used as an oxidizer in cocaine production. Both chemicals are targeted because they are the chemicals most often preferred, and most widely used, by illicit drug manufacturers. However, the effectiveness of Operation Purple has been declining recently, since participant nations are exporting significant amounts of potassium permanganate to non-participant countries.
Additionally, Chinese authorities further control the export of ephedrine and pseudoephedrine through the voluntary use of the Letter of Non-Objection (LONO) system. China will not allow exports of ephedrine or pseudoephedrine without a positive affirmation by authorities in the importing country as to the bona fides of the consignee. For those countries that do not issue import permits, a letter of non-objection must be provided to Chinese authorities.
China is a source country for significant amounts of the ephedrine and pseudoephedrine exported to Mexico, and subsequently used to manufacture methamphetamine destined for the United States.
Increases in pseudoephedrine diversion were noted, beginning with the seizures in March and April 2003 of four shipments of product destined for Mexico. The seizures occurred in the United States and Panama, and totaled over 22 million, 60-milligram pseudoephedrine tablets. The source of supply has been identified as legitimate pharmaceutical companies in Hong Kong. Additional investigations have revealed other companies in Hong Kong that have been engaged in supplying substantial amounts of pseudoephedrine to firms, sometime fictitious, in Mexico.
Also, reports indicate that acetic anhydride is diverted from China to morphine/heroin refineries found in the Golden Triangle. Domestically, Chinese officials express concern over the increasing number of synthetic drug production operations in their country. Seizures of precursor chemicals in China increased from 50 metric tons in 1991 to 383 metric tons in 1997; only 300 metric tons were seized in 2002. The statistics for 2003 are not yet available.
DRUG-RELATED MONEY LAUNDERING
In the past, money laundering was not considered a significant problem in China. However, with the booming economy promoting greater trade investment and the ever-increasing number of foreign bank branches opening throughout the country, it appears that China may become an emerging money laundering center.
China, however, has taken some initial steps to begin investigation of money laundering activities. An Economic Crimes Investigation Department was established in the Ministry of Public Security to focus on illicit activities. The People’s Bank of China (China’s central bank) began several structural reforms such as the establishment of two new divisions, the Payment Trade Supervisory Division and the Money Laundering Working Division. The People’s Bank of China also prepared guidelines for use by financial institutions to report suspicious transactions, and to sensitize the public about new regulations on money laundering and terrorist financing issues.
DRUG ABUSE AND TREATMENT
Drugs of Choice
The major drugs of choice are injectable heroin, smokeable opium, crystal methamphetamine, and MDMA. Preferences between opium and heroin, and methods of administration, differ from region to region within China. The use of heroin and opium has increased among the younger population, as income has grown and the youth have more free time. China considers crystal methamphetamine abuse second to heroin/opium as a major drug problem. The use of MDMA has only recently become popular in China’s growing urban areas.
Addict Population
There are over 900,000 registered drug addicts in China, but the Government recognizes that the actual number of users is far higher. Some unofficial estimates range as high as 12 million drug addicts. Of the registered drug addicts, 83.7 percent are male and 73.9 percent are under the age of 35. In 2001, intravenous heroin users accounted for 70.9 percent of the confirmed 22,000 human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) and acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) cases. Chinese officials are becoming increasingly concerned about the abuse of methamphetamine and other amphetamine-type stimulants.
Treatment and Demand Reduction Programs
Both voluntary and compulsory drug treatment programs are provided in China, although the compulsory treatment is more common. Most addicts who attend these centers do so involuntarily upon orders from the Government. Voluntary treatment is provided at centers operated by Public Health Bureaus, but these programs are more expensive and many people cannot afford to attend them. Addicts, who return to drug use after having received treatment, and who cannot be cured by other means, may be sentenced to rehabilitation at any one of the special centers for reeducation through labor.
Demand reduction efforts target individuals between the ages of 17 and 35, since this is the largest segment of drug users. These efforts include, but are not limited to, media campaigns and establishment of drug-free communities.
DRUG LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES AND LEGISLATION
At the national level, the agencies specifically responsible for the control of licit and illicit drugs are the Ministry of Public Health, the Ministry of Public Security, and the Customs General Administration. The State Drug Administration of the Ministry of Public Health oversees implementation of the laws regulating the pharmaceutical industry. In the Customs General Administration, the Smuggling Prevention Department plays the major role in intercepting illegal drug shipments. The Narcotics Control Bureau of the Ministry of Public Security handles all criminal investigations involving opium, heroin, and methamphetamine.
TREATIES AND CONVENTIONS
China is a party to the 1988 U.N. Drug Convention, the 1961 U.N. Single Convention as amended by the 1972 Protocol, and the 1971 U.N. Convention on Psychotropic Substances. China is a member of the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), and has been a member of the INCB since 1984.
China also participates in a drug control program with Iran, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Russia, and the United States. This program is designed to enhance information sharing and coordination of drug law enforcement activities by countries in and around the Central Asian Region.
