U.S Loser in War on Drugs – January 2003 U.S. Called the Loser in War on Drugs
Published by The Washington Post - December, 2002
Copyright: The Washington Post
In Prison Interview, Alleged Kingpin Says Demand Fuels Trade ALMOLOYA DE JUAREZ, Mexico.
Benjamin Arellano Felix, the man accused of running Mexico's most ruthless drug cartel, said the United States has already lost its war on drugs and that violent trafficking gangs will thrive as long as Americans keep buying marijuana, cocaine and heroin.
"It would stop being a business if the United States didn't want drugs," Arellano said Tuesday during a rare interview in the La Palma maximum security federal prison here, where Mexican authorities hope to keep him for the rest of his life.
Most Latin Americans, from presidents to taxi drivers, say that U.S. demand is responsible for the drug trade. But hearing it directly from Arellano Felix, in his first interview with U.S. reporters, provided a seldom-seen glimpse into the thinking of one of the hemisphere's most prominent drug lords.
U.S. and Mexican officials say Arellano, 48, heads the Tijuana-based cartel bearing his family name, which has moved billions of dollars worth of Mexican and Colombian drugs into the United States while committing some of the most vicious murders ever seen in the drug underworld.
But they also acknowledge that since his arrest in March there has been no slowdown in the flow of drugs over the border. "They talk about a war against the Arellano brothers," said Arellano, who eluded the Mexican police and military, the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration and the FBI for more than a decade. "They haven't won. I'm here, and nothing has changed.
"When something is out of reach, it is more interesting to people," Arellano said. "If drugs were like cigarettes or alcohol, there wouldn't be a black market. It would put an end to the capos."
Authorities say Arellano was the capo of capos, the brains behind an organization that controlled a third or more of the cocaine traffic into the United States and spent countless millions to buy protection from police, judges and generals. They said his top enforcer, his brother Ramon Arellano Felix, left a trail of hundreds of mutilated corpses.
Allegations against Arellano have been made for years in newspapers, books, political speeches and court documents in Mexico and the United States. He has been charged with numerous drug offenses. Now, telling his story, Arellano said that the accusations against his family are "all lies" made up by people who are "sick in the head."
"If I had all the money they say I do, where is it? You should be able to see the properties and the money," Arellano said, his face flushing with anger as he sat in a cold prison classroom wearing a beige uniform, slip-on shoes and a heavy beige coat. "I didn't have airplanes, bodyguards and yachts."
Authorities are not sure where Arellano's money went, beyond some real estate investments in Tijuana. Mexican officials say it has been invested in American real estate, while their U.S. counterparts say much of it is hidden in cash in Mexico.
Arellano described himself as a "simple" housing contractor. He said he suffers from daily migraine headaches from the stress of being wrongly accused.
Arellano acknowledged that he has moved frequently in the past decade, living in Mexico City, Monterrey, Puebla and Tijuana. Law enforcement officials said his life has been marked by a complicated series of dodges, aliases and secret dealings all designed to avoid arrest, which Arellano denied.
"I've lived simply, not in hiding," he said. "I wasn't calling attention to myself, but I wasn't running from them. I went to the movies, to restaurants just like you. If I wanted to go somewhere, I got on a plane. I'm a peaceful person. A person could not have done all they accuse me of without being caught."
Told of Arellano's comments, Donald J. Thornhill Jr., a DEA spokesman in San Diego, where for years there has been a joint DEA-FBI task force devoted solely to the Arellano Felix organization, said Arellano will face a mountain of evidence at his upcoming trials.
"This has been the priority case for the DEA for several years," Thornhill said. "They brought their violence into the streets of San Diego. He is an animal. He is a cancer against humanity. They killed so many people it turns my stomach. None of this is hearsay. We have hard evidence."
For nearly a decade, the Arellano brothers' faces looked out from wanted posters in both countries -- Ramon's picture was next to Osama bin Laden's on the FBI's "most wanted" list. They were known to all by their first names, as infamous in Mexico as Al Capone was in the United States. They served as a model for Mexican drug gangs in the Hollywood film, "Traffic," and their infamy combined with their ability to elude justice -- even with $2 million U.S. government bounties on their heads -- gave them an almost mystical aura here.
Arellano said his family has been conveniently demonized by the Mexican government. He said the police could have caught him at any time, but chose not to in order to "blame us for everything." He also said that the government's pursuit of his family was just a show to please Washington. "Mexico has to look good to the United States all the time," Arellano said.
Arellano said he tried to clear his name after the 1993 murder of Cardinal Juan Jesus Posadas Ocampo, in which the Arellano Felix gang has been implicated. That high-profile assassination brought international attention to the trafficking organization. Another of Benjamin's brothers, Francisco, was arrested soon after on drug charges and sent to La Palma, and Benjamin, Ramon and their brother Javier became fugitives.
Arellano angrily denied any involvement in the Posadas killing. He said he sent a message after the slaying to then-President Carlos Salinas, offering to turn himself in. "But that wouldn't have been convenient for them," he said. "They'd rather blame us for everything."
After Arellano's arrest in March, a judge dismissed all charges against him in the Posadas case for a lack of evidence.
To reach Arellano, visitors must pass through at least 20 sets of barred doors in La Palma, Mexico's most secure federal prison, located about 25 miles west of Mexico City. For the interview, Arellano stood waiting alone in a small prison classroom, where posters warned of the dangers of smoking, and an English lesson on the chalkboard read: "What does Pedro look like? He's fat."
"Hola. Benjamin Arellano," he said, introducing himself in a surprisingly soft voice, holding out a hand to shake. His timid demeanor, more like that of an accountant than a gangster, was hard to square with reports of DEA informants' skulls being cracked open in a vice on his orders.
He is about 5 feet 10, trim, with a bushy black crew cut. He said he is a fitness buff who likes baseball and soccer and never smokes or drinks. His eyes are the color of black coffee, hooded by thick, dark brows. When he speaks he locks eyes with his listener for an uncommonly long time.
Arellano was mostly serious during the 2 1/2-hour interview. But he occasionally lit up with smiles, particularly when talking about how his favorite baseball team, the Anaheim Angels, won the World Series. Arellano, who recently sent a letter to the United Nations protesting the conditions of his imprisonment, said he is almost never allowed out of his cell. He said a video camera is trained on him at all times.
"They watch me when I go to the bathroom, when I bathe, when I eat, when I sleep," he said. "There's always a light on, like I'm a hen they're trying to get to lay an egg." He said his jailers also watch on video during the four-hour conjugal visits he is allowed with his wife every eight days. Conjugal visits are permitted in Mexican prisons.
Arellano said he has occasionally seen his fellow inmate and brother, Francisco, at a distance, but that guards always tell him to turn away and not make eye contact.
Arellano, who did not attend college, was articulate and well-informed during the interview, discussing the recent Moscow theater siege, the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and U.S. politics. Asked who his heroes were, one name came out immediately: "Bill Clinton. He did a lot for the United States and the world."
Arellano, whose wife and four children were born in the United States, also faces drug charges in the United States. U.S. officials said they would like to see him extradited to stand trial in San Diego, a move Arellano said he would fight because extensive publicity about him would make a fair trial impossible.
Arellano answered almost all questions directly, except for one. He was evasive about whether he thinks his brother Ramon is dead or alive. Authorities say Ramon was killed last February in a shootout in the Pacific resort city of Mazatlan. They said the body, which later disappeared under suspicious circumstances, was identified by DNA testing at the FBI lab in Washington.
"The police say he's dead, but I don't know," Arellano said.
Law enforcement officials said Arellano is being coy to scare potential witnesses against him. They said Ramon was so fearsome that many people began to talk only after he was dead.
With Benjamin in jail and Ramon dead, officials said the Arellano Felix organization has been taken over by Javier and Eduardo, their lesser-known brothers. They said with the two main brothers gone, and with President Vicente Fox squeezing the drug trade with more soldiers and police officers, organized crime in Mexico is still strong but less flamboyant, like Chicago without Capone.
US Drugs War Has Hidden Agendas, Says Report – January 2003 Drug War Has Hidden Agendas, Says Report
Published by Associated Press - December, 2002
Copyright: Associated Press
A new report argues that ulterior goals motivate the war on drugs. The governments of struggling nations around the world prohibit the use of certain drugs not only to protect public health and safety, but also because launching and maintaining a war on drugs enables governments to expand their police powers, create enticing political rhetoric, and attract much-needed foreign aid, according to a recent report from an influential California think tank.
And governments are not the only ones who benefit from the war on drugs, says the report.
"Lots of governments, institutions within government, independent originations and some portions of the medical profession and media have gained benefits from telling scary stories about drugs and advocating a criminal response to drug problems," Harry Levine, the author of the paper and a professor of sociology at Queens College, City University of New York, told United Press International.
The paper, "The Secret of Worldwide Drug Prohibition: The Varieties and Uses of Drug Prohibition," appears in the most recent edition of The Independent Review, which is published by the Independent Institute, a non-partisan think tank that focuses on government reform.
Other drug policy experts -- who are also critical of national drug policies like those of the U.S. government, which criminalize illicit drug use and focus on interdiction and incarceration -- say Levine's analysis lacks supporting evidence and flies in the face of historical fact.
In his paper, Levine argues that few people are aware of the global scale of drug prohibition ( every country bans at least some recreational drugs ), or of the political and bureaucratic pressure that blocks reforms of drug policy in many nations.
An advocate of drug law reform, Levine said that governments, politicians and the news media gain political advantages from supporting the anti-drug rhetoric that accompanies drug prohibition. He said that these forces together produce systemic pressure against reforming drug policies.
"There is no doubt that governments throughout the world have accepted drug prohibition because of enormous pressure from the U.S. government and a few powerful allies, but U.S. power alone cannot explain the global acceptance of drug prohibition," writes Levine.
He says that world governments have found their anti-drug forces useful as a means to expand police and military power, because they can conduct surveillance operations and military raids under the guise of the war on drugs that might not have been possible otherwise.
He said that at the local level, drug war policies enable police squads to gain equipment to which they would otherwise not have access, and which benefits other law enforcement efforts.
Mark Kleiman, professor of policy studies at the University of California Los Angeles and a proponent of drug law reform, told UPI that Levine fails to provide any evidence proving that the drug war expands state power.
"What you are supposed to understand by this ( paper ) is that drug prohibition as promoted by states is used to increase their power, but he doesn't provide any evidence of that," said Kleiman. "While it is true that there are advantages to be gained by state cooperation with this international effort, I am not sure that we are using it to elevate state power," he said.
He added that Levine's analysis ultimately misses what is needed to improve public policy regarding illicit drug use.
"There is a tendency of people who are writing about drug policy to do social analysis or psychoanalysis to show how silly their opponents are, rather than asking about what policies would best serve the public interest," said Kleiman.
Beyond his ideas on state power, Levine argued that because drug prohibition is a true "mom and apple pie issue," typically skeptical media outlets and politicians have gained advantages by promoting anti-drug rhetoric.
"I think there are fundamental problems that are underreported and that people don't talk about," he said. "It has not been in anybody's particular interest to talk about international drug prohibition."
Adele Harrell, principal research associate at the Justice Policy Center of the liberal Urban Institute, said that although Levine is correct that the drug war is used as a political tool, his main thesis is unrealistic.
"I think that crime and drug use are routinely used to appeal to people," said Harrell.
"People are afraid of harm from unknown others," she said. "But arguing that drug policy might be due to some sort of secret cabal is almost bizarre. It lacks sound analysis and it doesn't stand up to scrutiny."
Like Kleiman, she said Levine failed to provide any solid evidence for systemic opposition to drug policy reform, although she said there is some research showing that drug policy has, to a certain extent, been used as a tool of social control.
Harrell cited studies demonstrating that through history, criminal penalties have tended to be focused most heavily on particular illicit substances that were associated with problem populations of lesser socioeconomic status and power.
She pointed out the liberalization of marijuana possession laws in the United States during the 1960s and 1970s -- when use of the drug became prevalent among college kids -- as proof that social factors affect the criminal penalties attached to drug use.
"It is the reason we don't do more about alcohol, because it has social and cultural accepted status," said Harrell, noting that peyote and opium are other drugs that have achieved a level of social acceptance in different cultures at various times.
But Harrell said the long history of drug prohibition is mostly directly related to the dangers associated the use of illicit drugs, not attempts to control society.
"It is all about social normalcy," she said. "But the bottom line is that psychoactive substances have a potential for harm, and most societies establish some sort of regulations over their use through formal law and informal social rules. This has been the case throughout the sweep of history."
According to Kleiman, one reason there has been little real progression in drug law reform is that the current public policy debate has been hijacked by competing and sometimes-dishonest ideological forces that fail to look at the issue pragmatically. He said that there is fundamental lack of recognition that while drugs are dangerous and need to be controlled, their use cannot be completely stopped.
"The people who are against the drug war are just as guilty of a big lie as people who are for it," he said. "They keep repeating the same false claims."
Kleiman said that anti-drug war forces perpetuate lies regarding the status of drug offenders in the U.S. prison population. Contrary to popular belief, American prisons are not filled with non-violent drug offenders, he said. The reality is that the majority of people in prison on drug charges are not incarcerated for simple possession but for possession with intent to distribute -- which involves larger amounts of drugs -- or on even more serious trafficking charges.
He added that the substantial number of people incarcerated on simple possession charges have violated their parole and are therefore in prison due to earlier, often harsher crimes.
On the other side of the debate, he said that advocates of the drug war repeat lies, such as the claim that like marijuana is the most dangerous drug in the world because it is a gateway substance that leads users to harder drugs.
Kleiman also said that although Levine is correct for criticizing the media's role in the drug war, he has cited the wrong reason.
"The best move to making the debate over drug policy better would be developing a skeptical press corps," he said. "We have no body of reporters in this country who are experts in drug policy," said Kleiman. "Most of the people that write about drug stories are general assignment reporters and policy reporters, and you can tell them things and they will simply write them down."
He added that the media's focus on the opposing ideological camps in the debate over drug policy leaves the middle ground out of the public discussion. He said the correct path for drug policy is in that middle ground.
Centennial Thoughts: The Indian Hemp Drugs Commission Report – November 2002 Centennial Thoughts: The Indian Hemp Drugs Commission Report
Published by The Schaffer library of drug policy - Tuesday 19 November, 2002
Copyright: The Schaffer library of drug policy
This monumental study exposes the overriding and pervasive powers of contemporary collective denial and moral failure underpinning policies of cannabis prohibition. Motivated by convenient moralism, questions are repeatedly disingenuously raised concerning the harm of hemp drugs, cannabis, or marijuana. The engine of agitprop bureaucratic ire fires up. Hearings are scheduled, witnesses heard, proceedings transcribed, summarized, presented to the requesting organization, discussed, filed, and forgotten. The prohibition policies go on. Enforcement, corrections systems strain under the demands of majoritarian magical beliefs in coercive powers of Government; promoted by continuing self-serving Government misinformation and censorship. From the Indian Hemp Drugs Commission's policy perspective, today's drug polices would be unthinkable.
In the century since the resolution passed the British House of Commons setting up the Indian Hemp Drugs Commission that resulted in this massive inquiry documented in a nine volume report there have been drastic changes in public policy in the United States and Great Britain.
The Indian hemp drug regulation policies were explicitly predicated upon optimal and minimal government intervention.
The subsequent century in the United States, Great Britain, and Europe has seen pandemic spread of prohibitionist authoritarian Government interference- the American Disease- social experiment run amok.
Income taxes, mass conscription, and two world wars have seen regression from utilitarian governance of enlightened non-interference to intrusive majoritarian autocracy. Authoritative Government has become authoritarian. Less and less Government justification and demonstrated necessity are needed. The principle of non-interference is virtually inoperative. The space of human existence where a person reigns uncontrolled contracts even further. The large departments of individualistic human life are contracted or eliminated by laws, public and corporate policy.
The second intervention by Government; giving advice and promulgating information has seen a parallel degradation. From legitimate and trustworthy dissemination of factual information through the institutions of science and medicine to censorship, giving bad advice, dissimulation and deception in the service of coercion and manipulation. The ensuing chaos of ignorance, partial truths, and outright lies has produced a cacophonous toxic confusion surrounding the use of hemp drugs. The font of contemporary knowledge is now a stinking swamp, hopelessly poisoned by the ignorant fantasies, fears, and untruths resulting from prohibitionists' drug propaganda efforts.
Fifty years after the Indian Hemp Drugs Commission Report in America the New York Mayor's Committee on Marihuana reported on use of the drug after a five year study, seven years after national marijuana prohibition. The perspective was based on the premise that departments of human life and individual circle with uncontrolled reign did not include the right to use marihuana. The authoritative Government intervention of Prohibition is now accepted; the non-interference principle of the Millsean Indian Hemp Drugs Administration policy; dead- a luxury enjoyed, ironically, by people of India subjugated by the British imperium.
Descriptions of marihuana use were now from the perspective of studying the characteristics of the users of this illicit drug: to what extent, method of distribution, attitude of smoker toward society and use of the drug, relationship with eroticism, crime, and juvenile delinquency. Discussions of legitimacy of Government intervention are by implication discussing the relative dangerousness of marihuana. The legitimacy of Prohibition as a social policy was neither justified nor discussed. Religious use or freedom is not mentioned.
"I am glad that the sociological, psychological, and medical ills commonly attributed to marihuana have been found to be exaggerated insofar as the City of New York is concerned. I hasten to point out, however, that the findings are to be interpreted only as a reassuring report of progress and not as encouragement to indulgence, for I shall continue to enforce the laws prohibiting the use of marihuana until and if complete findings may justify an amendment to existing laws."
In the 1970 revision in Government marihuana prohibition policy generated another report in 1972: Marihuana: a Signal of Misunderstanding- First Report of the National Commission on Marihuana and Drug Abuse.
Individual rights are at least discussed in order to be heavily discounted:
"So, while we agree with the basic philosophical precept that society may interfere with individual conduct only in the public interest, using coercive measures only when less restrictive measures would not suffice, this principle merely initiates inquiry into a rational social policy but does not identify it. We must take a careful look at this complicated question of the social impact of private behavior. And we must recognize at the outset the inherent difficulty in predicting effects on the public health and welfare, and the strong conflicting notions of what constitutes the public interest."
"Religious freedom" as currently delineated by the Government places the burden on the individual to pass certain "tests" to prove that hemp drugs used for sacramental purposes:
"Cases dealing with religious freedom in other contexts have isolated three distinct foci of inquiry when a law is challenged as violative of the "free exercise" clause: (1) Is the claimant's belief and practice really a "religion" within the meaning of the First Amendment? (2) If so, is the practice prohibited by the challenged statute essential to the practice of the "religion?" (3) Even if the answers to (1) and (2) are yes, is there nevertheless a sufficiently compelling state interest to warrant overriding the practice? Only when the proscribed activity is essential to a qualified "religion" and the state's interest is not overwhelming will the courts invoke the First Amendment to invalidate an otherwise permissible legislative proscription."
In the 1989 Carl Olsen, a white Rastafarian and director of Iowa NORML unsuccessfully attempted a religious freedom defense for charges of marijuana selling and importation for distribution to other members of the Ethiopian Coptic Zion Church.