In June 2000, China and the United States signed a Mutual Legal Assistance Agreement (MLAT). This treaty subsequently went into effect on March 8, 2001. In 1999, China and the United States signed a Bilateral Customs Mutual Assistance Agreement. However, this agreement has not yet been activated. A May 1997 United States and China Memorandum of Understanding on law enforcement cooperation allows the two countries to provide assistance on drug investigations and prosecutions on a case-by-case basis.
China has over 30 MLATs with 24 nations covering both civil and criminal matters. In 1996, China signed MLATs that gave specific attention to drug trafficking with Russia, Mexico, and Pakistan. China also signed a drug control cooperation agreement with India.
China and Burma continue dialogue on counterdrug issues, such as drug trafficking by the United Wa State Army along the China–Burma border. The Government of China encourages and provides assistance for alternative crop programs in Burma along the China–Burma border. China is also building on Memoranda of Understanding that are currently in place with Burma, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, Vietnam, and the U.N. Office of Drugs and Crime.
KEY JUDGMENTS AND CONCLUSION
China is a major source of precursor chemicals necessary for the production of cocaine, heroin, and crystal methamphetamine. China produces over 100,000 metric tons of acetic anhydride each year, and imports an additional 20,000 metric tons from the United States and Singapore. Reports indicate that acetic anhydride is diverted from China to morphine and heroin refineries in the Golden Triangle. China is also a leading exporter of bulk ephedrine and has been a source country for much of the ephedrine and pseudoephedrine imported into Mexico; these precursor chemicals are subsequently used to manufacture methamphetamine destined for the United States. Although China has taken aggressive actions through legislation and regulation of production and exportation of precursor chemicals, extensive action is required to control the illicit diversion and smuggling of precursor chemicals.
China not only continues to be a major transit route for Southeast Asian heroin, but also for Southwest Asian heroin entering northwestern China from Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Tajikistan. A majority of the Southeast Asian heroin that enters China from Burma transits southern China to various international markets by maritime transport. Drug traffickers take advantage of expanding port facilities in coastal cities, such as Qingdao, Shanghai, Tianjin, and Guangdong, to ship heroin along maritime routes. Southwest Asian heroin (mainly from Afghanistan) represents as much as 20 percent of the heroin entering northwest China. Chinese authorities believe that these trends will increase and they attribute these increases to the continuing development of the infrastructure and economy in China.
This report was prepared by the Europe, Asia, and Africa Strategic Intelligence Unit, Regional Strategic Intelligence Section, of the Office of Strategic Intelligence. This report reflects information received prior to January 2004.
dea.gov: INDIA: COUNTRY BRIEF January 2004
http://www.dea.gov/pubs/intel/03080/03080.html
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)
Office Responsible: New Dehli Country Office
Type of Government: Federal Republic
Official Name: Republic of China
Capital: New Dehli
Population: 1,049,991,145 (July 2003 Estimate)
STATUS IN INTERNATIONAL DRUG TRAFFICKING
India is the world’s largest producer of licit opium; however, a portion of the licit opium poppy crop is diverted to the illicit market. Opium, obtained both through diversion and from illicit poppy cultivation, is processed into heroin in India. The type of heroin that is most often found in India is a crudely refined heroin base called “brown sugar.”
India’s large chemical industry produces a wide variety of precursor and essential chemicals, including acetic anhydride (AA), potassium permanganate (PP), ephedrine, pseudoephedrine, and other chemicals used to produce amphetamine-type stimulants.
India serves as a minor source country for heroin, and also serves as a transit area for Southwest Asian (SWA) heroin from Afghanistan that often enters India from Pakistan. The transit of Southeast Asian (SEA) heroin from Burma is not believed to be significant. Heroin from Burma is used primarily within the addict population of northeastern India.
India’s large population contains a significant number of drug abusers, although precise estimates are not available. Heroin, hashish, and pharmaceutical drugs are readily available and widely abused. Brown sugar heroin is primarily produced for domestic heroin users, since there is little market for this type of heroin outside of India.
CULTIVATION AND PROCESSING
Cannabis
Cannabis cultivation is illegal, yet widespread, in India. No estimates as to the size of this illicit cultivation are available. Both marijuana and hashish are processed in India. The Kullu Valley in Himachal Pradesh is known to produce marijuana with a high delta-9 tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) content, which makes the marijuana attractive to foreign hashish buyers.1 However, the majority of India-produced marijuana and hashish is for domestic use, although a small percentage is destined for the international market.
Ephedra
The active alkaloid for the precursor chemical ephedrine is chemically extracted from the ephedra plant and processed for pharmaceutical purposes. There are at least 30 different species of the ephedra plant found throughout Asia, Europe, and North America. There are only five species of the plant that are capable of producing useable quantities of ephedrine. These five species are found in China, India, Mongolia, and Pakistan. India and China are major producers of ephedrine.
Opium
India is the largest producer of opium gum for the world’s pharmaceutical industry. In 2002, India produced 820 metric tons of opium gum from 18,447 hectares of opium poppy. In 2001, India produced only 726 metric tons of opium gum, which was a decrease from the 1,302 metric tons of opium gum produced in 2000. India is the only country that permits the legal extraction of opium gum, rather than using the concentrate obtained from the poppy straw (CPS) processing method.