"If the 'compelling interest' test is to be applied...it must be applied across the board, to all actions thought to be religiously commanded... Any society adopting such a system would be courting anarchy.... The rule respondents favor would open the prospect of constitutionally required religious exemptions from civic obligations of almost every conceivable kind- ranging from compulsory military service....to the payment of taxes.....drug laws."
Dutifully crafted by Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg, now on the supreme court, no question of how authoritative interference of Government is accepted to be appropriate public policy. Religious freedom is now restricted to activity that must be asserted and proven rather than assumed. Proving compelling interest has switched from the Government to the individual.
Departments of human life were seen not to be imperiously guarded for the individual but regarded with mistrust and source of opportunities for dissent against public policy. At the height of the Vietnam war marijuana use was strongly identified with the growing student antiwar resistance.
The non-intervention principle is at least recognized but the departments of individuality and circle around the individual were routinely stepped over by Government with justification in this case for national security. Militarism preempted any considerations of individual rights of privacy. Departments of human life were small and confined to cosmetic obligatory institutional ritual displays in the context of growing public resistance to the American military industrial behemoth run amok in southeast Asia.
Notwithstanding the cautious conclusion of the Commission to critically examine the policies of marijuana prohibition, the report was conspicuously rejected sight unseen by then president Richard M. Nixon to demonstrate his being "tough on crime" in a presidency struggling to end the Vietnam war.
Twenty-two years later on the centennial of the Indian Hemp Drugs Commission Report finds the principle of Government non-interference is an all but forgotten faded idealistic icon, given hollow obeisance at state ceremonies, a quaint philosophical curiosity of the past. The circle around the individual is reduced to a pale, flaccid, tattered, transparent, and permeable membrane. Intrusion is limited only by available funding to Government interference. The worsening of the balance of power between the individual and state has increased by an order of magnitude, facilitated by advances in technology.
Toqueville in his prophetic Democracy in America warns of dangerous forms of despotism in democratic, egalitarian America:
"A great many persons of the present day are quite contented with this sort of compromise between administrative despotism and the sovereignty of the people; and they think they have done enough for the protection of individual freedom when they have surrendered it to the power of the nation at large. This does not satisfy me: the nature of him I am to obey signifies less to me than the fact of extorted obedience."
"Thus it every day renders the exercise of the free agency of man less useful and less frequent; it circumscribes the will within a narrower range and gradually robs a man of all the uses of himself. The principle of equality has prepared men for these things; it has predisposed men to endure them and often to look upon them as benefits.
After having thus successively taken each member of the community in its powerful grasp and fashioned him at will, the supreme power then extends its arm over the whole community. It covers the surface of society with a network of small complicated rules, minute and uniform, through which the most original minds and most energetic characters cannot penetrate, to rise above the crowd. The will of the man is not shattered, but softened, bent, and guided; men are seldom forced by it to act, but they are constantly restrained from acting. Such a power does not destroy, but it prevents existence, it does not tyrannize, but it compresses, enervates, extinguishes, and stupefies a people, till each nation is reduced to nothing better than a flock of timid and industrious animals, of which the government is the shepherd."
Attacked by oaths of "drug free," informers (including children), undercover police, drug-sniffing dogs, random and warrantless searches, child snatching, drug testing, forfeiture of property, surveillance of bank, business, electricity, and other records, the departments of human life wither. The parts of human life considered reserved territory are noticeably smaller- the individual, society and "civilization" suffer the loss.
Review of the Indian Hemp Drugs Commission Report is important for perspective in assessing the legitimacy and direction of contemporary Government drug policy in a democratic society. Froude's theorem of functional governance: "no laws are of any service which are above the working level of public morality, and evasion." was of importance to feudal England, the Indian Hemp Drugs Commission in 1894 and a century later a public policy issue of prime magnitude.
THM April 16, 1994
http://www.druglibrary.org/schaffer/index.htm
Physical, Mental, and Moral Effects of Marijuana – I.H.D.C.R – November 2002 Physical, Mental, and Moral Effects of Marijuana: The Indian Hemp Drugs Commission Report
Published by The Schaffer library of drug policy - Tuesday 19 November, 2002
Copyright: The Schaffer library of drug policy
Table of contents
History of British Involvement
FORMATION OF THE COMMISSION
PROCEDURES
Physical Effects of Chronic Cannabis Use
Cannabis and Insanity
Cannabis and Crime
Conclusions
Physical Effects
Mental Effects
Moral Effects
Discussion
The Indian Hemp Drugs Commission Report (1894), comprising some seven volumes and 3,281 pages, is by far the most complete and systematic study of marijuana undertaken to date. Because of the rarity and, perhaps, the formidable size of this document, the wealth of information contained in it has not found its way into contemporary writings on this subject. This is indeed unfortunate, as many of the issues concerning marijuana being argued in the United States today were dealt with in the Indian Hemp Drugs Commission Report.
It is both surprising and gratifying to note the timeless and lucid quality of the writings of these British colonial bureaucrats. It would be fortunate if studies undertaken by contemporary commissions, task force committees, and study groups could measure up to the standards of thoroughness and general objectivity embodied in this report. In the current context of violently polarized attitudes toward marijuana, the prospect of a study of similar stature is bleak.
The scope of this paper is necessarily limited to the issues of physical, mental, and moral effects of hemp drugs as discussed in the report, although the topics of cultivation, processing, and administrative control schemes make up significant portions of the work itself.
History of British Involvement
The British government in India had substantial knowledge of intoxicants other than alcohol because of active involvement in regulation, taxation, and actual trafficking in these substances for over a hundred years prior to the Hemp Drugs Commission investigation and report.
In 1790 duties on alcohol and other intoxicant drugs were first levied by the British on landlords in India. The regulation of cannabis preparations was further specified in 1793 in Regulation XXXIV of that year. "No person shall manufacture or vend any such drugs (bhang,2 ganja,3 charas,4 and other intoxicating drugs) without a license from the collector of the zillah5" (3:16).
This system of regulations was instituted "with a view to check immoderate consumption, and at the same time to augment the public revenue" (3:16).
In 1800 in a further modification of regulation, the manufacture and sale of charas was prohibited as "being of a most noxious quality" (3:16), while daily rates of duty were declared as the basis for taxing procedures. Curiously, in 1824 the restriction on charas was rescinded "as this drug was found on examination to be not more prejudicial to health than ganja or other intoxicating drugs" (3:16).
In 1849 limits on retail sale of cannabis drugs were fixed "for better securing the abkari6 revenue of Calcutta," and later extended to the whole of Bengal (3:16). Four years later the daily tax method was abandoned and a fee charged on a per weight basis, and in 1860 an additional set of dealers fees' imposed (3:16).
It should be noted, however, that the system of the state of Bengal was only one of several schemes among the many provinces. Variations on this approach existed in the other states, a function of the differing local administrations, reflecting the degree of administrative and fiscal controls exerted by the Imperial government.
There had apparently been controversies as to the possible noxious effects of cannabis drugs at least from the time of the inception of British controls on these products, unless we assume that the initial stated reasons for regulation were merely cynical rationalizations for obtaining additional sources of revenue. Within a country of several hundred millions of inhabitants, divided into hundreds of regions, and with only rudimentary "homogenizing" forces of effective transportation and mass media, it is perhaps reasonable to infer that wide variations in opinions and beliefs would be encountered.
1 Report of the Indian Hemp Drugs Commission, 1893-94. Simla, India: Government Central Printing House, 1894, 7 vols. All references in this paper are to volumes of the Report.
Received for publication December 1967
2 Leaves and flowers of wild growing or inferior cultivated cannabis plants.
3 Flowering tops of the cannabis plant.
4 Resin from the mature cannabis plant.
5 A county-sized district or administrative division.
6 Manufacture or sale of intoxicating liquors or drugs: hence, an excise or internal revenue tax on such manufacture or sale (Ankara: A wine seller; distiller. Also, one whose trade is subject to abkari tax).
FORMATION OF THE COMMISSION
On 2 March 1893 (1:1,n) a question was raised in the British House of Commons concerning the effects of the production and consumption of hemp drugs in the province of Bengal, India. In response, the Government of India convened a seven-member commission to look into these questions on 3 July 1893 (1:1). Upon the suggestion of Lord Kimberley the scope of the investigation was expanded to include all of India.
PROCEDURES
The Commission actually met for the first time in Calcutta on 3 August 1893 (1:4). Between this date and 6 August of the following year, when the study was finished (1:361), the Commission received evidence from 1,193 witnesses (1:12). Field trips were made to thirty cities in eight provinces and Burma from the end of October 1893 through the latter part of April 1894 (1:9-10). Eighty-six meetings for examination of witnesses transpired during the inquiry. Actual participation of the members of the Commission was duly noted and reported - a custom that it might be worthwhile to revive.
The statement on the previous page shows the attendance of the members of the Commission during the period occupied in inquiry (3rd August 1893 to 25th April 1894).
Witnesses whose evidence was received by the Commission were divided into three categories:
(1) Official witnesses able to give information regarding hemp drugs, based on their official and local experience.
(2) Non-official witnesses of all ranks able to give information regarding the drugs generally or in connection with certain classes of the people.
(3) Other persons or associations having facts or holding opinions which they desired to communicate to the Commission (1:11).
Categories and numbers of the witnesses were (1:12):
Civil Officers 467
Medical Officers 214
Private Practitioners (European methods) 34
Private Practitioners (Native methods) 87
Cultivators 144
Professional Men 55
Missionaries 34
Associations 24
Persons engaged in Trade 75
Others 59
Total 1,193
To facilitate collection of information, seventy questions framed by the Commission were given to the witnesses. The written answers to these questions constituted the bulk of the evidence before the Commission (1:13). Where appropriate, witnesses were examined orally for further clarification or explanation. In addition, witnesses who had not submitted written statements were examined orally. It was duly noted in the record which forms of testimony had been provided by the individual witnesses. The following were the questions dealing with effects of hemp drugs with regard to adverse physical consequences, insanity, and the causation of crime (4:iii):
45. (a) Does the habitual moderate use of any of these drugs produce any noxious effects - physical, mental, or moral?
(b) Does it impair the constitution in any way?
(c) Does it injure the digestion or cause loss of appetite?
(d) Does it cause dysentery, bronchitis, or asthma?
(e) Does it impair the moral sense or induce laziness or habits of immortality or debauchery?
(f) Does it deaden the intellect or produce insanity?
If it produces insanity, then of what type, and is it temporary or permanent?
If temporary, may the symptoms be re-induced by use of the drug after liberation from restraint?
Are there any typical symptoms?
Do insanes, who have no recorded ganja history, confess to the use of the drug?
(g) In such cases of the alleged connection between insanity and the use of hemp as are known to you, are you of opinion that the use of the drug by persons suffering from mental anxiety or brain disease to obtain relief his been sufficiently considered in explaining that connection?
And do you think there is any evidence to indicate that insanity may often tend to indulgence in the use of hemp drugs by a person who is deficient in self-control through weakened intellect?
Give an account under each of these points of any cased with which you are acquainted.
46. Discuss the same questions in regard to the habitual excessive use of any of these drugs.
51. (a) Are any large proportion of bad characters habitual moderate consumers of any of these drugs?
(b) What connection, if any, has the moderate use with crime in general or with crime of any special character?
52. Discuss the same question in regard to the excessive use of any of these drugs.
53. Does excessive indulgence in any of these drugs incite to unpremeditated crime, violent or otherwise? Do you know of any case in which it has led to temporary homicidal frenzy?
Are these drugs used by criminals to fortify themselves to commit a premeditated act of violence or other crime?
Physical Effects of Chronic Cannabis Use
The Commission sought to evaluate alleged connections of hemp drug use with disorders other than mental. Popular opinion held that the use of hemp drugs led to the physical disorders of dysentery, bronchitis, and asthma:
In regard to these definite physical results, the only evidence to which much weight can be attached is the evidence of the medical witnesses. From their training and opportunities of observation they are the only witnesses qualified to give reliable evidence. It is proposed to examine this medical evidence in detail (1:205).
The Commission reviewed and discussed medical evidence given by 335 physicians7 throughout India from Bengal, Assam, North-Western Provinces, Punjab, Central Provinces, Madras, Bombay, Sind, Burma, and Berar. The testimony from the array of medical witnesses from Bengal illustrates the confusion and the lack of knowledge among the members of our profession:
In Bengal eight commissioned medical officers were examined on the effect of the moderate use of the drugs. Surgeon-Lieutenant-Colonel Russell (witness No. 105), 20 years in civil employ in Bengal and Assam, a witness whose evidence has frequently been quoted by the Commission, stated that the use of the drug does not cause bronchitis, dysentery, or asthma, and that scarcely any other noxious effects are induced. Surgeon-Lieutenant-Colonel Russiel Lall Dutt (witness No. 107) an officer of over 20 years' experience, stated "Very moderate smoking of Ganja or charas or moderate drinking of siddhi in infusion do not produce any appreciable effects. . . but these moderate cases are seldom long-lived. There is in them a slow and insidious undermining process going on in their digestive, respiratory, and nervous system, which predispose them to acute diseases and cut their lives short." Surgeon-Lieutenant-Colonel Price (witness No. 108), of 21 years' service, who had frequently come across consumers of hemp drugs, was unable to answer the question regarding effects. Surgeon-Captain Prain (witness No. 113) stated: "I do not believe that the habitual moderate use of any of these drugs produces any noxious effects - physical, mental, or moral. I think that perhaps the use of bhang does injure the digestion and impair appetite even when used moderately, but I am convinced that it neither causes dysentery, bronchitis, or asthma." Surgeon-Major Cobb (witness No. 110) stated that the drugs did not cause asthma, bronchitis, or dysentery; and in cross-examination he stated: "I have no experience that the excessive use of the drug produces dysentery and bowel complaints." Surgeon-Lieutenant-Colonel Flood Murray (witness No. 102), five years in military service and nineteen years in civil employ, quoted the opinion of a pandit8 whom he consulted regarding the ill effects of the drugs. In cross-examination he stated: "The general statement as contained in my written answer is a statement made to me by this hakim9 and others to whom I applied for information. My own experience in no way corroborates it." Surgeon-Lieutenant-Colonel Bovill (witness No. 109), of 21 years' service, stated that the habitual moderate use of bhang does not produce any ill effects, and in many cases that of ganja is equally harmless. He added; "I know of no case where it has caused bronchitis, dysentery, or asthma, but I have noted hoarseness of the voice probably due to some laryngeal irritation among ganja smokers." Surgeon-Lieutenant-Colonel Crombie (witness No. 104), of over 20 years' service, is not aware of any ill effects being produced by the moderate use of the drugs; but he added: "If any were produced, the use would no longer be moderate, but excessive." In cross-examination Dr. Crombie stated: "I have had no experience of any diseases attributable to ganja. My experience has been chiefly in Eastern Bengal, where ganja is largely consumed."
Twenty-three assistant surgeons were examined. Assistant Surgeon Devendranath Roy (witness No. 123), of over 20 years' service, and who has had service in Rajputana, the North-Western Provinces, Behar, and Bengal, where hemp drugs are used by a large portion of the people, is of opinion that those who smoke ganja not more than twice or thrice a day do not suffer in general health; bhang does not impair the digestion, whereas ganja does. "Those of my patients," he remarks "who admitted having been habitual ganja smokers suffered from dysentery or diarrhoea, but they have been exposed to conditions which produce these ailments. Hence I do not draw any conclusion as to ganja being a primary cause of those diseases." Assistant Surgeon Preonath Bose (witness No. 122), Teacher of Materia Medica and Pharmacy in the Dacca Medical School, clearly has no personal knowledge of the effects, as he remarked: "Evidence on these points is conflicting. Some of the consumers maintain, others deny, that evil effects are produced." Another teacher at the same school (witness No. 121 ) stated: "Evidence on these points is conflicting. The general consensus of opinion is that the habitual moderate use of bhang and ganja does not impair the constitution." Assistant Surgeon Soorjee Narain Singh, of 28 years' service, now Teacher of Materia Medica, Patna Medical School (witness No. 125), stated that "habitual moderate consumers of bhang, ganja or charas do not apparently suffer from any injurious effects." Assistant Surgeon Narendra Nath Gupta (witness No. 120), as Deputy Superintendent of Vaccination and as Deputy Sanitary Commissioner and as Civil Medical Officer has had considerable opportunities for noting the effects of the drugs. His opinion is that the moderate use of ganja and bhang does not produce any noxious effects. Durga Dass Lahiri, L.M.S. (witness No. 132), a private medical practitioner, said: "I have not seen any evil results mentioned when taken moderately, but it is very difficult to keep to moderation." Assistant Surgeon Taraprosanna Roy (witness No. 116) is Chemical Examiner to the Government of Bengal. He stated that the habitual moderate use of the three drugs is not known to produce any noxious effects. Assistant Surgeon Bosonto Kumar Sen (witness No. 119) has had service in ganja producing districts. He stated that the use of ganja and bhang products noxious effects, and "generally produce dysentery, asthma, and bronchitis." The cross-examination of this witness is of interest. "I have seen more than one person, about half a dozen, in my village. . . suffering from dysentery, bronchitis, and asthma who were also ganja smokers. They were all excessive smokers. These effects do not follow the moderate, but the excessive, use. It is a mistake to have put them under the moderate use. . . . The fact that they were ganja smokers led me to believe that these effects were due to ganja . . . I have no recollection of ever treating any case of dysentery, bronchitis, or asthma caused by ganja. These cases are the basis of my remarks. I do not remember any case of dysentery, bronchitis, or asthma in a ganja smoker which I attributed to any other cause. In other words, when I saw ganja smokers suffering from these diseases, I attributed them to ganja. This was twenty years ago, before I was a medical student." Pyari Sankar Dass Gupta, L.M.S. (witness No. 134), is a private medical practitioner, Secretary to the Bogra Medical Society of ten members, and a member of a temperance association founded by the late Keshub Chunder Sen. The witness is pledged against the use of all intoxicants. The witness submitted three papers to the Commission which seem to illustrate the development of tradition into opinion. In one paper the witness states: "The smokers of ganja often suffer from hoarseness of voice produced by the continual inhalation of its fumes, giving rise to sore-throat, bronchitis, and carbonaceous phthisis. It has long been a tradition in our country that the ganja-khors always die of dysentery, their intestines gradually sloughing away." In his second paper the witness states "Ganja smokers generally die of bloody dysentery, asthma and phthisis, and haemoptysis." And in his last paper he says: "It produces bloody dysentery and chest diseases, blood spitting, bronchitis, asthma, and phthisis." Kailas Chundra Bose, L.M.S. (witness No. 135), is a private medical practitioner in Calcutta with an extensive practice. He states that no ill effects are produced by the moderate use, and that, instead of causing bronchitis, dysentery, or asthma, it relieves these afflictions. The witness, however, states in his oral examination: "My experience is not to any large extent what I have gathered in my practice, but rather what I have learnt from smokers." Assistant Surgeon Akbar Khan (witness No. 124) is another Teacher in the Patna Medical School. He states the habitual moderate use of any of the drugs does not produce noxious effects, but that charas and ganja cause dysentery, bronchitis, and asthma if the consumers are not well fed. Witnesses Nos. 126 and 138 consider that no ill effects are produced. Assistant Surgeon Upendra Nath Sen (witness No. 118) states that bronchitis, and asthma are common complaints of ganja smokers. Madhab Krishna Dass, L.M.S. (witness No. 158) a private practitioner in Calcutta, considers that smoking may cause dysentery, bronchitis, or asthma. Assistant Surgeon Durga
Nath Chakravarti (witness No. 150) considers that "ganja causes dysentery after a long run." Annoda Prasanna Ghatak, M.B. (witness No. 149), a private medical practitioner, considers that digestive complaints are caused when good food is not procurable. Rakhal Das Ghosh, L.M.S., (witness No. 149) a private practitioner in Calcutta, had apparently seen no ill effects caused by the drug. The remaining witnesses in this class clearly failed to discriminate between the moderate and excessive use and their evidence has not been considered.