Analyst Note: In the CPS process, poppy pods are dried on the stalk in the fields, and then crushed in order to remove the seeds. The seeds are used for a food product and the crushed pods are processed to extract the alkaloids. In India, however, farmers lance poppy pods in the fields to remove the opium. Farmers then sell the collected opium gum to the government.
Licit Opium Cultivation
In 1981, the United States applied the “80-20 rule” to guarantee that India and Turkey (also a traditional opium producer) have a combined 80 percent share of the U.S. pharmaceutical market’s annual purchase of morphine. The 80-20 rule reflected the realities of the morphine market in 1981 when Australia, France, and other licit producers were considered new or nontraditional producers, and provided less than 20 percent of global production. While India and Turkey still share 80 percent of the U.S. market, they now share closer to half of the global market. The 80-20 rule will remain in effect until January 2006, at which time it may be extended, modified, or discontinued.
Licit opium poppy cultivation is a labor intensive and locally dispersed industry in India. Opium poppy cultivation is permitted under government control in the States of Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, and Uttar Pradesh. The Central Bureau of Narcotics (CBN), which is part of the Department of Revenue, is responsible for all facets of the opium industry. The CBN monitors the industry to prevent diversion, determines the number of licensed growers and areas of cultivation, and supervises collection of opium gum from farmers. The CBN operates two processing centers, one in Madhya Pradesh and the other in Uttar Pradesh. These processing centers purify, dry, weigh, and package the opium. If farmers divert opium to the illicit market, they can lose their licenses to cultivate opium and are subject to fines and imprisonment.
The exact amount of licit opium diverted to the illicit market is unknown. However, the most frequently reported estimates indicate that from 10 to 30 percent of the licit crop may be diverted. Using these estimates, diversion from the 2002 opium crop ranged from 80 to 250 metric tons, which means more illicit opium could have been available in India than in other opium cultivating countries such as Colombia, Mexico, or Laos. Since 2001, the United States and India have collaborated on a study that enables the Government of India to better estimate diversion. In 2003, the joint licit opium poppy survey will improve the scientific basis to determine a minimum-qualifying yield, which is the figure that farmers must meet when turning in opium gum to the Government of India. When minimum-qualifying yields are not met, the Indian Government has a basis for investigating the discrepancy. However, India’s large geographic area and the scope of opium cultivation hamper enforcement efforts in the country.
Illicit Opium Cultivation
Illicit opium cultivation also occurs in India. The Indian Government began eradication efforts in northeast India in 1996, due to increased illicit cultivation. Illicit cultivation occurs in the States of Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, and Himachal Pradesh, as well as Arunachal Pradesh and other parts of northeastern India. Indian officials pursue detection and destruction of illicit opium crops and the prosecution of illicit cultivators.
Processing
Heroin
Opium is processed into heroin in illicit laboratories located in India. These laboratories generally produce a low-quality brown sugar heroin base. Heroin hydrochloride (HCl), to include “white” export-quality heroin, is also produced in India. Since 1999, there have been increases in the number and quantity of seizures of Indian white heroin. Most of this white heroin is destined for Europe. Most of the heroin bound for Sri Lanka now appears to be the brown sugar heroin.
Methaqualone
India is the world’s largest producer of illicit methaqualone. Methaqualone is one of three categories of depressants, and is usually marketed under the brand name Mandrax. Large seizures of Mandrax are common. For example, in September 2000, more than 2 metric tons of Mandrax powder were seized near Hyderabad. In February 2001, 1.4 metric tons of Mandrax tablets were seized in Bombay. Although methaqualone laboratories and tablet-pressing operations have been seized in South Africa, India remains the major source for a substantial amount of the Mandrax found in South Africa. Most of the India-produced Mandrax originates in the Gujarat or Maharashtra States and is usually shipped by maritime containerized cargo to locations, such as South Africa, which have serious Mandrax abuse problems.
Trafficking
Heroin
The United States remains a minor market for heroin from India, whether it has been produced in, or has transited through, India. Heroin produced in India is trafficked to international locations, although the total amount is negligible, compared to the quantities of heroin produced in Burma, Afghanistan, or Colombia. The most common type of heroin, brown sugar, produced in India has a limited market outside the region. However, seizures of shipments en route to, and within, Sri Lanka suggest that there is an external regional market for heroin produced in India.
Precursor Chemical Production and Diversion
Precursor chemicals, such as AA, N-acetylanthranilic acid (N-AAA), ephedrine, pseudoephedrine, ergotomine, egonovine, PP, methylendioxyphenyl-2-propanone (MD2P2), phenyl acetone (P2P) and others, are legally manufactured in India. Indian officials fully control access to a number of chemicals, such as AA, N-AAA, ephedrine, and pseudoephedrine, but do not control all 23 chemicals listed in the annex of the 1988 United Nations (U.N.) Convention. India is an active participant in Operations TOPAZ and PURPLE, which are international initiatives designed to prevent the diversion of AA and PP.
Ephedrine and pseudoephedrine produced in India are legally exported to many countries, including the United States, Canada, Germany, and Mexico. Ephedrine and pseudoephedrine can also be used for the illicit production of methamphetamine. In 1999, Indian law was amended to include controls on ephedrine. Ephedrine diverted for illicit use is most often traced to the companies that use it to produce pharmaceutical drugs, rather than to licensed ephedrine producers or wholesalers.
There are at least 12 legal producers of AA in India. AA is used to produce licit pharmaceutical drugs, and it is also employed in the textile industry. Although India is currently producing an estimated 35,000 metric tons of AA, it has the capacity to produce an estimated 90,000 metric tons of AA annually. AA is the most commonly used chemical to convert morphine into heroin, and can be used to synthesize the methaqualone precursor N-AAA and the methamphetamine and amphetamine precursor, 1-phenyl-2-propanone. Despite governmental controls, India-produced AA continues to be seized en route to Afghanistan’s heroin laboratories, and to Burma’s methamphetamine and heroin laboratories.
Trafficking Groups
Trafficking groups operating in India include nationals from India, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Nepal. Although India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh are no longer combined into one country, as they were prior to 1947, family connections remain strong in the region, and provide a network of contacts that facilitate cross-border trafficking.
Nigerian traffickers are present in India, particularly in Delhi. In some instances, Nigerian-controlled couriers transit through India en route to international destinations. This is an effort to avoid law enforcement authorities at the destination airport, as passengers who arrive from major drug-producing or transit countries are subject to greater scrutiny. Pakistani officials continue to arrest couriers who are ticketed to India at airports in Lahore, Karachi, and Islamabad. In other cases, West African traffickers reside in India and domestically sell heroin and hashish to other Africans and Indians.
There are only two authorized border crossings on India’s otherwise porous northeastern border with Burma. This region is connected to the rest of India by a 32-kilometer strip of land, bordered by Bangladesh, Bhutan, and Burma. This region is home to insurgent groups, and reporting suggests that, while these groups are not involved in drug production or drug trafficking, they may profit from some aspects of the drug trade. For example, several groups in Nagaland, including the Isaac-Muivah and Khaplang factions of the National Socialist Council of Nagaland, tax and extort money from traffickers in return for protection or the right to traffic drugs. These groups in Nagaland are of Tibeto-Burmese ethnic origin. Nagas live in remote parts of northwest Sagaing District in Burma, and in the State of Nagaland in India. The People’s Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak, a leftist group headquartered in Manipur, and the All Tripura Tribal/Tiger Force in Tripura are other groups that profit from extortion, and they may facilitate cross-border drug trafficking.
Analyst Note: The collective term Naga is used for the many tribes that live in this region. They speak different and mutually unintelligible dialects.
Ethnic Tamils in the southern Indian State of Tamil Nadu are involved in trafficking between India and Sri Lanka, an independent island off the southern coast of India. Heroin destined for Sri Lanka is regularly seized in India and in the Gulf of Mannar. Some reports suggest that the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), a Sri Lankan separatist group, receives funding from drug trafficking, although no direct nexus between the LTTE and drug trafficking has been confirmed.
Ethnic Indian organized crime syndicates, such as the organization headed by Dawood Ibrahim, are reportedly involved in a variety of illicit activities, such as extortion, drug trafficking, money laundering, counterfeiting, and terrorism. Dawood Ibrahim is currently considered a fugitive by the Indian Government, which is seeking him for his connection to 1993 Mumbai (Bombay) stock-market bombings.
Trafficking Methods and Routes
India is a transit country and a destination for heroin and hashish originating in neighboring Nepal, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. Although the border is closely monitored and tensions remain high between India and Pakistan, opiates continue to enter India overland from Pakistan. Sea and air routes are also used to bring heroin from southern Pakistan. An unknown percentage of this heroin remains in India, but some also transits India en route to international destinations, especially from New Delhi or Bombay by couriers traveling on commercial airliners. Little information is available on heroin and hashish smuggling by sea, although both are believed to occur.
Drug-related Money Laundering
India is not considered an international or regional financial center, but money laundering does occur in the country. The primary means of money laundering in India is the informal banking system known as the hawala. Hawala is an underground banking network composed of businesses that engage in international commerce. Through these businesses, large sums of money can be transferred internationally with little paperwork and no physical movement of funds.
The events of September 11, 2001, and the December 13, 2001, attack on the Indian Parliament caused a flurry of anti-money laundering activity in the Indian Parliament in late 2001. In November 2001, the Indian Parliament passed the Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance, which provides law enforcement more tools to seize the financial assets of organizations linked to terrorist and drug trafficking activities. In November 2002, Parliament passed the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, which significantly increases the fines and jail time for individuals convicted of money laundering. The Prevention of Money Laundering Act was signed into law in January 2003, by the President of India.