Three hospital assistants were examined. One gave no reply regarding moderate use. The other stated: "The habitual moderate use of ganja or charas does not produce any noxious effects - physical, mental, or moral, but the use of ganja impairs the constitution in some way or other . . . and has a tendency toward bronchitis and asthma." Witness No. 145 is a vernacular class hospital assistant, but not now in Government employ. According to this witness, moderate use of ganja leads to excessive use. "The habitual moderate consumers, as well as the excessive consumers, suffer in their lungs and become insane . . . No intoxicant can be taken in moderation except when administered medicinally."
Fifteen native practitioners were examined. Bijoya Ratna Son (witness No. 151), a kabiraj10 practising in Calcutta, considers that the habitual moderate use of ganja or charas, but not siddhi, may in some cases cause bronchitis, dysentery or asthma. Witness No. 152, also of Calcutta, gives the same reply couched in the same language. Witness No. 126, of Nattore, in the Rajsha-hi district, and witness No. 153, of Calcutta, both consider the moderate use harmless. Piyari Mohan (witness No. 154), a kabiraj states: "I know it causes dysentery and I believe owing to its healing power it can cause bronchitis and asthma." Kedareswar Acharjya (Witness No. 137) remarks: "Those ganja smokers who cannot command abundant wholesome food suffer from dysentery, but it is difficult to determine how far it is due to ganja or to improper food. As to asthma, I have not seen any typical case originating from ganja smoking. I know that a chronic catarrhal condition of the air passages with a certain amount of spasm is the misfortune of many old ganja smokers. I know a friend who suffered from chronic bronchitis, and in whom asthmatic fits were induced by attempts to smoke ganja." The witness refers also to another case in which a habitual ganja smoker had an asthmatic attack which subsided on breaking off the habit and reappeared on resuming it." This witness lays stress in personal idiosyncrasy as modifying the effects of the drugs, and on the importance of a diet rich in fat. Witness No. 155, another kabiraj, states that, while no ill effects are produced, occasionally it entices dysentery, bronchitis, and asthma. Witness No. 128, also a kabiraj, states that, according to the Aurveda Shastra, smoking these drugs causes bronchitis and asthma, and in his opinion "even the moderate use of any of these drugs, not according to the rules of Shastra, is injurious in its effects." This witness does not appear to have any personal knowledge of ill effects, but to base his views on the teachings of the Shastras. Witness No. 139 states: "Certainly they produce effects on the moral and physical constitution," but as the witness is silent as to the effects of excessive use, probably he has not discriminated between the two uses of the drugs. Witness No. 157, a valid11, considers that even the habitual moderate use of these drugs produces noxious effects. This is the pandit who was consulted by Dr. Flood Murray (witness No. 102), and who produced two cases of hemp drug asthma and weakened heart for Dr. Murray's inspection. These seem to have been the only cases in any way connected with hemp drug that he had. Witness No. 146 is a zamindar12 and medical practitioner, and does not reply as to effects. Witness No. 147 studied two and half years at the Calcutta Medical College, but took no degree. He states that no noxious effects are produced without giving details (1:205-8).
After reviewing similar conflicting testimony from the other states, the Commission concluded:
The medical evidence which has thus been analyzed very clearly indicates in the opinion of the Commission that when the basis of the opinions as to the alleged evil effects of the moderate use of the drugs is subjected to careful examination, the grounds on which the allegations are founded, prove to be in the highest degree defective. A large number of medical witnesses of all classes, ascribe dysentery, bronchitis, and asthma to the moderate use of the drugs. An equally representative number give a diametrically opposite opinion. The most, striking feature of the medical evidence is perhaps the large number of practitioners of long experience who have seen no evidence of any connection between hemp drugs and disease, and when witnesses who speak to these ill effects from the moderate use are cross-examined it is found that (a) their opinions are based on popular ideas on the subject; (b) they have not discriminated between the effects of moderate and excessive use of the drugs; (c) they have accepted the disease as being induced by hemp drugs because the patients confessed to the habit; and (d) the fact has been overlooked that the smoking of hemp drugs is recognized as a remedial agent in asthma and bronchitis. A few witnesses incidentally refer to personal idiosyncrasy as perhaps being a factor in rendering some consumers of the drugs less tolerant and more liable to be affected by them even when used in moderate quantity. This view the Commission are prepared to accept; but for the vast majority of consumers, the Commission consider that the evidence shows the moderate use of ganja or charas not to be appreciably harmful, while in the case of moderate bhang drinking the evidence shows the habit to be quite harmless. As in long continued and excessive cigarette smoking considerable bronchial irritation and chronic catarrhal laryngitis may he induced, so, too, may a similar condition be caused by excessive ganja or charas smoking; and to the oetiology of bronchial catarrh and asthma in ganja smokers the Commission have already referred. The direct connection alleged between dysentery and the use of hemp drugs the Commission consider to be wholly without any foundation. In the case of bhang there is nothing in the physiological action of the drug which could in any way set up an acute inflammation of the large intestine resulting in ulceration. On the contrary, it is well known that hemp resin is a valuable remedial agent in dysentery. As regards ganja or charas smoking inducing dysentery, even assuming that the products of the destructive distillation of the drugs directly reached the intestines, there is evidence that those products, when condensed and injected into a cat's stomach, failed to induce any inflammatory process. The connection, therefore, between hemp drug smoking and dysentery appears even remoter than in the case of bhang drinking and that disease and cannot be accepted by any stretch of the imagination as even a possible direct cause of dysentery ( 1: 223).
7 214 Medical Officers, 34 Practitioners of European medicine and 87 Practitioners of native methods.
8 Learned man, teacher; esp., a Brahman versed in Sanskrit, and in the science, laws, and religion of the Hindus; in Kashmir, any clerk or native official.
9 In Moslem countries, a ruler or a judge.
10 A member of a Unitarian reform sect of India based upon the teachings of Kabir (Hindu mystic and poet, c. 1450-1518).
11 A native practitioner.
12 A land owner; also: Formerly, under the Mohammedan administration, a collector of the land revenue of a specified district for the government. Now, usually a kind of feudatory recognized as an actual proprietor so long as he pays the government a fixed revenue averaging in different provinces less than one-half the net revenue (India).
Cannabis and Insanity
Because many people believed that the use of hemp drugs led to insanity, especially in the case of prolonged use of large amounts of charas and perhaps ganja, the Commission addressed a significant amount of effort to the study of this topic ( 1: 225 and all of Vol. 2). In addition to the testimony received from physicians, the Commission set about to evaluate all cases admitted to the Indian mental hospitals for the year 1892 that were listed as being caused by hemp drugs ( 1:227).
Initial inquiry into the Dullunda Asylum at Calcutta led the Commission to distrust the asylum statistics. Because of incomplete figures, frequent absence of supporting data and outright errors, the Commission decided to take up each of the cases of 1892 separately and to inquire as fully as possible into its history (1:227).
In the course of its inquiry into the 24 asylums in India and Burma, the Commission sharply criticized the testimony of the reporting superintendents:
They have known nothing of the effects of the drugs at all, though the consumption is so extensive, except that cases of insanity have been brought to them attributed with apparent authority to hemp drugs. They have generalized from this limited and one-sided experience. They have concluded that hemp drugs produce insanity in every case, or in the great majority of cases, of consumption. They have had no idea that in the vast majority of cases this result does not follow the use. They have accordingly without sufficient inquiry assisted, by the statistics they have supplied and by the opinions they have expressed, in stereotyping the popular opinion and giving it authority and permanence (1:226).
With such hindrances to the inquiry into the connection between hemp drugs and insanity, the Commission, after careful inquiry into the 222 cases allegedly attributed to hemp drugs, from among the total of 2,344 patients admitted during the year 1892 to asylums, concluded, with reservation, that some 61 cases might have been caused by hemp drugs alone:
Even in regard to the remaining 61 cases, it must be borne in mind that it is impossible to say that the use of hemp drugs was in all the sole cause of insanity, or indeed any part of the cause. The following considerations combine to demand caution and reserve in pronouncing an opinion on this point.
Firstly, there are twelve cases in which it has been found impossible to obtain any further information by local inquiry. In these cases we are thrown back on the original papers and the asylum history. Besides these, there are ten more cases in which the patients are beggars and foreign laborers about whose past history no satisfactory information is obtainable. Thus there remain only 39 of these 61 cases about which anything like a satisfactory inquiry has been possible. Further, a great majority of these cases come from the lower orders of cultivators and laborers, from whom information of any value is very difficult to obtain as to other than the most apparent causes. The fact of the existence of the hemp habit is easy enough to ascertain, but that it is the cause, or one of the causes of the insanity, or that it even preceded the insanity, is much more difficult to establish.
Secondly, the method of inquiry has not been satisfactory in regard to all the cases referred for local inquiry. In regard to the great majority, the instructions issued by the Commission as to the agency by which this further inquiry should be conducted have been carried out. But in some, it will be observed, even this further inquiry has been left to the police. Then again there are cases, such as those of the Hyderabad (Sind) Asylum, in which the Superintendent has necessarily been the principal agent in the inquiry, and has, perhaps, not unnaturally, but certainly unfortunately, evinced a strong tendency to defend the old asylum entries regarding cause. The series of questions framed by the Civil Surgeon of Delhi for use in the further inquiry also illustrates a tendency to assume that the cases were hemp drug cases, and thus to limit the scope of the inquiry.
Thirdly, it may be noted that excess in the use of hemp drugs is very frequently only one of several vices in which a dissipated man indulges. Further inquiry has proved this in several cases. There is strong probability that had information been complete, it would have been established in many more cases. It is impossible in such cases to say definitely to what form of excess insanity may be mainly due. Further, it is an accepted and established fact that intemperance of any kind may sometimes be not the cause of insanity, but an early manifestation of mental instability. Dr. Conolly Norman (Hack Tuke's Dictionary of Psychological Medicine; article "Mania") says: "The patient also indulges in intoxicants with very undue or unwonted freedom, and thereby precipitates the course and aggravates the symptoms of his disease." One or two cases have been rejected by the Commission on the ground that the evidence merely showed that the habit of use of hemp began at the same time as the mental aberration, or even later. There may have been other cases in which this would have been shown had the information been complete. It is possible therefore that more complete information might have shown in some cases, not only that other causes contributed to the insanity, but also that hemp drugs had nothing whatever to do with inducing it.
These and similar considerations already indicated demand caution in the expression of any judgment as to the causation of insanity in this country. If in England opinion, based on inquiries such as are there possible, has to be stated with caution, this is much more necessary here. In many or the cases in which the hemp drug habit has been established, it is impossible to feel certain in view of the defective character of the information that the drugs have been the sole cause, or perhaps indeed a cause at all, of the insanity (1:241-2).
Summing up, the Commission indicates the difficulties that prevent conclusive answers to the question of causality between the use of hemp drugs and insanity:
In answering the question therefore, on what the evidence rests that hemp drugs may induce mental aberration, the Commission would offer the following remarks: The evidence may he considered under two heads - (a) popular; (b) scientific. The popular idea that the use of hemp drugs may induce insanity can be traced back for many centuries, and the present day views on the subject are no doubt the outcome of old popular ideas which have been handed down and become concrete. With non-medical wit the mere use of the drug along with the fact of insanity, as the evidence shows, has as a rule been accepted as cause and effect. Of the large number of medical witnesses who have given evidence before the Commission, probably not a single one has ever observed the inception of the habit and the use giving rise to mental aberration, and been in a position to gauge the value of other contributory causes if present. With practically no modern literature on the subject, with no special knowledge apart from the popular idea, with a very slight or no clinical experience of insanity in England, with the experience derived from perhaps having had half a dozen insanes in the course of two years under observation as Civil Surgeons, officers have been placed in charge of asylums, and have had to differentiate between cases of hemp drug insanity and ordinary mania. The careful inquiry which has been made by the Commission into all the alleged hemp drug cases admitted in one year into asylums in British India demonstrates conclusively that the usual mode of differentiating between hemp drug insanity and ordinary mania was in the highest degree uncertain, and therefore fallacious. Even after the inquiry which has been conducted, it cannot be denied that in some of the cases at least the connection between hemp drugs and insanity has not been conclusively established (1:250).
Thus, final answers to this pressing but complex question of the causal relation between hemp drugs use and insanity, as such, remain obscured.
With their usual thoroughness, the Commission sought to explore the possible structural changes to the brain caused by chronic hemp drugs use. Because data from neuropathologic studies based on postmortem examinations was wholly lacking, Brigade-Surgeon-Lieutenant-Colonel D.D. Cunningham, F.R.S.. C.I.E., undertook three experiments at the Biological Laboratory attached to the Zoological Garden in Calcutta to evaluate the effects following the continued administration of hemp drugs to monkeys (3:192-6).
The first study dealt with the chronic smoking of ganja in a 16 lb. male rhesus monkey. By means of a smoking chamber, the animal was administered 181 inhalations of ganja smoke over a period of about 8 1/3 months. The daily dose was supplied by a habitué, the amount administered being proportional by weight to that consumed daily by the chronic user. An autopsy performed after sacrificing the animal, including gross examination of the brain, revealed an absence of any pathology.
The second experiment examined the effects of chronic oral ingestion of charas, with the daily dose again obtained from a chronic user on a comparative weight basis. The animals used this time were two smaller cynomolgus monkeys, weighing 5 lb. 7 oz. and 4 lb. 1oz. The study lasted 67 days, the animals receiving the drug mixed in milk on 62 days. Because either minimal or no effects were noted, the dose was increased from the usual 1/2 grain to 2 and then 3 grains about a week before termination of the study. Although no behavioral effects were noted with this higher dose schedule, the animals refused to eat the charas-treated milk after three days, bringing the study to a premature end. These animals were not sacrificed.
The third investigation evaluated the effects on a rhesus monkey of the smoking of dhatura daily, for six weeks. The same inhalation chamber was used as in the first experiment. Unfortunately the size of the dose is not specified. Post-mortem examination of the central nervous system revealed the following effects:
On opening the cranium the dura-mater was found to be somewhat thickened and, especially in the neighbourhood of the superior longitudinal sinus, very conspicuously congested. In this region, too, the membrane in the occipital region was fixed to the cranial walls by soft, very vascular adhesions. The piamater was thickened and so highly injected throughout that the cerebral surface had a generally diffused pink tint. The cerebral substance was everywhere abnormally soft and so friable as to render any immediate removal of the membranes impossible without the occurrence of much destruction of the nervous tissue. Like the surface, although in minor degree, it was of a pinkish tinge owing to abnormal accumulation of blood. Conditions or this kind appeared to be universally diffused throughout the whole of the cerebral centres, the texture of the hemispheres, of the cerebellum and of the basal ganglia being alike soft, and the evidence of abnormal congestion universally distributed. In spite of this, however, the spinal cord and its membranes were to all appearance perfectly healthy.
In so far as a single experiment goes the results in this case would, then, seem in show that the habitual inhalation of the smoke of dhatura, even when only practised for a relatively brief period, is sufficient to establish serious morbid changes in the cerebral nervous centres, and that it therein differs from the habitual inhalation of the smoke of ganja extending over a much more prolonged period. This clearly indicates the necessity of distinguishing between cases in which ganja alone is employed from those in which a mixture of ganja and dhatura is substituted for it, as otherwise certain prejudicial effects which are really due to the use of the latter drug may be erroneously credited to the former one" (3:195-6).
Comparisons made concerning organic brain pathology caused by alcohol (whose effects were well known from other studies) and dhatura left the Commission with the impression that these other Intoxicants were far more hazardous than hemp drugs:
So far as the information from all sources before the Commission is concerned there is no evidence of any brain lesions being directly caused by hemp drugs, as they have been found to be caused by alcohol and dhatura; and there is evidence that the coarse brain lesions produced by alcohol and dhatura are not produced by hemp drugs (1,251).
The complex phenomenon of intoxication, as such, was noted by the Commission:
The individual factor with its idiosyncrasies plays here, as everywhere, a very important part. There are other factors, too, which have to be considered, the degree of education, reason, locality, dosage, and mode of preparation of the drug, all of which may modify the symptoms. Thus the hallucinations of the Western people under the influence of hashish are not identical with the voluptuous dreams of the Orientals ( 1:253).
Of more functional import is the discussion of medico-legal questions involved in the confusion between intoxication and insanity:
A more serious result of this confusion is that there are cases in which men who have committed offenses, especially crimes of violence, under the influence of hemp drugs have been acquitted on the ground of insanity, although the circumstances have been such that had the intoxicant been alcohol, they would have been convicted. It is undoubtedly more difficult in the case of ganja than in the case of alcohol to recognize the line drawn for social and legal purposes between intoxication and insanity. But the difficulty is not insuperable. The main reason for the confusion that has existed is probably the ignorance that has prevailed regarding hemp drugs. When they are recognized as a common intoxicant, it is to be hoped that the practice of the Courts will be freed from the occasional blemishes above indicated. It is not expedient nor is it just that intoxication from hemp drugs should secure immunity from punishment which is not allowed to alcohol (1:254).
Cannabis and Crime
The use of hemp drugs had been implicated as a cause of crime:
In discussing the connection of hemp drugs with crime, it is necessary to discriminate between any effect which they may be supposed to produce of crime in general and the unpremeditated crimes of violence to which intoxication may give rise. Thus there are those who allege that the habitual use of alcohol, at all events if carried to excess, degrades the mind and character of the consumer and predisposes him to crime in general, or to crimes of particular character, especially to offenses against property. Drink is thus so down sometimes as one of the most efficient agencies for increasing the criminal classes. On the other hand, there are well known cases in which intoxication from alcohol has led to crimes of an occasional and exceptional character generally to unpremeditated crimes of violence or other unpremeditated offenses against the person. These two classes of cases should be carefully distinguished and treated separately (1:253-6).
In addition to hearing testimony of numerous enforcement and county officials, the Commission examined the 81 case records of crimes of violence alleged to have been caused by cannabis drugs in the whole of India over the prior 20 years. The Commission immediately excluded 5 of these cases, ascertaining either that data included in abstracts of the court records did not support the assertion that hemp drugs were causative factor, or that the records were unavailable.