Drug Abuse and Treatment
Drugs of Choice
Marijuana, heroin, and domestically produced pharmaceutical drugs are the most frequently abused drugs in India. Marijuana products, often called charras (hashish), ganja (marijuana), or bhang (crushed marijuana) are abused throughout the country. In fact, in some parts of India, crushed marijuana is used to season foods and spice drinks during religious ceremonies and on holidays. Cocaine, d-lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD), and 3, 4-methylenedioxy-methamphetamine (MDMA) are available, but not widely used due, in part, to their high cost.
Heroin is readily available in India. Most users smoke brown sugar heroin by breathing in the smoke from heroin burning in a dish rather than in a pipe (a process known as “chasing the dragon”). In the northeast, high-purity, low-cost heroin from Burma dominates. Intravenous drug use is highest in northeastern India. In addition to heroin abuse, the intravenous injection of proxyvon is also a problem in the States of Manipur and Mizoram. Proxyvon is a legally produced analgesic and opium derivative. Users inject a suspension of proxyvon powder and water, which leads to a very short, yet intense, high. Other pharmaceutical drugs are also abused. Opium derivatives, such as buprenorphine, diazepam, and codeine can be easily obtained from pharmacies, even though prescriptions are required. Phensidyl is heavily abused in the Indian State of West Bengal.
Addict Population
The exact number of drug abusers in the country is not known. India is the second most populous country in the world, with a population of approximately 1,049,991,145 people (July 2003 estimate). Drug abuse is widespread throughout the country. From 1999 to 2001, the Government of India and the U.N. Office of Drugs and Crime conducted a nationwide study of drug addiction. The study focused on a variety of situations, location, and subject criteria (4,648 drug users). The study concluded through multiple pages of statistics, trends, and interviews that drug abuse in India led to a variety of problems for India, such as an increased burden on the health care system.
Treatment and Demand Reduction Programs
India pursues multiple approaches to deal with drug issues. A high level of social and official awareness is evident, especially on issues such as demand reduction, rehabilitation, and detoxification. Due to a large number of local government initiatives, especially in areas in and around Calcutta, strong demand reduction programs have been implemented.
Drug Law Enforcement Agencies and Legislation
The Narcotics Control Bureau (NCB) was established in 1986 and is responsible for coordinating counterdrug activities for all of India’s law enforcement agencies. The NCB had been under the Ministry of Finance, but was transferred to the Home Ministry in April 2002.
The CBN is staffed with approximately 1,600 personnel and is responsible for all aspects of the opium industry and preventing illicit precursor chemical trafficking. The Directorate of Revenue Intelligence is part of the Ministry of Finance and is responsible for information on the smuggling of goods, including drugs into, or out of, India.
Other law enforcement agencies with counterdrug responsibilities in India are the Central Bureau of Investigation, the Customs Commission, and the Border Security Force. The Customs Commission has a wide variety of drug law enforcement tasks and falls under the Ministry of Finance’s Central Board of Excise and Customs. The Border Security Force, under the Home Ministry, is a paramilitary force that controls India’s land borders and frequently interdicts drug shipments.
In October 2001, the Indian Government amended the Narcotics Drug and Psychotropic Drug Act of 1985. The most significant amendments include changing the law to allow for sentencing to be based on the size of the drug seizure, and formally authorizing controlled deliveries inside and outside of India. Prior to these changes, individuals found with small amounts of illicit drugs were subject to the same penalties as large-scale drug traffickers.
Treaties and Conventions
India has bilateral agreements on drug trafficking with 13 countries, including Pakistan and Burma. Prior to 1999, extradition between India and the United States occurred under the auspices of a 1931 treaty signed by the United States and the United Kingdom, which was made applicable to India in 1942. However, a new extradition treaty between India and the United States entered into force in July 1999. The United States and India signed a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty in October 2001. India also is signatory to the following treaties and conventions:
Member of the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL);
Member of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC);
1961 U.N. Convention on Narcotic Drugs;
1971 U.N. Convention on Psychotropic Substances;
1988 U.N. Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances;
1987 SAARC Regional Convention on Suppression of Terrorism;
1993 SAARC Regional Convention on Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances; and
2000 Transnational Crime Convention.
Statistical Tables
Drug Prices in India as of Decembe 2002
Heroin (kilogram) $1,666-$6,251
Opium (kilogram) 166-312
Hashish (kilogram) 145-312
Methaqualone (kilogram) 208
Acetic Anhydride 1.45
Source: DEA New Dehli
Key Judgments
India will continue to be a major supplier of chemicals diverted to the illicit market. India actively seeks to control diversion and cooperates effectively with other countries. Even though Indian officials control access to a number of chemicals (such as AA, N-AAA, ephedrine, and pseudoephedrine), they do not yet control all 23 chemicals listed in the annex of the 1988 U.N. Convention. Despite governmental controls, India-produced AA continues to be seized both en route to Afghanistan’s heroin laboratories and to Burma’s methamphetamine and heroin laboratories. Although India is currently only producing an estimated 35,000 metric tons of AA, it has the capacity to produce an estimated 90,000 metric tons of AA annually. India’s continued active participation in Operations TOPAZ and PURPLE is vital to the international initiatives, which were designed to prevent the diversion of AA and PP.
India’s large population remains at risk for increased drug abuse, due to availability and low cost of both domestically produced drugs and drugs smuggled from the nearby countries of Burma, Nepal, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. The Indian Government is actively seeking ways to reduce demand and to increase public awareness.
This report was prepared by the Europe, Asia, Africa Strategic Intelligence Unit of the Office of Strategic Intelligence. This report reflects information received through October 31, 2003.
dea.gov: METHAMPHETAMINE: THE CURRENT http://www.dea.gov/pubs/intel/03052/index.html
September 2003
Overview
Methamphetamine production, trafficking, and abuse are problems affecting every country in the Asian and the Pacific Rim Regions. As early as World War II, methamphetamine abuse had become a scourge for Japan. During World War II, the Japanese Government (as well as the German, British, and U.S. Governments) used methamphetamines to keep their soldiers active for extreme amounts of time over long periods of engagement. After the end of World War II, large military stockpiles of methamphetamine found their way into the public sector. At one point in the early postwar years, Japan had approximately two million methamphetamine addicts in a population of only 88 million.
Burma (Myanmar), China (People’s Republic of China), and India are nations that play key roles in the production of methamphetamine in the East Asian and the Pacific Rim Regions. China and India are significant producers of precursor chemicals, such as ephedrine and pseudoephedrine, which are used in methamphetamine production. Burma and China are the two largest producers of methamphetamine. Burma is known for the production of methamphetamine tablets (“Ya-Ba”), while China produces crystal methamphetamine (called “ice” and “Shabu”).
Trafficking organizations find synthetic drug production (especially methamphetamine) attractive for several reasons: there is no dependence on growing seasons; no large workforce is required; necessary chemicals are easily obtained; it is easy to locate laboratories near consumer markets; and there is a high profit return on their investment.
Precursor Chemicals
China and India have vast commercial chemical industries, which produce significant quantities of ephedrine and pseudoephedrine. The proximity to illicit methamphetamine production areas facilitates the diversion of these chemicals to the illegal drug arena. Significant amounts of ephedrine and pseudoephedrine produced in China and India are exported to countries such as Burma, Canada, Germany, Mexico, and the United States. While China and India each produce over 400 metric tons of ephedrine and pseudoephedrine a year, only limited quantities of these chemicals destined for illicit drug production are seized.
Since 1999, China and India have made extensive efforts to control the diversion of United Nations-listed precursor chemicals. These efforts include the passage of new legislation and immediate enforcement of these new regulations by China (February 2000) and India (December 1999). Both countries also participate in a variety of diversion-control efforts with the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA).
Production and Trafficking
Methamphetamine Tablets (a.k.a. “Ya-Ba”)
Burma is the primary producer of methamphetamine tablets in the region. Other countries also producing tablets, although in much smaller quantities, include Cambodia, Laos, and Thailand. U.S. Government estimates place Burmese methamphetamine tablet production in excess of 800 million tablets per year. According to officials in Thailand, Burma produces up to 80 percent of the methamphetamine tablets that are consumed in Thailand each year. The Government of Thailand considers Burmese methamphetamine production to be Thailand’s number-one national security threat.
The primary producer of methamphetamine tablets in Burma is the United Wa State Army (UWSA), an insurgent group that has a cease-fire agreement with the Burmese Government. The UWSA and several other drug trafficking organizations began methamphetamine production in the early to mid-1990s to supplement their income from heroin trafficking activities. Because their heroin trafficking activities had been the focus of international law enforcement efforts, their cash flow was impacted. Methamphetamine has low production costs, easily obtained precursor chemicals, and a simple production process. The UWSA often co-locates its methamphetamine- and heroin-processing laboratories. The UWSA finds methamphetamine production to be very lucrative, as it provides large amounts of cash from the huge Thai drug market.
The UWSA produces methamphetamine tablets embossed with the “WY” and “99” logos. Originally, these logos represented the high quality of the methamphetamine tablets. However, over the past several years, other drug trafficking groups have been counterfeiting these logos for their own tablets.
Most of the methamphetamine tablets produced in Burma are shipped overland to Thailand, with some shipments passing through Laos. Large shipments of the tablets are caravanned into northern Thailand by soldiers of the UWSA or local “hill tribe” people, to be trucked to locations throughout Thailand. These shipments are then handled by various brokers conducting deals with a variety of local distributors. The remainder of the tablets are shipped by various maritime-and aviation-smuggling methods to international drug consumption markets. Burma-produced tablets have been seized in Australia, Brunei, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan (Republic of China), and Vietnam.
There have also been shipments of methamphetamine tablets to ethnic Hmong and Yao individuals in the Sacramento, California, area. However, the amount of Burma-produced tablets being shipped to the United States is currently unknown. There is also no reliable seizure data on Burma-produced tablets entering the United States.
Crystal Methamphetamine (a.k.a. “Ice,” “Shabu”)
China is the primary producer of ice in Asia and the Pacific Rim. Smaller quantities of ice are produced in the Philippines, Taiwan, and South Korea. The Chinese Government has no estimates on the scale of either methamphetamine production or consumption within its borders. However, Chinese officials consider ice to be one of the country’s most significant drug abuse problems, second only to heroin abuse. China has the largest consumer market for ice. Other consumer markets for ice include Australia, Brunei, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, the Marianas Islands, and the United States (specifically Guam and Hawaii).