In each of the remaining 23 cases, the Commission reviewed the court transcripts and examined, where possible, individuals who were connected, with the case (1:259-60; 3:262-6). The Commission concluded:
Of these twenty-three cases, then, the records in not less than eighteen show that the crimes cannot be connected with hemp drugs. There is one case of which doubt is thrown by subsequent discoveries. The connection between drugs and crime is only established in the remaining four. It is astonishing to find how detective and misleading are the recollections which man witnesses retain even of cases with which they have had special opportunities of being well acquainted. It is instructive to see how preconceived notion based on rumour and tradition tend to preserve the impression of certain particulars, while the impressions of far more important features of the case are completely forgotten.
In some cases these preconceived notions seem to prevail to distort the incident altogether and to create a picture in the mind of the witness quite different from the recorded facts. Some of the witnesses whose me have thus failed them are men who might have been expected to be careful and accurate. Their failure must tend to increase the distrust with which similar evidence, which there has been no opportunity of testing must be received (1:263).
On the topic of crime, the Commission concluded:
In respect to his relations to society, however, even the excessive consumer of hemp drugs is ordinarily inoffensive. His excesses may indeed bring him to degraded poverty which may lead him to dishonest practices; and occasionally, but apparently very rarely indeed, excessive indulgence in hemp drugs may lead to violent crime. But for all practical purposes it may be laid down that there is little or no connection between the use of hemp drugs and crime (1:264).
Conclusions
The Commission have now examined all the evidence before them regarding the effects attributed to hemp drugs. It will be well to summarize briefly the conclusions to which they come. It has been clearly established that the occasional use or hemp in moderate doses may be beneficial; but this use may be regarded as medicinal in character. It is rather to the popular and common use of the drugs that the Commission will now confine their attention. It is convenient to consider the effects separately as affecting the physical, mental, or moral nature.
Physical Effects
In regard to the physical effects, the Commission have come to the conclusion that the moderate use of hemp drugs is practically attended by no evil results at all. There may be exceptional cases in which, owing to idiosyncrasies of constitution, the drugs in even moderate use may be injurious. There is probably nothing the use of which may not possibly be injurious in cases of exceptional intolerance. There are also many cases where in tracts with a specially malarious climate, or in circumstances of hard work and exposure, the people attribute beneficial effects to the habitual moderate use of these drugs; and there is evidence to show that the popular impression may have some basis in fact. Speaking generally, the Commission are of opinion that the moderate use of hemp drugs appears to cause no appreciable physical injury of any kind. The excessive use does cause injury. As in the case of other intoxicants, excessive use tends to weaken the constitution and to render the consumer more susceptible to disease. In respect to the particular diseases which according to a considerable number of witnesses should be associated directly with hemp drugs, it appears to be reasonably established that the excessive use of these drugs does not cause asthma; that it may indirectly cause dysentery by weakening the constitution as above indicated; and that it may cause bronchitis mainly through the action of the inhaled smoke on the bronchial tubes (1:263-4).
Mental Effects
In respect to the alleged mental effects of the drugs, the Commission have come to the conclusion that the moderate use of hemp drugs produces no injurious effects on the mind. It may indeed be accepted that in the case of specially marked neurotic diathesis, even the moderate use may produce mental injury. For the slightest mental stimulation or excitement may have that effect in such cases. But putting aside these quite exceptional cases, the moderate use of these drugs produces no mental injury. It is otherwise with the excessive use. Excessive use indicates and intensifies mental instability (1:264).
Moral Effects
In regard to the moral effects of the drugs, the Commission are of opinion that their moderate use produces no moral injury whatever. There is no adequate ground for believing that it injuriously affects the character of the consumer. Excessive consumption, on the other hand, both indicates and intensifies moral weakness or depravity (1:264).
Discussion
Viewing the subject generally, it may be added that the moderate use of these drugs is the rule, and that the excessive use is comparatively exceptional. The moderate use practically produces no ill effects. In all but the most exceptional cases, the injury from habitual moderate use is not appreciable. The excessive use may certainly be accepted as very injurious, though it must be admitted that in many excessive consumers the injury is not clearly marked. The injury done by the excessive use is, however, confined almost exclusively to the consumer himself; the effect on society is rarely appreciable. It has been the most striking feature in this inquiry to find how little the effects of hemp drugs have obtruded themselves on observation. The large number of witnesses of all classes who professed never to have seen these effects, the vague statements made by many who professed to have observed them, the very few witnesses who could so recall a case as to give any definite account of it, and the manner in which a large proportion of these cases broke down on the first attempt to examine them, are facts which combine to show most clearly how little injury society has hitherto sustained from hemp drugs (1:264).
REPORT OF THE INDIAN HEMP DRUGS COMMISSION, 1893-94.
President:
The Hon'ble W. MACKWORTH YOUNG, M.A., C.S.I., First Financial Commissioner, Punjab.
Members:
1. Mr. H.T. OMMANNEY, Collector, Panch Mahals, Bombay.
2. Mr. A. H. L. FRASER, M.A., Commissioner, Chhattisgah Division, Central Provinces.
3. Surgeon-Major C.J.H. WARDEN, Professor of Chemistry, Medical College, and Chemical Examiner to Government, Calcutta; Officiating Medical Storekeeper to Government, Calcutta.
4. Raja SOSHI SIKHARESWAR ROY, of Tahirpur, Bengal.
5. KAIIWAR HARNAN SINGH, Ahluwalia, C.I.E., Punjab.
6. LALA NIHAL CHAND, of Muzaffarnagar, North-Western Provinces.
Secretary:
Mr. H.J. McINTOSH, Under-Secretary to the Government of Bengal, Financial and Municipal Departments.
SIMLA:
PRINTED AT THE GOVERNMENT CENTRAL PRINTING OFFICE.
1894.
Price Rs. 3.
Period of Attendance with the Commission
Name
(a) During the first tour
(b) During the second tour
(c) Number of meetings for examination of witnesses attended
President
(a) 83 days
(b) 183 days
(c) 86
Mr. Ommanney
(a) 83 days
(b) 183 days
(c) 85
Mr. Fraser
(a) 83 days
(b) 193 days
(c) 85
Dr. Warden
(a) 83 days
(b) 183 days
(c) 86
Raja Soshi Sikhareswar Roy
(a) From 3rd August to 15th September, 44 days
(b) From 30th October to 24th January, from 14th to 16th February, from 22nd to 24th February, and from 7th to 25th March, 112 days
(c) 44
Kanwar Harnam Singh
(a) 83 days
(b) From 13th November to 5th January, 22nd February to 2nd April, and from 12th to 25th April, 78 days
(c) 48
Lala Nihal Chand
(a) 3rd August to 20th September, 49 days
(b) From 30th October to 18th November and from 17th to 25th April, 29 days
(c) 5
The attendance of Raja Soshi Sikhareswar Roy was broken by occasional absence caused by ill-health and other reasons. The absence of Kanwar Harnam Singh during two short periods was due to ill-health. The prolonged absence of Lala Nihal Chand was due to the fact that he suffered from continued ill-health, and was able to be with the Commission only at Calcutta at the first; then for some part of their preliminary tour and at a few meetings for the examination of witnesses during the second tour. All the members were present at Simla during the preparation of the report (1:11).
http://www.druglibrary.org/schaffer/index.htm
Indian hemp and the dope fiend of old England – I.H.D.C.R – November 2002 Indian hemp and the dope fiend of old England
Published by The Schaffer library of drug policy - Tuesday 19 November, 2002
Copyright: The Schaffer library of drug policy
Table of contents
From Mother's Friend to Opium Wars
"The Lunatic asylums are filled with Ganja Smokers."
Criminalise it!
The Dope Fiends of Old England
"One of the most valuable medicines we possess"
The Cosmopolitan Dope Fiends
The Respectable Fear begins
The post war scandal boom
Epilogue
A sociopolitical history of cannabis and the British Empire 1840-1928
Sean Blanchard & Matthew J. Atha MSc
When the report of the Indian Hemp Drugs Commission (IHDC) reached 1890's England it met official and public apathy. There was no political debate. It went into the 'forget about this' file on arrival and has stayed there ever since. There was no publicity; The news that "Ganja is not appreciably harmful" was of no concern to the majority of users, who took cannabis products for their medical benefits. The non-medical users were mostly artists who didn't mind a little harm. Prohibitionist sentiment was concentrated on the opium trade between India and China and on alcohol at home. Cannabis use in England was considered negligible, and the authorities were content to have no laws at all controlling it for another thirty years.
When laws were later proposed, the Government paid no attention to the evidence in their possession from the IHDC. In India, the recommendations of the IHDC report for control by taxes rather than prohibition went into force quietly, standardising laws and tariffs on cannabis in all the provinces. In March 1895, the Indian Government passed a resolution after reviewing the report. It said that for the last twenty years their policy had been of "restraining use and improving the revenue by the imposition of suitable taxation" and "imposing as high a rate of duty as can be levied without inducing illicit practices" on the grounds that "the best way to restrict the consumption of drugs is to tax them..." So, "to that policy the Governor-General... has decided steadily to adhere."[1]
There was never any suggestion that the same rules might be applied in the UK; the Empire didn't work like that. The Governor-General (also known as Viceroy), Lord Landsdowne, was appointed by the UK Government. When they instructed him to commission a report, he did so, then accepted or rejected it, passed any regulations needed, and told the UK what he'd done. His job was to 'keep natives in their place' and help the British get on with de, not to give advice on home affairs.
From Mother's Friend to Opium Wars
Cannabis was virtually irrelevant to 19th century England. The drug of the century was opium, freely available to the British population and so popular that the government went to war to prevent the prohibitionist Chinese disrupting the trade. The opium wars still write their history in the 1990s, as Britain is soon due to hand back Hong Kong, the territory it won from China and those territories leased for 150 years, in 1997.
Thomas De Quincy, in his 'Confessions of and English Opium Eater' gave the first popular account of the '...marvellous agency of opium, whether for pleasure or pain'. He may have been the first glamouriser of the psychotropic effects of the drug, but, for most people opium was a friend and medicine as indispensable as aspirin or Valium in the 20th century. Godfrey's cordial, or chemists' home-brewed versions of popular patent medicines, were used to quiet children, while no home would be without laudanum (alcoholic tincture of opium). Opium was first used in the treatment of cholera in the epidemics of the early 19th century, and continued to be used for the treatment of diarrhoea and sickness, common complaints in the less than hygienic environment of the day. It was during the Crimean war that the analgesic effects were fully exploited, and it is certain that the widespread use of laudanum, Collis Browne's mixture or other opium-based medicines, available to the poor for a penny a bottle, enabled ordinary people to cope with the harsh realities of life in Dickensian England. From the government's point of view, it was no doubt preferable to have the poor in a state of comfortable stupor than rioting on the streets.
India was not the main source of opium for the domestic market. Most of this was grown in Turkey or Persia (Iran), as this opium was of generally high qualify, and trade flourished in the period following the end of the Napoleonic wars, particularly after the treaty of Balta Limon (1838) granting the Ottoman Empire 'most favoured nation' trading status[2]. Indian opium, however, was responsible for one of the British Government in India becoming the largest drug-trafficking syndicate in the world during the latter part of the century.
Opium and tea were the mainstays of the British East India Company, who had a monopoly on the opium produced in Bengal. In 1772 Warren Hastings, then chief executive of the company, realised the potential for foreign revenue in exporting Indian opium to China. Opium had been known in China for centuries, but
imports bad been banned in 1729 by decree of the Emperor. An foreign trade was funneled through Canton, opium being smuggled with legitimate consignments in British ships, and sold through corrupt officials to an eager market Other traders smuggled opium to China overland, and the consumption spread to all levels of society, even to the personal retinue of the Emperor. Exports to China rose from 10,000 chests ill 1820 to 40,000 chests in 1840. By 1836, a Chinese official in Canton, Hsu Nal-chi, petitioned the emperor to legalise the trade after witnessing the failure of prohibition... "the severer the interdicts against (opium) became, the more widely do the evils therefrom spread." He was summarily dismissed from his post and replaced with a committed "war on drugs"-minded individual, Lin Tse-hsu.
Lin was determined to wipe out the opium trade by threatening the British merchants with the loss of the tea trade, and in 1839 forced them to surrender 20,000 chests of the drug. Captain Charles Elliot the British Chief Superintended, retaliated by ordering all British ships out of the Canton estuary, transferring the tea trade to American ships who would transport their cargoes to Hong Kong, an inconvenience, but not an obstacle, to the trade. Instead of using Canton, smugglers would take opium consignments ashore up and down the coast in sin_all boats, fast enough to evade the Customs craft. Meanwhile Elliot had ordered an expeditionary force of naval steamships which arrived in 1840 and put direct pressure on Peking. Lin was dismissed and the trade continued uninterrupted following the Chinese capitulation and the end of the first opium war in 1842. To the domestic audience in the UK, Palmerston, the Prime Minister, bad portrayed the war as an attempt to force the Chinese to accept free trade. In reality, the only commodity directly involved was -opium, tax revenue from which was becoming increasingly important to the Indian Government [3].
In Britain, the Conservative opposition was not satisfied with Palmerston's explanations and they opposed the opium trade in the 1840 Commons debate. By the time they took power in 1841 their tune had changed, and the trade continued to expand. The Chinese government was effectively warned that no British ships should be searched. Although fresh edicts against the drug were issued by the Chinese, they were powerless to stop the trade following the treaty of Nanking, which ceded Hong Kong to Britain, allowing a bridgehead for further opium supplies. In 1856, following growing and-British sentiment, the Chinese gave the British government a further excuse for war by seizing the Arrow, a British vessel with a crew of Chinese criminals anchored off Canton. The fact that the Arrow's registration had expired, technically justifying the Chinese action, was overlooked by Palmerston, once again the Liberal Prime Minister after fighting an election forced by government defeat on an opposition motion condemning the war, and winning on a wave of patriotic fervour.
Lord Elgin was dispatched with an expeditionary force which burned down the Summer Palace in Peking to impress upon the Emperor the need to keep agreements. The main consequence of the Second Opium War was that China was forced to legalise the trade in opium, and were only permitted to tax the product at a level acceptable to the British. Consumption increased from 60,000 chests in 1860 to 105,000 by 1880. The trade generated taxes to the British Indian Government equivalent to over half their total revenue, enough to cover the entire civil service and armed forces budgets. In this climate, financial expediency, as so often is the case, took precedence over the growing moral arguments against the drug trade.
Following increased public pressure to end the trade, and in response to a Parliamentary motion, the Government called a Royal Commission on the production and consumption of opium, which was only to consider prohibition among other options, after full investigation. It was during these manoevres that the IHDC was also established. The Indian Viceroy, Lord Lansdowne was against anything that might disrupt business. Prime Minister Gladstone was much more pro trade than he was anti drug. They packed the opium commission with pragmatists from the Indian Civil Service, with some of the more economically literate abolitionists, and ensured that it would concentrate a good deal on money. It first met in September 1893 and saw 2,500 witnesses by February '94.
When the report was published in '95, it said that opium was "generally used in moderation", and "led to no evident ill-effects". Even some senior anti-opiumists had been convinced. The fact that Chinese missionaries were overwhelmingly critical of the effects of opium, in contrast to the Indian witnesses who were predominantly favourable towards the drug, was put down to the fact that in India the drug is normally taken orally, whereas in China it was generally smoked [3]. There was only one dissent; Joseph Rowntree, one of the committee members, was later to denounce the Commission's report as a whitewash. By that time there was another election under way. Prohibition had no chance under the Conservatives, and there would be no Liberal government until 1905.(4). The government, despite public opinion, was determined to continue the opium
"The Lunatic asylums are filled with Ganja Smokers."
The question of cannabis occasionally cropped up as an incidental issue in skirmishes during the long legislative battle against the opium business. As early as 1840 the pro-opium banker William Bingham Baring MP told the Commons that if the opium trade were suppressed then there would be a danger of users turning to drugs "infinitely more prejudicial to physical health and energy than opium". Baring, one of 10 MPs of both parties from the same pro-free trade family, was particularly concerned about "an exhalation of the Hemp plant, easily collected at certain seasons, which is in every way more injurious than the use of the poppy." [3] This was another justification for the lucrative opium trade which flourished in a climate of official and unofficial governmental encouragement. However, attitudes were slowly changing and in 1875 Mark Steward MP had proposed that the Indian Governor General be instructed to investigate the opium trade "with a view to gradual withdrawal," and lost by 37 votes. Similar moves were regularly defeated for the next twenty years. By April '91, a spokesman for the Society for Suppression of the Opium Trade (SSOT) had obtained a 30-vote majority for a motion that the Governments' revenue from opium was "Morally indefensible".
On 16 July 1891 Stewart asked a three part question about ganja [5]:
"i Whether the Secretary of State for India has seen a report in the Allahabad Pioneer of 10 May that ganja, which is grown sold and excised in much the same way as opium, is far more harmful, and that "the lunatic asylum of Bengal are filled with ganja smokers."
ii Is he aware that ganja has been made illegal in Lower Burma and that excise reports say this has been 'of enormous benefit to the people.'
iii Will he call to the attention of the Governor General the desirability of extending theprohibition to other provinces?"
The answers to which were yes, yes, and that he would "Enquire whether further steps should be taken to limit consumption..." On 7 August 1892 those enquiries were answered at some length. The Viceroy's office told London that the whole question had been extensively discussed with provincial administrations in 1871-73. They sent 174 pages of old dispatches from Indian provincial governments to the centre, and from there to London. After considering these, "The Governor General is of the opinion that while ganja may be among the most noxious of all intoxicants commonly used in India... even if absolute prohibition could be enforced, the result might be to induce the use of more noxious drugs" (e.g. datura). Apart from which it would be impossible to enforce a prohibition. It was "Our duty to restrict consumption, but unnecessary to do more than persevere in the policy established In 1873." These papers languished unread in London, perhaps because there was a general election going on.
The 1873 dispatches showed the pragmatism of imperial administrators which was to be repeated by the IHDC, in very similar words. The then Viceroy had said that while the Government should endeavour to restrict the use of ganja, it would be impossible to enforce general prohibition, especially because of religious feelings in some groups and because the plants grew freely some areas. It would be inexpedient to order what could not be enforced... "It does not appear to the Governor-General to be specifically proved that hump incites to crime more than other drugs or spirits." There was also some evidence that hump, "usually so noxious", might usefully be taken for medical reasons. There was no doubt that habitual use tended to cause insanity but not in very many cases relative to the numbers of the insane.(6]. "General opinion seems to be that the evil effects of Ganja have been exaggerated."
The dispatches from regional governments were more forthright. The Lt.-Governor of the Punjab wrote that considering the practicalities, they should not restrict hemp drug use unless there was proof of connection with crime. Civil, police and medical officers disagreed on the details but: "His Honour is of the opinion that if people were prohibited from using preparations of hemp or opium, they would, in all probability, have recourse to some other stimulant, such as alcohol, the crime resulting from the use of which would be much greater than that resulting from the abuse of these drugs .... It seems that the amount of crime, violent or other, incited by ganja, is exceedingly small... If, therefore, these preparations have no effect on crime and only injure the persons who use them, it is difficult to see in what manner the law can restrict their use in a country where opium is a monopoly of the Government, the effects of which are perhaps as injurious when taken in excess as those of hemp."
The local governments of Mysore, Hyderbad, Oudh, and Burma said that as hump drugs were little used locally, not necessary. Central Provinces sent plenty of data but no opinions. The Northwest Provinces (later Pakistan), one of the main cannabis growing areas, said the evidence on crime was confused, where if the situation was bad as supposed there would surely be a consensus. To stop production would be almost impossible, so they could not recommend attempts to limit or stop consumption. Bombay, Madras, and Bengal said that restrictions and taxes already in place should be preserved. All agreed excessive use to be somehow connected with physical harm and perhaps insanity, but the numbers harmed were very small. Bengal sent the most information. Asked if a particularly popular type of local ganja was more deleterious than others, they submitted a long report on cultivation, uses and profit margins on all hemp products by Dr Watt, State Reporter on Economic Products. Their local product was popular due to the quality of plants and traditional production skills, rather than sheer strength. A table of samples analysed for "Resinous extracts or Cannabin" ranged from 1.4% (NW Province) to 12% (Madras), mostly about 4% [7]. All of the legal trade was inside India. The state of Bengal had been making an average 1 million rupees per year through the 1860's in tax on ganja shops and duty at government auctions, about £100,000 - tens of millions in today's money.
When these papers were taken from the files, twenty years after they were written, the August 1892 elections were under way. The Conservatives went out and the Liberals came in. Drug control was not high on their agenda; however, the new Home Secretary, Foreign Secretary, and Secretary of State for India were all known to be anti-opium, and the Prime Minister had spoken out against it in the past. The prohibitionists knew they might get some sort of opium control agreed if it didn't oppose the Liberals' central Free Trade policy. Believing their moment had come, they began to quarrel among themselves.
Criminalise it!
Before the development of the hypodermic syringe by Alexander Wood, the main concern about opium was not the threat of addiction, but the danger of poisoning. Only after the 1860s did the risk of dependency start to cause concern among the medical profession. Certainly, people would have been habituated to the drug, but the stereotype of the drug addict had yet to gain acceptance within the UK. Even where individuals wrote of their habit, such as a chemists wife who had been using morphia for 30 years, described her experience in a matter of fact way, free from any sense of stigma her major concern being the perceived tendency of the drug to cause her to put on weight. Although the dependency syndrome had been described two centuries earlier by Thomas Sydenham, the risk was not taken seriously by most medical practitioners. Following increasing reports of dependency symptoms after 1860, culminating in a series of articles in The Practitioner in 1870, the debate on the wisdom of permitting free access to opium accelerated. In 1878 Edward Levinstein in Germany started the 'moral' argument about the effect of opium on the character of the user, and was one of the first to promote abstinence as a cure for the addict [2].
From the 1840s on, there were several anti-opium organisations, all small and mostly broke. Their memberships overlapped, but the leaders didn't get on well. None of them had ever tried to gain mass support. The first organisation to come out against the trade were the Birmingham Quakers. In 1869, Lord Shaftesbury urged the Indian government to withdraw from its monopoly position in the trade. By 1884 the Society for the Study and Cure of Inebriety, founded by Sir Norman Kerr, aimed "to educate the professional and the public mind to the dangers of intemperance". At that time, alcohol was the main target for the temperance movement, whereas other, more exotic drugs were not seen as much of a threat to respectable Britons. These drugs were not expected to be a threat to the well-adjusted British gentleman, and habituation among the Chinese and others was regarded as the kind of 'filthy foreign habit' that should be stopped for the foreigners' own good. Kerr recognised the dangers of opium with a crusading zeal, and railed against its use, denying any possibility that some persons could be able to restrict their use to a moderate level. The Society for Suppression of the Opium Trade (SSOT), founded in 1874, became the best-known anti-opium organisation, but had always been elitist, controlled by Quaker businessmen with knighthoods, funded by one family. Their best argument combined economic and humanitarian interest; other exports to China had been damaged by the sleaziness of the opium business. Trade with China had been stagnant between 1860-80 while business with Japan had tripled. The SSOT moved for ending the India-China opium trade, and an enquiry into alternate ways of making up the money. They took too long agreeing a proposal with other lobbyists, but did manage to force the government to concede the 1893 Royal Commission on Opium [8].
Meanwhile, in February '93, William Caine, MP (Bradford East), had the papers on ganja collected the previous year placed in the House of Commons Library. 0u the 2nd March 1893 he put a public question to the Under-secretary of State for India. "If he will instruct the Government of India to create a commission of experts to enquire into and report on the cultivation of and trade in all preparations of hemp drugs in Bengal, the effects of theft consumption on society, and on the moral condition of the people, and the desirability of prohibiting its growth and sale." Would he also invite written reports on the same matters from all other provinces, and include in the commission non-official natives of India. The Secretary of State would ask the Viceroy to do just that, "and he will be glad if the result of this inquiry is to show that further restriction can be placed upon the sale and consumption of these drugs."(7) Since the Government seemed so amenable, a secondary question by the Right Hon. Sir Charles E. Schwann, Bart, was then dropped.
The members of the commission were named on 3rd July, and held their first meeting on 2nd August - a mouth before the Opium commission began to meet. They continued until April, seeing over 800 witnesses, assembling over 3000 pages into seven volumes, and a confidential extra volume on hemp drug use in the Army; then the Finance and Commerce department of the Government of India considered the report, and another British election crept closer. It is unclear what Caine and Schwann thought they were up to. Both were Liberals, Temperance campaigners, and probably anti-opium. Schwann had a safe scat, a comfortable merchants' fortune and radical opinions. Caine wrote books, including 'Young India', 'Picturesque India' and 'A Trip Around the World.' He had quit the Liberal Party six years earlier over the Irish question, and been re-admitted in a new scat after losing as an Independent; he was to lose it again in 1895. The timing, and the request for the commission to include non-official Indians, suggest that they were part of a faction among the anti-opiumists, perhaps trying to stir them into holder demands or quicker action. Perhaps they were simply trying to get in on what looked like a winning side. Neither is recorded as ever mentioning hemp drugs in public again.
The Dope Fiends of Old England
The international drugs trade was quite a different thing from home consumption; for example although the British Empire produced a great deal of the worlds' opiates, over 80% of the opium used in the UK was from Turkey and Persia [2]. The economic pressure for international prohibition came from traders and nations with rival products. In the UK drug control was at first pan of an increase in medical involvement in social policy. Prescription by professionals had to take over from self-medication before complete prohibition became possible.
There was not much openly recreational drug use in Victorian England, other than alcohol. A few serf consciously unconventional young artists and mystics searched for inner experience, rejecting vulgar materialism, but the majority of drug abusers, then as now, considered themselves to be taking medicines, to help them work or relax. This was an age which demanded refinement, in every sense of the term. They took extracts, tinctures, distillations or the 'active ingredients' of traditional medicinal plants like Indian hemp or poppies, in amounts that would kill modern addicts. This was all for the good of their health, so morally impeccable. They didn't do dope to get wasted, or didn't admit to it
Vulgar materialism provided ever more purified forms of relief from the stresses of righteous life, as opium was dissolved into laudanum, concentrated into morphine, re-concentrated into heroin. Some condemned booze while chewing opium, just as well-known modern anti-drug campaigners have been tranquilliser addicts. In this atmosphere Cannabis Indica was just another potentially useful plant, which could be perhaps refined into some sort of medicine but was quite unsuitable in natural form. The distinction between drug use and abuse had hardly been invented. Doctors were expensive and not well trusted, so the poor dosed themselves with whatever remedies they could afford. Pseudo-medical opiate use was decreasing, but still respectable; Elizabeth Barrett Browning and Florence Nightingale had used it, and William Wilberforce, saint of the anti-slavery movement, had eaten twelve grains a day for thirty years. Self-medication bluffed into non-medical use. Boozing was low class and unfeminine, so respectable ladies took "tonics." Patent medicines were a huge business, often including alcohol, opium, or cannabis.
Sales of pure morphine, cocaine, and barbiturates were supposedly controlled by the 1868 Poisons and Pharmacy Act, but quack nostrums and patent medicines were not, and an attempt to extend the law in 1884 had failed. The Act only affected shops, not users. One especially dangerous popular remedy was Collis Brownes' Chlorodyne, containing chloroform and morphine, which the British Medical Association campaigned through the 90's to have banned.
"One of the most valuable medicines we possess"
There had been increasing medical interest in cannabis since William O'Shaughnessy described the use of indian hemp as medicine and intoxicant [9], relying on accounts of hashish use from ancient Persian and Arabic sources, as well as on his own observations in India. He described the use of hemp in the treatment of rheumatism, hydrophobia, cholera, tetanus and infantile convulsions, as well as describing the delirium induced by continued use. O'Shaughnessy had written in 1839 that, with a couple of exceptions, "I have been unable to trace any notice of the employment of this drug in Europe." However, despite citing western works by Ainslie and von Estebeck he managed to overlook one classic account.
The noted medieval herbalist, Nicholas Culpepper (1616-1654), listed a variety of medical uses of the common european hemp (Cannabis sativa), including anti-inflammatory, analgesic, and antiparasitic activity [10]. Culpepper made no mention of the psychotropic activity, although the temperate hemp he described would normally be of low drug content and be grown for fibre. Culpepper's work would have owed much to the folk herbalism used by British witches, or wise women, who until the christian persecutions had provided most primary health care to the rural population, as well as to the monastic healers who replaced them. By the Victorian "age of reason" most traditional use had been suppressed, as the pioneer pharmacologists began to analyse folk medicines to refine and extract the active compounds therein. An unsuccessful attempt had been made in the 1840's to grow hemp for medicine in the London suburb of Mitcham. Experimenters used it for athsma and other chest problems, sleeplessness especially in cases of opiate or alcohol withdrawal, and with opium and bromide of potassium in treating insanity.
One reason why cannabis was not as widely used as opium products, or the newer chemical remedies, was the difficulty found refining an "active ingredient." There were problems getting supplies of reliable strength, confusion about apparently different products from the same plant, and uncertainty about its effects in the body. However, it was used to treat many disorders. In 1889, Dr E.A.Birch described in the Lancet the successful use of cannabis indica in the treatment of chloral hydrate and opium withdrawal, drawing attention to the abolition of craving and the antiemetic (vomit suppressing) effects and the stimulation of appetite in patients who would not normally eat, or keep down, their food [111. Queen Victoria's personal physician, J.R. Reynolds described it in 1890 as "One of the most valuable medicines we possess." In another Lancet article published in 1890, he described the use of cannabis indica for treating insomnia in the senile, alcoholic delirium, neuralgia, migraine, spastic paralysis, and convulsions [12]..He allegedly prescribed tincture of cannabis to Queen Victoria herself for the treatment of menstrual cramps. Cannabis tincture and an extract made from resin were available from Peter Squire of Oxford St in 1864, and wholesale through the Society of Apothecaries by 1871. Chemists extracted stuff they called cannabene, cannabin tannin, cannabinnene etc. but had no idea which, if any, was the "active ingredient" until cannabinol was isolated in 1895.
At the same time some thought of drug-taking as a form of poisoning, and some researchers proposed that it either caused, or was, a type of insanity. W.W. Ireland compared the mental state of cannabis users to delirium, with its alteration of time and space and visual illusions. British doctors' reports from Cairo Asylum in 1894 linked violent insanity with "Hashism"(13,14) Some of the medical studies would have been recreational use in any other context. Walter Dixon must have tried it on himself as well as small furry animals when he showed in 1899 that the effects vary according to type of preparation as well as method of ingestion. He recommended smoking for immediate effect and wrote in the British Medical Journal, "Hemp taken as an inhalation may be placed in the same category as coffee, tea and kola. It is not dangerous and its effects are never alarming, and I have come to regard it in this form as a useful and refreshing stimulant and food accessory, and one whose use does not lead to a habit which grows upon its votary." He was to be a member of the Rolleston Committee on Morphine and Heroin Addiction in the 1920's, who opposed criminalising narcotics policy.
At the end of the century cannabis tincture became popular again as a cure for cramps, migraine, opium addiction, withdrawal and insomnia, but the fashion faded. In the early 1900's a British Medical Association campaign against 'Secret Remedies' got most of the opiates, cocaine and cannabis out of tonics and non-prescription medicines. Doctors became responsible for most drug distribution as the consumer beverage trade withdrew. As drag dispensing was professionalised, substances used for self-medication were replaced by more refined, more medically controllable drags. The Indian Hemp Drugs Commission report made no apparent difference to this at all, and it's quite possible that nobody in the medical establishment read it. It held quite a lot of scientific data but its purpose had been political rather than medical. The political and economic interests of the British Medical Association were quite different from those of the Government of India.
The Cosmopolitan Dope Fiends
It is worth noting that most publications from the time refer to "Hashish," the Arabic term, Indian Hemp, or Cannabis, rather than Charas, Ganja or Bhang, the Hindi names. The French empire in North Africa had at least as much effect on European cannabis use as the British empire in India. A certain style of drug use, the Wasted Artist role, as established by the laudanum swigging Coleridge and De Quincey early in the century, was revived by Dr Jean Moreau in Paris after 1845. The doctor, who experimented with hashish to treat insanity, founded the Club des Hashishins with the writer Theophile Gautier, for non-medical experiments. Some of the members were quite keen on a little delirium. Gautier was a hack with brilliant friends, an 'art for arts sake' romantic with a taste for macabre fantasy who encouraged the Symbolist poets. Rimbaud and Verlaine shared his drugs. Baudelaire dedicated "Fleur du Mal" to him, and wrote an essay that explained their attitudes: "On Hashish and Wine as a means of expanding individuality." They created strange, sensuous art, struck foreign poses based on their beliefs about the romantic East, scandalised bourgeois society [15].
By the 90's the club had imitators in London. If there was no recreational drug use "subculture" in the 1890's, one network came close. This was the circle of poets, psychics, writers and would-be magicians around the Rhymers Club and the Hermetic Order of the Golden Dawn. They didn't define their connection by shared drug use, but they certainly included drug experiments in their self-definition. Occult studies, drugs, hypnotism, proto-psychiatry and new styles of arts were all 1890's fashions mingled in overlapping cliques in central London. The Golden Dawn was established in 1888 by some occultist Freemasons, as a society of "Christian practiced magic. In 1890 Yeats and two others formed the Rhymers Club as a sort of literary wing, drawing inspiration from the French Symbolists. None of the Rhymers Club apart from Yeats ever achieved as much recognition as their French heroes, but they had the style. They were melancholy, self-dramatising, they hoped Byronic. They had doomed love lives and nervous breakdowns, and mostly died young. Their defiance of conventional society included such un-English deviance as drinking black coffee and speaking comprehensible French, as well as attempted magic, sexual permutations not discussed in polite company, and hefty drug use.
Yeats and his lover Maude Gonne tried using hashish to improve their telepathic powers. Others had a more relaxed, recreational approach. Arthur Symons was one Rhymer who survived to he described as "highly strong, over-sensitive" in the 1930's, best known for "Confessions - A study in Pathology" which described his two years in an Italian lunatic asylum and cure by near-fatal pneumonia in 1909. He was the author of 'The Opium Smoker; "I am engulfed, and drown deliciously/soft music like a perfume, and sweet light/Golden with audible odours exquisite/ swathe me in cerements for eternity.../". In a biography of fellow Rhymer Ernest Dowson he described one afternoon; a couple of ballet dancers and a poet visiting, the host issuing tea, cakes, cigarettes and then hashish. "That slow intoxication, that elaborate experiment in visionary sensations... he sat awaiting the magic, half shy in the midst of that bright company of young people." Dowson wrote poems with Latin titles about doomed love affairs, and consorted with the "most degraded" women in dockside dives. He experimented with mescal in 1896, with the sexuality researcher Havelock Ellis. He died of TB in 1900, aged 32. The other poet present at the hash and tea party and the mescal experiment was John Addington Symonds, a historian who studied the criminal mentality - he was part blinded after several breakdowns and TB. One of their associates, Count Eric Stenbock, who wrote The Shadow of Death and Studies of Death, was known for wearing a live snake around his neck; he died aged 35, of either alcohol or opium.(13)
The Wasted Artists were picturesque and dramatic, and their style became a popular image of drug abusers. Ethereal and rather unhealthy, possibly creative but definitely pasty-faced. The perception of a difference between drugs suitable for legitimate use, under medical control, and drugs which can only be abused, was extended by their example; anything they took was obviously not doing any good for their health. Still there was no anti-drug panic in the UK. Drugs were still seen as foreign stuff, only used by those who wanted to act like foreigners. The artists were added to an existing mythology of the opium addict and the opium den, spread by popular fiction from Wilkie Collins to Oscar Wilde, the addict over-sensitive, hollow-cheeked with torment, the dens glided in rococo brothel style, populated by vicious Chinese and degenerate aristocrats.
The Respectable Fear begins
The first demon dope stories came over from the USA in the mid 1890's. There were, apparently, ever-increasing numbers of Black men with cocaine, Chinese with opium, and Mexicans with both, plus marijuana. These coloured men were allegedly using their fiendish substances to gain the flesh of white women, and many of them would go crazy with big knives if frustrated in any way. The British media only retold a few of these tales at first. The pathological imagination of the US Press kept it up for the next forty years, changing the drug and the villains' colour now and again. Heroin was refined in 1898 but for the first few years it was considered a miracle painkiller and cure for morphine addiction. The subject of the grossest stories was cocaine, also considered a miracle cure a few years earlier. The medical enthusiasts didn't think it suitable for recreational use. The recreational users disagreed. The alcohol prohibitionists built a mass following and inflicted a huge social disaster on the USA. When the alcohol ban was repealed, drug control was not. The myths were retired for a few years, but similar stories can be found, only slightly less racist, in the mass media today.
Before, during and after Prohibition, the USA lobbied for international drugs laws, mixing economic self-interest with moralism. The Hague Conference in 1912 agreed to the principle of certain drugs being strictly for "legitimate medical purposes." It was never effective internationally because of obstruction by the British opiate and German cocaine businesses. The conference suggested an investigation of hemp, but it wasn't followed up. The Assam Opium & Ganja Committee of 1913(16) showed that the IHDC had been forgotten or ignored in that province of India, for instance accepting that ganja causes insanity without calling any evidence. It did say that when ganja prices rose users turned to opium, when opium prices rose they turned to alcohol or, alarmingly, morphine. The number of licensed shops in Assam had fallen from 1116 in 1878 to 347 in 1911, and the committee thought it couldn't be reduced further without provoking unrest.
Recreational drug use in British literary circles in the '90s spread through the next two decades into a wider worlds. Cocaine use had spread well into the upper class by the First World War. Officialdom grew concerned about officers on leave, who often weren't afraid to wreck their health since their chances of survival were slim. Morale would not be improved, it was felt, by the sight of the upper ranks behaving like beasts, and it would be worse yet if the common soldiers imitated them. There was a press scare about the Germans using drugs and prostitutes, collecting blackmail material. This unlikely tale and other stories of moral degeneracy caught the imagination of the Army Council, who banned the sale of all intoxicants to troops in mid 1916. In July the first U K law against possession of drags was sneaked through, section 40B of the Defense of the Realm Act. It covered cocaine and opiates; cannabis was not included, although it had been considered. Section 40B also banned "Malththusian appliances" (contraception) and quack medicines. The same Act established legal closing times for pubs, which caused a lot more fuss.