The ability to manufacture multikilogram quantities of ice in China is a result of the easy availability of ephedrine and pseudoephedrine. Most ice-producing laboratories are located in the provinces along the eastern and southeastern coastal areas, with limited production occurring in the inland areas. Chinese authorities report that some Chinese drug trafficking organizations use different sites for different stages of the production process. Chinese law enforcement authorities also report that most of the ice labs are small and highly mobile.
Ice, produced in China, is shipped to other nations by a variety of methods including containerized cargo, small freighter, or fishing vessels that travel in international waters. Several seaports in southern and southeastern China serve as transit points for ice leaving by containerized cargo. Ice is not normally transported by air cargo or air courier; however, some quantities have been known to enter Japan by courier.
Outlook
The methamphetamine production, trafficking, and abuse situation in the Asian and the Pacific Rim Regions is unlikely to change in the near future. The Government of Thailand has long considered Burmese methamphetamine production to be Thailand’s number-one national security threat. Chinese officials now consider crystal methamphetamine to be among the country’s most significant drug abuse problems, ranking it second only to heroin abuse. Given the current methamphetamine situations in both countries, it is doubtful that either government will change its view on this threat anytime soon.
The UWSA and other drug trafficking organizations have found methamphetamine production to be attractive for a variety of reasons, specifically the high return of profit on their investment. As a result, these groups will likely expand their methamphetamine production and trafficking activities to maintain their financial base.
This report was prepared by the Europe, Asia, Africa Strategic Intelligence Unit of the Office of Strategic Intelligence. This report reflects information received through July 2003.
dea.gov: Illegal Drug Price and Purity Report for the USA http://www.dea.gov/pubs/intel/02058/02058.html
April 2003
This report was prepared by the Domestic Strategic Unit of the Office of Domestic Intelligence. This report reflects information received prior to December 2002.
Excutive Summary:
This edition of the Illegal Drugs Price and Purity Report provides cocaine, heroin, marijuana, hallucinogen, depressant, and stimulant prices in the United States from January 1998 through December 2001. In addition, purity levels are included for cocaine and heroin as is the delta-9-tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) content for marijuana. The price data were compiled from DEA field division reports. The highest and lowest reported prices during the year for each drug provide the national range. The wide range in kilogram prices reflects the following variables: buyer/seller relationship; quantity of kilograms negotiated (more kilograms = lower price); purchase frequencies; location (higher prices paid in outlying areas); purity (higher price paid for higher purity); and transportation costs. Purity information for cocaine and heroin comes from DEA’s System To Retrieve Information from Drug Evidence (STRIDE). Purity data are based on STRIDE printouts of average purities for the 1-to-10-gram, 1-to-10-ounce, and 1-to-10-kilogram ranges. STRIDE is a computerized data base program used to record, collate, and display the results of qualitative and quantitative chemical analysis of all drug evidence submitted to the DEA laboratory system. The University of Mississippi’s Marijuana Potency Monitoring Project provides THC levels for marijuana.
Cocaine prices at the kilogram level remained relatively low in the primary importation/distribution centers, such as Los Angeles, Miami, and New York City, as well as in most other major U.S. cities. (Price information for Chicago, Los Angeles, Miami, and New York City is provided in this report; price information is available upon request for major cities not included in the report.) Cocaine prices nationwide have remained relatively stable over the time period, particularly for ounce and gram quantities, suggesting that cocaine was readily available to the user. “Crack” cocaine prices also remained stable, indicating it too was readily available nationwide. Typically, cocaine is converted into crack cocaine, or “rock,” within the United States by the secondary wholesaler or retailer. Crack cocaine is often packaged in vials, glassine bags, and film canisters. The size of a crack rock can vary, but generally ranges from 1/10 to 1/2 gram. Rocks can sell for as low as $5 to as high as $100, but prices generally range from $10 to $20. Cocaine purity levels decreased at the kilogram level from 82 percent in 1998 to 69 percent in 2001. Ounce and gram levels have also decreased from 69 percent in 1998 to 53 percent in 2001 and from 69 percent to 56 percent, respectively.
Heroin is readily available in many U.S. cities as evidenced by the unprecedented level of average retail, or street-level, purity. Criminals in four foreign source areas produce the heroin available in the United States: South America (Colombia), Southeast Asia (principally Burma), Mexico, and Southwest Asia (Afghanistan). While virtually all heroin produced in Mexico and South America is destined for the U.S. market, each of the four source areas have dominated the U.S. market at some point over the past 30 years. Over the past decade, the northeastern states, with the largest concentration of heroin addicts in the country, shifted from a largely Southeast Asian heroin market to one now dominated by heroin from South America. In the West, by contrast, “black tar,” and to a lesser extent, brown powdered heroin from Mexico have been, and continue to be, the predominant available type.