The post war scandal boom
Immediately after the Great War the British press got their first US-style dope story. Actress Billie Carelton, age 21, died supposedly from cocaine taken at an alcohol-free Victory Ball. Her supplier was tried for manslaughter but could not be convicted. It was just as likely the sleeping drug Veronal that killed her, but that didn't bother the Daily Express. They included hashish eating in the habits of a circle of degenerates who, they said, had mined a sweet and innocent girl. In September 1920 a Dangerous Drugs Act was passed, clarifying the wartime possession law and effectively dividing the drug trade into medical vs criminal. It was greeted with such apathy by Parliament that it was hard to make up a quorum in some of the committees. Cannabis was still not banned.
Internationally, the UK government stopped blocking drug controls after several scandals at home and reports that morphine and cocaine addiction were spreading in the colonies. There were more sex drugs and foreigner stories to keep up the postwar drug scare. In 1922 the death of dancer Freda Kempton gained unwanted publicity for Brilliant Chang, Chinese restaurant owner and alleged dope king since 1917, handling morphine, opium and hashish as well as cocaine. After many raids and mentions in the press he was sentenced to 14 months - not much for such an alleged villain - then departed in 1924. Eddie Manning, Jamaican jazz drummer and alleged dope king, was convicted of dealing opium and cocaine in '23. Both, it was strongly implied, had used their dealing to get close to English girls. In 1922 three sisters were found half dressed and unconscious in the company of a dead Chinese man, Yee Sing a.k.a. Johnny Hop, in a sealed room full of opium smoke above a Cardiff laundry. The girls never told quite what had happened, so the press made it up, including a Chinese love potion made from hashish used especially to subdue white women, with an antidote made from geraniums.(17) Pulp fiction by the likes of Sax Rohmer helped spread the corrupt aristocrat and Chinese dope plot themes.
Despite all this advertisement, there was still no working class drug subculture. The upmarket drug users of the 20's continued to be found where the overlap between high society and the arts copied what were seen as American fashions for jazz and cocaine. Aleister Crowleys' 1922 novel, Diary of a Drug Fiend, thinly disguised a real West End scene where cocaine was dealt in the Cafe Royal on Regent Sweet. Crowley was a former Golden Dawn member who publicised himself as "The Wickedest Man in the World," and ran a black magic cult largely based on sex. He occasionally kicked his morphine habit cold turkey in front of acolytes, to show the power of his will; he did quite a lot to establish a link in the public mind between heavy drug use and being a dangerous but pretentious creep. Chloroform and morphine were popular with Lady Diana Cooper and Katherine Asquith, models for several wild aristos in fiction. Morphine might be risky and maybe immoral, but boozing was common, which was much worse. Compared to these types cannabis users were sweethearts. Having previously tried smoking it to no effect, the painter Augustus John tried a hashish compote or jam after sardines and wine with friends in Hampstead; "...catching the eye of Iris, we were both simultaneously seized with uncontrollable laughter, about nothing at all..." Despite the publicity, and penalties increasing in 1922, prosecutions under the Dangerous Drugs Act averaged a steady 60 a year for cocaine, 65 for opium.
Cannabis lust became illegal in the UK after the country agreed the 1925 Geneva International Convention on Narcotics Control. It was included in the '25 Convention with the opiates and cocaine, because Egypt and Turkey proposed it. An Egyptian delegate stirringly denounced "Chronic Hashism" which he said caused most of the insanity in his country. It also, he said, weakened users, gave them heart and digestive troubles and made them look wild-eyed and stupid. India opposed including cannabis in the Convention, as their delegate said it had been used there since time immemorial, grew wild, and they doubted that a prohibition could enforced. The British delegate abstained from the vote but signed in the end. There was hardly any parliamentary debate before it came into law as amendments to the Dangerous Drugs Act on 281h September 1928. Despite this cannabis offences, and 206 for opium. In 1950 for the first time there were more prosecutions for cannabis than for opium and manufactured drugs together - 86 against 41 opium and 42 others. That year a series of police raids on jazz clubs produced a new crop of stories about black men with drugs and white women, this time involving marijuana and benzedrine. Cannabis had finally got into the shock horror league.
Epilogue
The Indian Hemp Drugs Commission finally had its moment in Parliament in July 1967, after the Government had established an Advisory Committee on Drug Dependence. J.J.S. Driberg, Chief of Police and Inspector of Prisons for Assam, had given gave evidence to the IHDC. His son Tom was a Labour MP. According to his autobiography [18], the poet Alan Ginsberg asked Tom to "look up for him the report... in the House library I found that my father had given evidence before this commission, putting forward strongly the view that people living in a damp, cold climate needed the traditional consolation of ganja... The climate referred to was that of Assam, rather than England; but I felt it was almost an act of filial piety to sign a full page advertisement in the Times calling for a liberalisation of the laws on pot..." When it became obvious that there would be no liberalisation, be attacked the government, his own party, in the parliamentary debate. He said his father had told the IHDC that when insane people were arrested a form had to be filled saying why they were insane, and the safest thing to say was ganja as the police knew that no further enquiry would be made. When the government spokeswoman asked rhetorically "What sort of society will we create if everyone wants to escape from reality 7" Driberg answered that "They want to escape from this horrible society we have created." The 1968 Wooton Committee on Cannabis was "in agreement with the conclusions reached by the IHDC... that the long-term consumption of cannabis in moderate doses has no harmful effects." Given wide publicity, the government couldn't completely to ignore this new study; instead they did exactly the opposite of what it recommended, and increased penalties for all cannabis offences in a new 1971 Misuse of Drugs Act. Cannabis use continued to increase dramatically. By 1990 there were 40,194 convictions and cautions for cannabis in the UK, well over 90% of all recorded drugs crimes.
References:
1. Resolution 1369, Finance and Commerce Dept. (Separate Revenue), Government of India, 21/3/1895. 23 pp. 2. T.M. Parssinen, Secret Passions, Secret Remedies - Narcotic Drugs in British Society, 1820-1930. Manchester University Press 1980
3. B. Inglis (1975) The Forbidden Game London Hodder & Stoughton
4. Report of the Royal Commission on Opium. Parliamentary papers 1895
5. Hansand, Parliamentary Questions,
6. Resolution 3773, Finance and Commerce Dept., Government of India, 17/12/1873.
7. In full IHDC report. India (Ganja) 97 in House of Commons papers 1893-4 LXVI.79.
8. In (2) V. Berridge & J. Griffith Edwards, Opium and the People, Yale 1982.
9 0'Shaughnessy W.B. (1839) On the preparations of Indian Hemp, or Gunjah. Transactions of the Medical and Physical Society of Bengal 1838-40 pp 421-461
10. Culpepper's Complete Herbal. London, W. Foulsham & Co.
11. Birch E.A. (1889) Indian hemp in the treatment of chronic choral & opium poisoning. Lancet 30-3-89 p625
12. Reynolds Sir J.R. (1890) Therapeutic Uses & Toxic Effects of Cannabis Indica Lancet, 22-3-90
13. V. Berridge, Origins of the English Drug "Scene" 1890-1930, Medical History 32, 1988. Also
14. Walsh J.T. Hemp Drugs and Insanity. Journal of Medical Science 40 1894
15. The Hashish Club, Ed P. Haining, Peter 0wen 1975,
16. Assam Opium & Crania Committee 1913.
17 Marek Kohn, Dope Girls, Lawrence & Wishart, London 1992.
18. Tom Driberg, Ruling Passions, Cape 1977
About the Authors.
Sean Blanchard is a freelance journalist and researcher. From 1981 to 1983 he was coordinator of the Legalise Cannabis Campaign.
Matthew J. Atha B.Sc. MSc, was Legalise Cannabis Campaign Secretary from 1983 to 1989. His MSc psychology thesis "Quantitative Assessment of Illicit substance use" (Birmingham University 1987) included analyses of surveys of drug use at pop festivals. He divides his time between advocacy work and performing as a rock musician.
http://www.druglibrary.org/schaffer/index.htm
Swedish national policy and the drug free state – November 2002 Swedish national policy and the drug free state
Published by The Canadian Library of Parliament - Tuesday 19 November, 2002
Copyright: The Canadian Library of Parliament
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION
BACKGROUND TO SWEDISH DRUG POLICY
NATIONAL DRUG STRATEGY
LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK
A. Classes of drugs
B. Offences
C. Penalties
D. Prosecutorial discretions
DEBATE IN SWEDEN
RECENT REPORTS OR STUDIES
COSTS
A. Public Costs
B. Social Costs
ADMINISTRATION
STATISTICS
A. Use
B. Offences
INTRODUCTION
This paper provides a brief introduction to Sweden’s national drug policy. This includes:
· Background information to its drug policies;
· A review of the national drug strategy;
· The legislation with respect to illicit drugs;
· The debate and recent studies;
· The costs associated with illicit drug use; and
· Data related to drug use and drug-related offences.
This paper forms part of a series of country pictures being prepared by the Parliamentary Research Branch of the Library of Parliament for the Special Senate Committee on Illegal Drugs.
BACKGROUND TO SWEDISH DRUG POLICY
Sweden, a Nordic country covering 450,000 km2, has a population of roughly 9 million. Approximately 2/3 of the population lives in rural areas and the others generally have their roots in these areas. The population is relatively homogenous, with almost 90% being Lutheran. It would appear that Swedish people tend to be conformist and that strange or deviant behaviour is not easily accepted. Sweden has a social democratic tradition and is well known for its welfare system which in the past included jobs, housing, universal health care, a social safety net and a secure future for its population. It is only in the last century that it has become a “rich” country. Economic problems in the last decade or so, however, have had negative effects on its welfare system.
Popular movements have a long history in Sweden and have helped shape it. These movements are eligible for state subsidies and are nationally established with many local branches. Some of the popular movements in the fields of drugs (for example, Parents Against Drugs, Hassela Solidarity and the Association for a Drug-Free Society who all strive for a drug free society and a corresponding strict drug policy) have played, and still play, an important role in the development of Swedish drug policy. Others with influence include individuals and groups from the treatment sector, the police and the organization European Cities Against Drugs.
In Sweden, drug policy is viewed as part of its welfare and social policy. The drug phenomenon is seen as one of the most serious social problems (if not the most important problem) and drugs are viewed as an external menace to the country. Drug abuse is often perceived as a cause for other social problems. Many are of the view that the drug problem puts traditional Swedish values at risk. It is not only drugs, but also the liberalization debate, that are seen as coming from other countries to influence Swedish values. These concerns have increased since Sweden became a member of the European Union in 1995, as most of the other members of the EU have adopted a more liberal approach when it comes to the drug issue.
In comparison to other Western countries in Europe, Swedish drug policy is regarded as restrictive. One of the aims of the policy is to make it clear that drugs are not tolerated in society. Drug use is regarded as deviant behaviour and such behaviour must be stopped. Some examples of this restrictive attitude include:
· The overall goal is that of a drug-free society;
· Harm reduction programs are only available in a limited fashion;
· Treatment is based on obtaining complete abstention and it is possible to force people into treatment;
· Consumption of narcotics is an offence, and urine and blood test are used to detect those suspected of drug use;
· Drug legislation is strictly enforced;
· Discussions regarding the medical value of cannabis are almost non-existent;
· Swedish legislation strictly adheres, and even surpasses, the requirements set out in the three United Nations drug conventions.
Historically, Sweden has not had a problem with illegal drug use and such use was not regarded as a serious social problem. As in many other western countries, this changed in the 1960s. In Sweden in 1965, there were signs of increased drug use, including use of cannabis, amphetamines, LSD and opiates. Amphetamines were, and are, more of a problem than heroin, which was the problem drug in many other countries. Drug addicts have historically been people injecting amphetamines intravenously.
Amphetamines were introduced into Sweden in 1938, and were promoted for weight loss and as stimulants. They were used by large segments of the population and were also related to a criminal subculture. Over the years, as the controls on amphetamines increased (for example being only available on prescription), the occasional and experimental use declined, while regular use and abuse increased. In addition, the way the drug was taken (intravenously rather than orally) had changed. “The development of the consumption of central stimulants from the late 1930s to the mid 1960s could be described as the transformation of a socially accepted medicine used by many, and different kinds of people, to an illicit drug basically consumed in a deviant environment.” This long history of use is one of the reasons that amphetamine use was and remains a major concern in Sweden.
While Swedish drug policy is currently very restrictive, this was not always the case. In fact in the 1960s, its policy was fairly liberal, basically reflecting a harm reduction approach. For example, from 1965 to 1967, it was possible for severe drug abusers to obtain prescriptions for morphine and amphetamines. This non-scientific experiment (involving approximately 120 people) was used by Nils Bejerot, a police doctor and very influential figure in Swedish drug policy, in his study of the relationship between drug use and drug policy in the period between 1965-1970. Some of his findings included: that changes from restrictive to permissive policy and vice versa was reflected in the rates of intravenous drug use; that this experiment was the origin of the Swedish drug epidemic; and that the experiment did not have the desired effect of crime reduction. His findings are still widely accepted in Sweden even though they have been criticised. Other examples of a more liberal policy include that police focussed their efforts on large-scale drug trafficking and that a Prosecutor General’s instruction provided for the waiver of charges for minor drug offences. Thus, the focus was more on the supply side of drugs.
With increased drug use in 1965, the Committee on the Treatment of Drug Abuse was established: it published four reports from 1967 to 1969. The first report dealt with treatment and the second with repressive measures. It is this second report which led to the adoption of the Narcotic Drugs Act in 1968. The Committee’s reports indicated that the drug problem was on the increase. This finding, in conjunction with the findings of Bejerot, are partly responsible for the more restrictive approach adopted by Sweden in the late 1960s. In addition, since 1968, the government organized a massive media and school campaign against drugs. This led to a generation growing up with messages based on the gateway theory, among others. This theory is used as a justification for being restrictive in relation to cannabis and “Swedish drug policy actually focuses on cannabis, since it is alleged ‘drug careers’ start with this substance.” In addition, the dangers caused by cannabis itself (psychosis, addictive character, higher risk of suicide, etc.) are seen as reasons for having a restrictive policy.
Over time, Swedish policy became more restrictive and repressive. For example, penalties for drug offences have increased several times. The current Swedish policy, with its primary goal of a drug-free society, was instituted in the late 1970’s because of what was thought to be an increasing social problem. “The reason for this, in some respect, unrealistic pursuit, can partly be found in Sweden’s positive experience with the welfare state and its firm belief in being able to change society.” There are other examples of a more restrictive approach. For example, in 1980, a waiver of charges was only available if amounts possessed for personal use were sufficiently small that they could not be subdivided and the waiver would no longer apply to all drugs. In addition, the early 1980’s saw police focusing on street trading. “The aim was no longer to target big dealers, but the drug users, since they are considered to be the motor of the ‘drug engine.’” This more restrictive policy has continued over the years with even more strengthening of penalties, by criminalizing use, and allowing urine and blood tests for those suspected of use, etc. Although the original goal of the urine and blood tests was to detect new users and provide them with appropriate treatment, it would appear that the tests are no longer being used for this sole purpose as known drug users are also being targeted.
Some authors have drawn a link between Sweden’s restrictive drug policy and its restrictive alcohol policy. The temperance movement has a long history in Sweden and the country has developed a fairly restrictive alcohol policy, including a state monopoly on the sale of alcohol. The following has been stated:
Swedish attitudes towards alcohol are relevant since a restrictive alcohol policy makes a restrictive drug policy a logical option. Moreover, the total consumption model on which the alcohol policy is based, is thought to be valid for illicit drugs as well. By limiting the total consumption of drugs, the total harm caused by drugs is alleged to be lower as well. However, it was shown that this correlation is far from clear when it comes to (different) illicit drugs.
NATIONAL DRUG STRATEGY
Sweden is a party to the three international conventions on drug control and has adopted a comprehensive drug control strategy. Its vision is that of a drug-free society and the policy is built on three pillars: prevention, treatment and control measures.
Following the creation of a Commission on Narcotic Drugs, the Swedish government presented a new action plan in January 2002, which is to be valid until 2004. A total of SEK 325 million (approximately $50 million Canadian) has been allocated over the three-year period to combat illegal drug use. The action plan was presented as a means to reverse the disturbing trend in drug abuse.
Sweden’s vision, when it comes to drug policy, has not changed since the early 1980s: it is that of a drug-free society. This vision is reflective of Sweden’s restrictive drug policy. It is based on a balance between reducing demand for, and supply of, drugs. More specifically, the objectives are:
· To reduce the number of new recruits to drug abuse (mainly through prevention directed at young people);
· To encourage more drug users to give up the habit (through care and treatment); and
· To reduce the supply of drugs (through criminal measures).
One of the key new features of the drug strategy is the creation of a national anti-drugs coordinator position. The position was created to have clear leadership in the drug policy area, make it possible to follow up on the plan’s goals, and determine whether new initiatives are required to combat new problems. The coordinator will be responsible for implementing the action plan as well as coordinating the national drug policy in general. The key tasks for the new anti-drugs coordinator are:
· To develop cooperation with authorities, municipal and county councils, NGOs, etc.;
· To shape public opinion;
· To undertake a supporting function for municipal and county councils in the development of local strategies;
· To initiate methods development and research;
· To serve as the Government spokesperson on drugs issues;
· To evaluate the action plan; and
· To report regularly to the Government (at least once a year).
Of the SEK 325 million, 100 million (approximately $15 million Canadian) has been allocated to a special drugs initiative within the Swedish Prison and Probation Service. The goal is to offer care and treatment to all drug abusers in this system. In addition, the National Prison and Probation Administration is required to:
· Develop methods for preventing drugs being brought into institutions and detention centres;
· Investigate the obstacles to treatment outside institutions; and
· Produce special programmes for contract care, i.e. care in accordance with a contract between the person convicted and the community.
With respect to the police, the National Police Board and the National Council for Crime Prevention will be required to carry out their own review of police efforts to combat drug-related crime.
In Sweden, while the national policy is created at the national level, much of the responsibility for implementing the goals of the action plan remains with the municipalities. For example, they have responsibility for the care of drug abusers pursuant to the Social Services Act. In addition, prevention initiatives are also carried out at the local level. Thus, strategies in municipalities will be based on local concerns. Enforcement of the legislation remains at the national level, however, through the police and customs services.
Treatment is one of the three pillars of Sweden’s drug policy. One of the stated goals of Swedish drug policy is to rehabilitate the user rather than to punish them by way of the criminal justice system. Since 1982, it has been possible to force people into drug treatment (also applies to alcohol and other products) for a period of up to six months. The main reason for this type of treatment is to protect the user or others in cases of life threatening situations and to motivate the user to continue treatment on a voluntary basis. The use of compulsory treatment appears to be uncommon and its effectiveness has been questioned.
The goal of treatment in Sweden is generally to obtain complete abstention. In the last several years, there has been a shift from compulsory treatment and institutional treatment towards out-patient treatment. In the past, the emphasis was put on long-term, in-patient programs. The treatment was often done in therapeutic communities based in rural areas of Sweden. Many of the institutions involved in treatment are non-governmental but are paid for their services by the government. This has created a very influential lobby group that obviously requests more resources for treatment initiatives as this is needed for their survival.
Treatment initiatives were very well funded in the past (particularly in the 1980s because this is when HIV/AIDS started to manifest themselves). Pro-active efforts were made to locate drug addicts and provide them with proper treatment. A person could often be in treatment for a period of two years (often in a therapeutic community). It would appear, however, that treatment is less easily available today than it was 10 to 15 years ago. In addition, the time a user spends in treatment has shortened. These changes are due to cutbacks in social service spending at the municipal level that occurred in the 1990s. “Whereas in 1989 there were 19,000 people in treatment centres (for both alcohol and drugs), in 1994 this number had dropped to 13,000. In the same period, the number of people in compulsory care dropped from 1,500 to 900. Due to the budget cuts, 90 treatment homes were closed between 1991 to 1993.”
Methadone substitution programs have been available in Sweden since the end of the 1960s. Currently, approximately 600 people are involved in methadone substitution programs in Stockholm, Uppsala, Malmo and Lund. The programs are strictly regulated and are officially viewed as being experimental. Some of the conditions for participation include that: the patient must be aged over 20 and demonstrate at least four years of intravenous opiate abuse; he or she must have tried several forms of drug-free treatment; the person in question must have entered the program on a voluntary basis (for example, the person must not be detained, under arrest, sentenced to a term of imprisonment or be an inmate of a correctional facility). For those participating in methadone substitution programs, other drugs are not permitted and the patient must visit the clinic on a daily basis. At this time, the maximum number of people that may be in the program at one time is 800. Pilot projects are under way with Subutex.
While Sweden has spent large sums of money on treatment, few of its programs have been properly evaluated. Therefore, it is difficult to provide details of their effectiveness. “The official aim is to rehabilitate drug addicts and a lot of effort and financial means are allocated to achieve this; much more than in many other European countries. However, despite all these good intentions, the reality is that the effectiveness of these very expansive programmes is relatively low. In the long run, the Swedish drug treatment programmes do not show better results than what is found internationally.”
With respect to harm reduction initiatives, there are few low threshold services in Sweden and most are staffed by voluntary organisations. They offer a series of services, but no prescriptions. Needle exchange programs are operated at clinics for infectious diseases in hospitals in Lund and Malmo, and are thus fairly limited. Harm reduction initiatives, such as needle exchange programs, are difficult to promote under a vision of a drug-free society where drug use is not accepted. A proposal in the late 1980’s to introduce needle exchange programs throughout Sweden was quashed by Parliament because it “was felt that a higher availability of needles would not stop the spread of HIV, on the contrary, it was thought to increase intravenous drug use.”
The criminal justice system also plays a role with respect to treatment. In 2000, more than 5,000 drug users were placed in prison. While in prison, offenders have access to treatment programs for drug abuse and some offenders are transferred outside prison for treatment. There are also initiatives to keep drugs out of prisons, for example by conducting searches and urine tests. While in prison, the offender is not offered syringes and substitution treatments are not available.
As previously stated, Swedish legislation allows, under certain conditions, that a sentence may be served outside prison. The necessity of drug treatment is one of the reasons that is often raised. Another alternative to imprisonment is a probationary sentence combined with institutional drug treatment. An example of an alternative to prison is the following:
Since 1998, persons with drug addiction problems who have committed a drug offence can access treatment signing a ‘treatment contract.’ It is a real contract between the drug addict and the Court in which the two parties have rights and obligations like in all contracts. However, certain conditions must be fulfilled by the drug addict: the person must need treatment and he must be motivated to undergo treatment; he/she is a misuser of drugs; and the drug habit contributed to the drugs crime, which should not be serious (less than 2 years foreseen as penalty). The person is not sent to prison and a personalised plan of treatment is established. The health authorities are responsible for the treatment and shall report to the local prison and probation administration and to the public prosecutor if the probationer seriously neglects the obligations stated in the personal plan.
With respect to cannabis, it is viewed as a dangerous drug “and its use is regarded as the beginning of a career in drugs.” This is one of the reasons that prevention measures pay specific attention to cannabis as this should lead to less experimenting with the drug which will prevent new recruits into the drug scene.
With respect to prevention, drug education programs start early and regularly appear throughout the school curriculum. “Without exaggeration, this opinion-forming could be described as a process of indoctrination. Considering the magnitude of these programmes, the contents of them have gradually become something indisputable and conclusive that one incorporates them into one’s own value system.”
LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK
A. Classes of drugs
The main drug legislation in Sweden is the Narcotic Drugs Criminal Act 1968. The term “narcotic drugs” is defined in section 8: they include medicinal products or substances hazardous to health with addictive properties and which are subject to control under an international agreement to which Sweden is a party or which the Government has declared to be ‘narcotic drugs’ within the meaning of the Act. No distinction is made between soft and hard drugs. As will be discussed later, the nature of the substance is, however, among the criteria to determine the seriousness of an offence. Narcotic drugs are set out in five lists. List I deals with illegal drugs without medical use; lists II to IV deal with narcotic substances with medical usage and regulation of its import/export; and list V deals with narcotic substances outside international controls. Pursuant to the legislation, narcotic medicines may only be supplied on prescription from a doctor, dentist or veterinarian.
B. Offences
In Sweden, almost all forms of involvement with narcotics are prohibited pursuant to the Narcotic Drugs Criminal Act. This Act lists the behaviours and practices which constitute drug offences and includes possession for personal use, supply (which is fairly broadly defined), manufacture, etc. Even consumption (drug use) has been prohibited since 1988. In this case, “it is not addiction which is a criminal offence according to this law, but the act of adding a drug to the human body.” The police are entitled to conduct urine or blood tests in the case of people suspected of having used drugs.
The Smuggling Criminal Act 2000 regulates illegal import and export of drugs. Other relevant legislation includes: the Doping Criminal Act 1991 which regulates the importation, supply, possession of performance enhancing drugs for example; the Act on Prohibition of Certain Substances which are Dangerous to the Health 1999 which regulates possession and supply of substances that entail danger to life or health and are being used, or can be used, for the purpose of intoxication – this legislation does not regulate substances regulated by other Acts.
There are also a number of relevant laws outside the criminal law area. They include: the Social Service Act 1980 which covers the possible forms of care for drug users; the Act on the Forced Treatment of Abusers which provides that an addict who is dangerous to himself or to others may be ordered by a court to undergo compulsory treatment (which involves deprivation of liberty for up to six months for adults and even longer for those up to the age of 20). Other legislation deals with possible expulsion from school for students who abuse drugs, revocation of a driving licence for drug addiction, etc. There is zero-tolerance with respect to driving under the influence of drugs.
C. Penalties
Punishment is determined by rules contained in the Swedish Penal Code. There are three degrees of penalties for drug offences: minor, ordinary and serious. Penalties for minor drug offences consist of fines or up to six months’ imprisonment, for ordinary drug offences, up to three years, and for serious offences, two to ten years imprisonment. The penalties regulated under the Smuggling Criminal Act, are identical to the penalties listed above.
The seriousness of the offence is based on the nature and quantity of drugs and other circumstances. The government has stated that the term “minor drug offence” is to be reserved for the very mildest of offences. For example, it should generally only involve personal use or possession for personal use of very small amounts. In these cases, a fine may be warranted. The fine is based on the offender’s income. Minor offences include: amphetamine up to 6 g, cannabis up to 50 g, cocaine up to 0.5 g and heroin up to 0.39 g; ordinary offences include: amphetamine from 6.1 g to 250 g, cannabis from 51 g to 2 kg, cocaine from 0.6 g to 50 g and heroin from .04 g to 25 g; and serious offences include: amphetamine 250 g or more, cannabis 2 kg or more, cocaine 51 g or more and heroin 25 g or more. The trafficking of drugs will generally led to imprisonment.
With respect to smuggling, in determining whether the offence is serious, one must consider whether it formed part of an activity pursued on a large scale or on a commercial basis, involved particularly large quantities of drugs or was otherwise of a particularly dangerous or ruthless nature.
In 1996, of the 5,862 people sentenced for drug-related offences, 3,760 were sentenced for minor offences, 1,708 for ordinary offences and 391 for serious offences. Of the 1,274 who were sentenced to imprisonment, 54 were for minor offences, 893 for ordinary offences and 326 for serious offences.
As in other countries, there are several alternatives to imprisonment. For example, the court can choose other sanctions including probation, conditional sentence or compulsory treatment. These sanctions appear to be used frequently in drug cases. The following has been stated with respect to compulsory treatment:
Generally a drug addict who is found guilty of any type of crime can in certain circumstances be ordered to undergo detoxification treatment. Treatment can take place in conjunction with a prison sentence or else together with probation, a conditional sentence or conditional release from prison. The consent of a convicted person to undergo treatment under certain conditions may constitute a reason for ordering probation instead of imprisonment (so-called contract treatment). In practice, probation and conditional sentencing in connection with compulsory treatment are usually used for drug offences of normal severity, that is in cases where imprisonment would otherwise be imposed.
Swedish legislation also allows for the forfeiture of any drugs used in the commission of an offence, any gains made, the property used as an aid in an offence, etc.
D. Prosecutorial discretion
The following is a description of prosecutorial discretion is Sweden:
The prosecutor has an absolute duty to prosecute. This means that the prosecutor must initiate proceedings for the prosecution of an offence. This is a principal rule to which there are a number of exceptions. For minor drug offences, the sanction imposed is imprisonment for a maximum of six months. In the Circular of the Prosecutor-General on Certain Questions regarding the Handling of Narcotics Cases, the Prosecutor-General stated that the dropping of prosecutions for narcotic drug offences should be limited to cases involving only possession for personal use of indivisible amounts or corresponding to at most a roll-up of cannabis resin or a dose of some stimulant of the central nervous system, with the exception of cocaine, i.e. such a small amount of a narcotic substance that it would not normally be further divided and sold. Having regard to the difficulties in individual cases of determining the magnitude of this quantity, prosecutions should go ahead in cases of doubt. If circumstances give grounds for assuming that the possession, despite the small amount, is not intended for personal use, the prosecution should not be dropped. As a consequence of these remarks, prosecutions should also not be dropped where an abuser is found in possession of narcotic drugs amounting to personal use for a certain period. In addition, it is of great importance that the dropping of prosecutions should be mainly limited to occurrences of the nature of first offences.
DEBATE IN SWEDEN
The Swedish vision of a drug-free society is so widely accepted that it is not questioned in the political arena or the media. The drug policy has support from all political parties and, according to the opinion surveys, the restrictive approach receives broad support from the public. For example, a survey in 2001 revealed that 96% were opposed to legalizing any drug that is classified. In addition, another survey in 2000 revealed that 91% were against decriminalizing cannabis use. The state of Swedish public opinion has been described as follows:
The role of public opinion is central to understanding the attitude of the different political parties. Opinion polls show that a large majority of the people subscribe to a restrictive drug policy. The same polls indicate that drugs are perceived as one of society’s main social problems. The moral panic surrounding drugs is such, that no political party dares to speak out against any measures that may appear to move in the direction of a more liberal drug policy. Supporting the restrictive policy, or even asking for more restrictive measures to curb increase in the drug problem are essential for a political party to win votes. Saying the contrary, to back a more liberal approach, is not an option for a political party and would almost mean its political death. It has been pointed out that anti-drug pressure groups have been the driving forces behind influencing public opinion, and through them the political parties. It has also been shown that besides the social movements, the media have also contributed to the drug scare that exists today and the defining of drugs as a major social problem.
Thus, the Swedish population in general has a negative view of drug use and is convinced that drugs pose a major threat to society. These themes have been advanced by government, the media and other organizations in Sweden, and others do not often criticize them. Scientists are generally the only group that raises doubts with respect to the current policy. Criticism of the drug policy can have negative consequences on a person. For example, they may be professionally and personally criticized, they may be regarded as a traitor, and, such a stance can have a negative impact on their employment situation. Much of the prevention in Sweden is based on providing information about the dangers of drugs. The purpose of these messages is to scare youth away from drugs. This has fostered a view in the Swedish population that drugs are evil and should be avoided at almost all costs.
In recent years, the consequences of downsizing preventive and treatment efforts have dominated the debate.
RECENT REPORTS OR STUDIES
In 1998, the government created a Commission on Narcotic Drugs. Its mandate was to evaluate Sweden’s drug policy and to propose, within the concept of a restrictive drug policy, measures for its strengthening and streamlining. The Commission was not to deviate from the overall aim of a drug-free society. The terms of reference were to:
· propose improvements of methods and systems to assess the drug situation and to evaluate the goal of a drug-free society;
· evaluate and propose measures to strengthen and streamline drug prevention measures;
· analyse the development of treatment programmes, including those in the prison and probation system, and propose measures to improve treatment and rehabilitation of drug abusers;
· evaluate the extent and focus of national funds for the development of treatment and of measures to prevent drug-related crime,
· analyse the need for changes in the working methods in the judicial system and in penal and criminal procedural legislation;
· review existing research, propose how research can be stimulated, strengthened and organized and identify important but neglected areas for research in the drug field;
· frame strategies for targeted information measures and for the formation of opinion.
The Commission recently published a report entitled The Crossroads (referring to one direction that calls for a significant increase of resources in the form of commitment, direction, competence and funding and another that implies a lowering of goals and considerable acceptance of drug abuse).
The Commission noted that the drugs issue was not a political priority in recent years which has led to reduced funding for all sectors involved while the drug problem has become more severe and widespread. The following are some of the Commission’s main findings and recommendations.
Leadership: The Commission noted that there is a need for stronger priorisation, clearer control and better follow-up of drug policy and of concrete initiatives at all levels of government. Thus, it recommended stronger leadership in relation to drug policy, with the Government playing a more active role, both nationally and internationally. In addition, it recommended a model for stronger local initiatives and improved local co-ordination. Despite the shared responsibilities, the Commission saw no reason for altering the basic allocation of responsibilities where drug questions are concerned. It was of the view that national leadership should be reinforced by the appointment of a minister specifically charged with the direction of drug policy activities. In addition, to facilitate and intensify development and co-ordination of local initiatives, it was proposed that local drug policy strategies be put in place by municipalities and county councils.
Demand reduction: The Commission noted that there are no hard boundaries between preventative measures, care and treatment, and the restriction of supply. For preventative measures to succeed, they must be “included in a system of measures restricting availability, and there must be clear rules which include society’s norms and values, as well as effective care and treatment.” The Commission views schools as the most important arena for drug prevention work and proposed that guidelines be set out for all school instruction concerning tobacco, alcohol and narcotic drugs. It also noted that preventative strategies were also required for young adults and are lacking in most municipalities. The Commission proposed that all young persons and their parents have access to local counselling on alcohol, drugs and abuse-related issues. The Commission made several other comments regarding prevention, including the need for reinforcement of specialist competence regarding young persons and substance abuse. It also added that for those who had started drug abuse, early detection and a clear reaction is important.
The Commission viewed care and treatment as an essential element of drug policy measures as they help reduce drug abuse and also the harm to drug abusers. It found that this is a field which has been subject to extensive spending cuts and downgrading by the municipalities in recent years, and that availability of treatment was not uniform throughout the country. The deficiencies in the system were most apparent for severe abusers and for long-term treatment measures. Severe abusers, in particular, need to be the subject of long-term, co-ordinated initiatives involving all agencies that are able to provide initiatives tailored to the individual needs of the client. In addition, the Commission found a need for improving the competence of those in the field of care and treatment. It set out the following guiding principles regarding care and treatment:
· All drug abusers shall be reached by an offer of help and, if necessary, care for the abuse.
· Advice, support and assistance shall reach people at an early stage of abuse.
· Measures of care shall be aimed at achieving a life free from substance abuse and illegal drugs.
· Care and other measures on behalf of substance abusers shall be of good quality.
· Measures to combat substance abuse shall be sustainable and long-term.
The Commission also noted a downscaling of measures to channel drug abusers into care and rehabilitation in the prison and probation system. This is important due to the intensive contact that system has with drug abusers. Thus, the Commission saw an urgent need for more resources for the maintenance and improvement of measures and also for an intensification of measures to combat drug abuse. It also made recommendations with respect to controlling availability of drugs in prisons, including increased search powers and increased penalties for refusing a blood test.
Supply reduction: The Commission did not find any real deficiencies in the legislation or the working methods used by drug authorities although it was found to be imperative that these authorities be allocated more resources. Police and customs have not gained control over the illegal market. In fact, indicators show that supply is more generous, prices are lower than in the past and the variety of drugs has expanded. Some minor recommendations were made with respect to minimizing the possibility of legal drugs entering the illegal market. With respect to combating illegal drug trade, the Commission recommended that the organizational structure of the police be examined (for example, the way in which the dissolution of specialized drug squads has affected the quality of police investigations) and that any shortcomings be followed-up. The Commission also recommended that special investigation methods (such as controlled deliveries) be reviewed and that the findings lead to the drafting of guidelines on the subject.
Competence development and research: The Commission was of the view that it was important to improve knowledge concerning different aspects of narcotic drugs, measures used to combat drug abuse and the effect of drug policy. For example, knowledge of the drug situation is necessary for planning measures and evaluating drug policy. The Commission found that knowledge and methods used in prevention and treatment were deficient and that measures should be based on knowledge and documented experience. Therefore, recommendations were made to increase knowledge and competence regarding those involved with drug issues, particularly those involved in prevention and treatment. The Commission stated that documentation, follow-up and evaluation should be improved and warns “against belief in simple solutions of the ‘cookbook’ variety.”
COSTS
As in other countries, systematic figures on drug-related costs are not readily available.
A. Public Costs
Treatment for alcohol and drug abuse has been estimated to cost municipalities SEK 3.7 billion (over $500 million Canadian) per year (55% of which is for institutional care). The police used 6% of its budget to combat drugs during 2000 (for a total of SEK 702 million – over $100 million Canadian). The police had 869 people involved in drug issues while customs had 1,080 involved in border defence. No costs were available for customs.
B. Social Costs
The Commission on Narcotic Drugs estimated the social costs at SEK 7.7 billion per year (does not take into account prevention, training and evaluation).
ADMINISTRATION
As discussed above, the coordinator will now be responsible for coordinating the national drug policy. In the past, this role had been played by the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs. With respect to the legal distribution of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, the Medical Products Agency is responsible for issuing authorizations for the import and export of drugs. This Agency also provides drug related statistics to the UNDCP.
The Swedish National Police have responsibility for drug enforcement. The Drug Offences Division of the National Police Board conducts criminal investigations in relation to organized crime, or other drug-related offences, on a national or international scale. The Swedish Customs Service is responsible for points of entry.
The National Institute of Public Health coordinates demand reduction activities. It is also the National Focal Point in the REITOX network. Operational activities are coordinated at the regional and municipal level. There is also local coordination with the participation of social services, the police, prison and probation services, medical services, schools and other concerned parties. Thus, in prevention and care and treatment, local groups and municipalities play a key role.