Heroin price and purity vary widely. Nationally, 2001 data show that South American heroin ranged from $60,000 to $125,000 per kilogram. Southeast Asian and Southwest Asian heroin ranged in price from $35,000 to $120,000 per kilogram. Wholesale-level prices for Mexican heroin were the lowest of any type, ranging from $15,000 to $65,000 per kilogram. Overall heroin purity at the kilogram level increased slightly, but remained below 70 percent in 2001. However, gram- and ounce-purity levels declined slightly, but remained over 50 percent.
Marijuana is available in two grades: commercial grade and sinsemilla. Sinsemilla is the unpollinated flowering bud from the female cannabis plant. Commercial-grade marijuana is a designation used by the DEA for non-sinsemilla marijuana. Prices for commercial-grade marijuana have remained relatively stable over the past decade, ranging from approximately $300 to $700 per pound in U.S. Southwest border areas to between $1,400 to $3000 per pound in the Midwest and northeastern United States. The national price range for sinsemilla, a higher quality marijuana usually grown domestically, is between $900 and $8,000 per pound. The term “BC Bud” literally refers to the bud of the female cannabis plant grown in British Columbia; the term has become synonymous in the popular media for high-potency Canadian-grown marijuana. BC Bud, which sells for $1,500 to $2,000 per pound in Vancouver, when smuggled into the United States, sells for between $3,000 and $8,000 per pound in major metropolitan areas. According to the University of Mississippi’s data, the average commercial-grade potency THC levels have increased from 4.19 percent in 1999 to 4.72 percent in 2001. Average sinsemilla potency THC levels have decreased from 13.38 percent to 9.03 percent over the same time period.
National methamphetamine prices at the pound level decreased significantly from 1998 to 1999, but increased in 2000 and remained stable in 2001. Nationally, methamphetamine prices at the ounce level increased slightly at the upper end of the price range and prices at the gram level remained stable.
Regionally, methamphetamine prices vary throughout the United States. At the wholesale level, prices range from $3,000 to $17,000 per pound in the West and from $5,000 to $23,000 per pound in the Midwest, southeastern, and northeastern portions of the country. Ounce prices range from $300 to $2,200.
Ice is a very pure, smokable form of methamphetamine that is more addictive than other forms of the substance. Ice contains the same chemical compound as powder methamphetamine, but undergoes a recrystallization process in which some impurities are removed. Ice is predominantly available on the West Coast, parts of the Southwest, and in Hawaii; however, it is increasingly available in other areas of the country. Ice is also used on the West Coast where a gram sells for approximately $140, from $1,200 to $1,500 per ounce, and from $10,000 to $18,000 per pound. There is limited information on the price of ice for the rest of the United States since its use is not that widespread. Ice prices in Hawaii are the highest in the United States with gram prices ranging from $200 to $400, ounce prices averaging $2,300, and pound prices as high as $30,000.
In 2001, methamphetamine continued to be a problem throughout the United States, although international chemical control efforts have reduced the supply of those chemicals needed to produce high-quality methamphetamine. Clandestine laboratory operators are likely to use more cutting agents to stretch their supply of methamphetamine to meet demand and increase profits. As a result, the national purity level for methamphetamine dropped dramatically; however, as methamphetamine makers found alternative chemicals, the purity has begun to increase. The average purity of methamphetamine exhibits seized by DEA dropped from 71.9 percent in 1994 to 31 percent in 1999, but increased in 2000 to 35 percent, and to 40 percent in 2001.
Dangerous drugs pose a continuing threat to the United States, in particular for adolescents and young adult populations. Prices for lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD), 3, 4 - methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA), phencyclidine (PCP), gamma hydroxy butyrate (GHB), and ketamine are contained in this report. However, because these drugs are either emerging or resurgent threats, in the case of ketamine, GHB, and PCP respectively, price information for the last 4 years was not available for use in this report. Consequently, only 2000 and 2001 prices are reported.
SE1 London Underground 14/8/04 Did anyone else go to this Harcore Heaven vs Frantic head-to-head?! Or to the atfer in First, Vauxhall? It was a novelty for me - I am British, but I only know the rave-tekno scene in France and it is VERY VERY VERY different over here - the music here is good, but why does no-one YELL??!! For me a great nite out is several soaking wet T-Shirts (from sweat) and no voice from screaming at the DJ to LET IT RIP!! :) And furry boots?! Wot the f***?! You'd be laughed off the planet anywhere in Europe, hahaha (have been to Germany, Italy, Belgium, Spain and Tchequi, never seen anything remotely resembling)
Anyhow, would love to hear your opinions and from anyone who has been to a "free" or a "teuf" in France :)
Taz.
P.S. This in France is the shortened version of "Ecstasy", but is actually my real first name - and yes, I get a lot of comments, especially as I have a car with a personalised UK number-plate "TAZ 1130", it turns a lot of heads, I'm pretty surprised it hasnt been ripped off yet!!)
Blunkett charges innocent prisoners David Blunkett wants to charge people who have spent time in prison,and have been freed as their conviction was unsafe,for their board and lodging....more here
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