Because of its encompassing nature, the drug issue also involves many other ministries, for example the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
STATISTICS
A. Use
Pursuant to surveys among youths in the 9th grade (15-year-olds) and among 18-year-old military conscripts, an obvious trend in the 1990s is the increase in lifetime prevalence use of drugs among teenagers, particularly older teenagers. There has also been an increase in recent use (last year, last 30 days) among teenagers and younger adults. For example, the percentage of 15 year olds who have tried drugs has risen from 4% to 9% from 1992 to 2000. It is interesting to note that the number was 14% in the beginning of the 1970s and had decreased to around 8% in 1982. With respect to military conscripts, the trend is similar. According to these surveys, consumption of illegal drugs is low compared to other European countries, although the trend points to an increase in use. It should be noted that these numbers have been criticized. First, they are applicable to only 15-16 year old students and 18-year-old conscripts. Thus, these prevalence rates do not consider older groups where some first-time experimentation with drugs will occur. In addition, it has been argued that there will be underreporting of drug use when drugs are viewed in such a negative light and the questionnaires are filled out at school (where some will feel they are being observed by their teachers).
In 2000, a running three-year average of lifetime prevalence for the 15-64 age group was 12% (with the highest at 17% for the 24-44 age group). Since 1988, last year prevalence has never been over 1%. Overall, males are twice as likely to have used drugs than females although the difference is not as high in lower age groups.
Most who have experimented with drugs have tried cannabis and the majority of these have tried only cannabis (in Sweden, cannabis is usually taken in the form of hashish). The second most popular drug in Sweden are amphetamines. Cocaine would be the third most popular drug for older people while for youths it would be ecstacy and LSD. During the 1990s, the availability of drugs has increased, in particular amphetamine and heroin. In Sweden, as was discussed earlier, the typical drug addict uses amphetamines intravenously. It would appear, however, that heroin use is on the increase in Sweden.
In general, the surveys indicate that overall drug use is fairly low in Sweden. With respect to severe drug abusers (defined as intravenous or daily drug use), it would appear that Sweden has a fairly serious problem with a range from 14,000 to 20,000 people. This is close to the European Union average. As discussed earlier, one distinction is that the main problem drug is amphetamine rather than heroin as is the case in many other countries, although most drug abusers are multiple drug users and heroin use appears to be on the rise.
B. Offences
The number of suspected people who were reported has increased from 6,567 in 1985 to 12,470 in 1999. The police registered 32,423 violations of the Narcotic Drugs Criminal Act in 2000 which is similar to the numbers in the last decade. The number of violations to the Goods Smuggling Act has decreased by 85% since 1980, to 350.
In 1998, 92% were suspected for use or possession (from 76% in 1975). In addition, the number of those suspected of selling or manufacturing is now 19% (from 40% in 1975).
The number of sentences for violations of the Narcotic Drugs Criminal Act or the Goods Smuggling Act is now 12,470 in 1999 (from 2,601 in 1975). Cannabis was involved in 51% of sentences in 1998. In 1998, the sentences were divided in the following fashion: 38% for fines; 27% for prison; 14% for prosecution waivers; 14% for probation; and, 8% for other sanctions. Imprisonment was generally from two to six months.
http://www.parl.gc.ca/common/index.asp?Language=E&Parl=37&Ses=2
DEA Afghanistan drug intelligence briefing – November 2002 Afghanistan drug intelligence briefing
Published by U.S. Department of Justice - Tuesday 19 November, 2002
Copyright: Drug Enforcement Administration
Drug Situation Report - September 2001
STATUS IN INTERNATIONAL DRUG TRAFFICKING
The Islamic State of Afghanistan is a major source country for the cultivation, processing and trafficking of opiate and cannabis products. Afghanistan produced over 70 percent of the world's supply of illicit opium in 2000. Morphine base, heroin and hashish produced in Afghanistan are trafficked worldwide. Narcotics are the largest source of income in Afghanistan due to the decimation of the country's economic infrastructure caused by years of warfare. Afghanistan was invaded by the Soviet Union in 1979. Following the withdrawal of the Soviets ten years later, civil strife ensued in Afghanistan. There is no recognized national government in Afghanistan and opposing factions continue to battle for control of the country. The Taliban, a fundamentalist Islamic group, now controls over 90 percent of Afghanistan, while a loose coalition of opposition forces (referred to as the Northern Alliance ) maintains control of portions of northern Afghanistan.
DRUG CULTIVATION AND PROCESSING
Opium: According to the official U.S. Government estimate for 2001, Afghanistan produced an estimated 74 metric tons of opium from 1,685 hectares of land under opium poppy cultivation. This is a significant decrease from the 3,656 metric tons of opium produced from 64,510 hectares of land under opium poppy cultivation in 2000.
The United Nations Drug Control Program (UNDCP) also estimates opium production in Afghanistan. The UNDCP estimated a reduction in 2000 opium production from 1999, pointing to a 10 percent reduction in land under opium poppy cultivation and the impact of a protracted drought in the area as the causes for the smaller opium production. Estimates for 2001 have not been released.
AFGHAN OPIUM PRODUCTION: METRIC TONS
2001 2000 1999 1998 1997 1996
USG 74 3,656 2,861 2,340 2,184 2,099
UNDCP N/A 3,276 4,581 2,102 2,804 2,248
For a number of years, there was a significant difference between U.S. Government and UNDCP estimates, with UNDCP estimates considerably higher than U.S. Government estimates. These differences are related to the differing methodology used. The U.S. Government estimates rely on imagery-based sample survey assessments, while the UNDCP utilizes a ground-based census survey. The UNDCP estimates more hectares under opium poppy cultivation than does the U.S. Government and bases yield estimates on farmer reports. The U.S. Government completed an opium poppy yield study in 2000. The study led to an increase in the yield per hectare figure used to determine total opium production. U.S. Government estimates for 1996 through 1999 were then revised using the new yield figure. Consequently, U.S. Government and UNDCP production estimates are much closer.
On July 28, 2000, Taliban leader Mullah Omar issued a decree banning future opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan. The decree states that the Taliban will eradicate any poppy cultivation found in the 2001 growing season in areas under their control. Reportedly, this ban applies to any territory seized from the Northern Alliance. In February 2001, the UNDCP declared that the opium poppy cultivation ban was successful and that the 2001 crop was expected to be negligible. This marks the first real effort by the Taliban to reduce opium production. In 1999, the Taliban decreed that opium poppy cultivation would be reduced by one-third in 1999-2000. However, this did not occur. The Taliban did report that opium poppies were destroyed in Qandahar and Helmand Provinces. This eradication effort was apparently in response to an agreement with the UNDCP, which agreed to fund alternative development projects on the condition that cultivation be reduced in Qandahar. In fact, there was a 50 percent reduction in the three UNDCP target districts in Qandahar, but there was not a one-third reduction overall as promised by the Taliban.
According to press reports dated August 31, 2001, Taliban leader Mullah Omar extended the opium poppy cultivation ban for another year, to the 2001-2002 growing season.
Cannabis: Cannabis grows wild and is also cultivated in Afghanistan. Afghanistan is a major producer of cannabis, much of which is processed into hashish. According to INTERPOL, Afghanistan and Pakistan together produce about 1000 MT of cannabis resin each year, with Afghanistan producing the bulk of the product.
Heroin Processing: Laboratories in Afghanistan convert opium into morphine base, white heroin, or one of three grades of brown heroin, depending on the order received. Large processing labs are located in southern Afghanistan. Smaller laboratories are located in other areas of Afghanistan, including Nangarhar Province. In the past, many opium processing laboratories were located in Pakistan, particularly in the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP). These laboratories appear to have relocated to Afghanistan, both to be closer to the source of opium and to avoid law enforcement actions by the Government of Pakistan.
Morphine base is usually produced for traffickers based in Turkey. The morphine base is then shipped to Turkey, where it is converted to heroin prior to shipment to European and North American markets. Laboratories in Afghanistan also produce heroin for the world market. Chemists in the region are capable of producing heroin hydrochloride with extremely high purity levels.
Taliban officials claim to have destroyed a large number of heroin processing labs in Nangarhar Province in the spring of 1999. However, reports suggest that heroin processing continues in Nangarhar. Laboratories are located throughout Afghanistan, with a significant number of conversion laboratories located in Helmand Province. Taliban officials also reportedly destroyed two heroin conversion laboratories in Helmand Province in October 2000. It is unlikely that the reported destruction of two laboratories had any impact on opiate conversion in the region.
TRAFFICKING
Afghanistan is landlocked and drug traffickers must rely on land routes to move morphine base and heroin out of the country. Opiates are consumed regionally, as well as smuggled to consumers in the west. It is estimated that 80 percent of opiate products in Europe originate in Afghanistan.
Morphine Base: The primary market for Afghan morphine base is traffickers based in Turkey. Morphine base is transported overland through Pakistan and Iran, or directly to Iran from Afghanistan, and then into Turkey. Shipments of Afghan-produced morphine base are also sent by sea from Pakistan's Makran Coast. Routes north through the Central Asia Republics, then across the Caspian Sea and south into Turkey are also used.
Heroin: Heroin is trafficked to worldwide destinations by many routes. Traffickers quickly adjust heroin smuggling routes based on political and weather-related events. Reports of heroin shipments north from Afghanistan through the Central Asian States to Russia have increased. Tajikistan is a frequent destination for both opium and heroin shipments, although Tajikistan serves mostly a transit point and storage location rather than a final destination. While some of the heroin is used in Russia, some also transits Russia to other consumer markets. Heroin transits India en route to international markets. Heroin also continues to be trafficked from Afghanistan through Pakistan. Seizures are frequently reported at Pakistan's international airports. Heroin is also smuggled by sea on vessels leaving the port city of Karachi. Heroin produced in Afghanistan continues to be trafficked to the United States, although generally in small quantities.
Hashish originating in Afghanistan is trafficked throughout the region, as well as to international markets. Although the bulk of the hashish intended for international heroin markets is routed through Pakistan and Central Asia and sent by sea, train or truck, hashish has also been smuggled in air freight in the past.
Afghanistan produces no essential or precursor chemicals. Acetic anhydride (AA), which is the most commonly used acetylating agent in heroin processing, is smuggled primarily from Pakistan, India, the Central Asian Republics, China, and Europe. According to the World Customs Organization, China seized 5,670 metric tons of AA destined for Afghanistan in April 2000. The AA was reportedly found in 240 plastic boxes concealed in carpets.
DRUG-RELATED MONEY LAUNDERING
Money laundering is not an issue in Afghanistan. The unsophisticated banking system which previously existed has been damaged by the years of war. It is likely that the informal banking system used extensively in the region, usually referred to as the hawala or hundi system, is also used by drug traffickers. This system is an underground, traditional, informal network that has been used for centuries by businesses and families throughout Asia. This system provides a confidential, convenient, efficient service at a low cost in areas that are not served by traditional banking facilities.
DRUG ABUSE/TREATMENT
No drug abuse or treatment statistics are available. The UNDCP states that heroin, opium and hashish are the most commonly abused drugs, along with pharmaceutical drugs (for which no prescription is required). Heroin use is by smoking, not injection. Reportedly heroin addiction is a growing problem in the cities of Jalabad, Kabul, Qandahar and Heart, and the only hospital providing even limited treatment is in Kabul. The Taliban have initiated a drug awareness campaign using leaflets, radio broadcasts and the newspapers. The UNDCP has distributed anti-drug materials in Badakshan Province, where reportedly the rate of opiate addiction is high at perhaps 10-25 per cent of the population.
DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES/LEGISLATION
The Taliban maintain effective control of nearly all of the opium poppy growing areas in the country, even though they are not internationally recognized as the official Government of Afghanistan nor do the control the entire country. Islamic law (Shari'a) has been imposed in territory controlled by the Taliban, and local Shari'a courts have been established throughout the country. In 1997, the Taliban re-activated the State High Commission for Drug Control, which was originally established in 1990 by the legitimate interim government. Prior to the UNDCP reports indicating that implementation of the 2000-2001 opium poppy cultivation ban has been effective and the release of the U.S. Government estimate indicating a dramatic reduction in opium production, the Taliban made only token gestures toward anti-drug law enforcement.
TREATIES AND CONVENTIONS
Afghanistan is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, but lacks a national government to implement the country's obligations.
Note: The United States Government has no presence in Afghanistan; the U.S. Embassy in Kabul is closed due to security concerns. The Drug Enforcement Administration covers Afghanistan from its Islamabad, Pakistan Country Office. In addition to Pakistan and Afghanistan, the Islamabad Country Office also includes Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, the United Arab Emirates and Oman in its area of responsibility.
STATISTICAL TABLES
Prices: No official prices are available. Press reports indicate that the cost for raw opium, heroin, hashish and precursor chemicals are relatively low in Afghanistan. For example, the Iranian press reports that one kilogram of heroin can be purchased for US $2,000 on the Tajikistan-Afghanistan border, but the price rises to US $15,000 per kilogram in Dushanbe, the capital of Tajikistan. The same kilogram of heroin can be sold for US $150,000 in Moscow, Russia according to press reports.
Prices have reportedly increased significantly in Afghanistan and Pakistan since the opium poppy cultivation ban has been in effect. White export quality heroin purchased in Pakistan has doubled in price to approximately US $4,000 since July 2000.
KEY JUDGEMENTS
Drug trafficking in the Golden Crescent appears to depend on the Taliban at this point. Although they have reportedly now banned opium poppy cultivation, the Taliban have long relied on drug trafficking for financial support.
In order to gain international recognition as the legitimate government of Afghanistan, the Taliban must make a convincing effort to halt drug trafficking activities. Roadblocks to international support for the Taliban remain even if the opium ban is proved successful, due to concern about harsh treatment of women, human rights abuses, and support for extremist organizations.
Opium production may resume if the Taliban believe that the international response to their opium ban is inadequate.
Should the opium poppy cultivation ban continue to be effectively implemented in future years, opium production may migrate to countries bordering Afghanistan.
For the short term, an adequate supply of opiates remains available in Afghanistan despite the ban. According to UNDCP reporting, farmers have traditionally stored up to 60% of each year's crop for future sale, which suggests that farmers themselves may have a significant amount of opium still available.
Prepared By:
Europe, Asia, Africa Strategic Unit (NIBE)
Intelligence Division
Drug Enforcement Administration
http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/
Chemical Diversion and Synthetic Drug Manufacture – November 2002 Chemical Diversion and Synthetic Drug Manufacture
Published by U.S. Department of Justice - Tuesday 19 November, 2002
Copyright: Drug Enforcement Administration
Preface
This report is a joint effort between the Europe, Asia, Africa Strategic Intelligence Unit, Office of International Intelligence, Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), and the Drug Analysis Section, Criminal Analysis Branch, Criminal Intelligence Directorate, Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP).
Executive Summary
The monitoring and control of precursor and other chemicals used in the manufacture of illicit drugs are recognized as a significant supply and demand reduction initiative in a comprehensive strategy to tackle drug abuse and trafficking. Both Canada and the United States are signatories to, and have ratified, the 1988 United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (Vienna Convention). Provisions adopted in this Convention dealing with precursor and other chemicals frequently used in the manufacture of illicit drugs provide a global solution to the worldwide issue of chemical diversion.
The United States has adopted various legislative measures dealing with the problem of chemical diversion, fulfilling its obligations under the Vienna Convention. The Canadian Government, led by Health Canada, is drafting a regulatory framework and administrative system to control and monitor precursors and other chemicals frequently used in the clandestine production of controlled substances. The regulations, which will satisfy Canada's international obligations/commitments and domestic requirements, are expected to come into force in 2002. The RCMP National Chemical Precursor Diversion Program has had success with voluntary reporting and cooperation from the domestic chemical industry, however, legal controls are required to enable law enforcement to effectively investigate chemical diversion and clandestine laboratory activities in Canada. Notwithstanding the absence of legal controls, Canadian law enforcement have continually responded to DEA investigative requests concerning chemical diversion.
Without regulatory chemical controls in Canada, drug traffickers have been able to legitimately purchase chemical products from licensed distributors. U.S.-based traffickers have taken great advantage of absent regulations and have crossed the border to obtain chemicals from Canadian suppliers. Chemical company distributors are not the sole sources for precursor and other chemicals used to synthesize illicit drugs. In both Canada and the United States, many of these products are readily available from aroma therapy companies, pharmacies, grocery, convenience and home improvement stores and other retailers where they are sold for a multitude of legitimate uses.
There is an apparent expansion of illicit methamphetamine production in North America. Pseudoephedrine (PSE) is the most common precursor used in methamphetamine synthesis in both Canada and the United States. Recent U.S. legislative controls regulating the sale and purchase of chemicals, coupled with a major nationwide investigation targeting PSE traffickers, have greatly limited the ability of groups or individuals to divert precursors from American supply sources. Consequently, Canada has become a major alternate source country from which huge amounts of PSE have been diverted for use in methamphetamine "super labs," notably in the State of California. The DEA has documented the involvement of ethnic Middle Eastern crime groups in the smuggling of precursor chemicals used in methamphetamine production in both the United States and Canada. The diversion of PSE from Canadian suppliers to the illicit market is reaching a critical level. This is supported by unprecedented increases in the amount of PSE imported into Canada over the last several years.
MDMA (Ecstasy) trafficking and use has escalated in Canada and the United States. Although domestic production occurs, the bulk of Ecstasy available in the North American market is imported from Western Europe. Dutch-based and Israeli-based crime groups continue to hold a monopoly on the international market. In Canada, there is an increasing number of poly-drug labs involving the production of MDMA, methamphetamine and other amphetamine-based drugs. In particular, the clandestine manufacture of MDA has increased. The Rave phenomenon in the United States and Canada has clearly propelled the demand for and supply of Ecstasy and has introduced a variety of other "club drugs," including gamma-hydroxybutyrate (GHB), ketamine and PMA. LSD popularity has had a resurgence in the U.S. Rave and nightclub scene.
The threat to public safety from explosion, fire, gas, groundwater contamination, and hazardous by-products associated with chemical synthesis is likely to increase with the proliferation of synthetic drug production in the United States and Canada. These dangers affect the safety and well-being of the public and the law enforcement personnel involved in the dismantling of these laboratories.
The recommendations made in the report include continued cross-border cooperation, an urgency for Canada to adopt a regulatory framework, consideration for charges of public endangerment resulting from clandestine laboratories, an industry code of good practices, and close cooperation between authorities and legitimate producers and distributors of chemical products.
Overview
Synthetic drugs continue to present a threat to North America. Domestic production of methamphetamine, MDMA and its analogues, and other synthetic drugs contribute to the overall drug threat in Canada and the United States. One of the primary strategies for combating the proliferation of synthetic drugs is the control and monitoring of precursor chemicals required for the production of these substances.
This intelligence product is a result of a joint assessment of the precursor chemical situation in Canada and the United States, conducted by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and United States Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA).
Brief History of Chemical Control
The potential for chemical control to impact on the illegal drug trade and thereby benefit public health and safety is enormous. The subject of the comprehensive need for chemical controls, as distinct from drug controls, was first examined in depth by an informal conference of U.S., Canadian and European drug control officials in Rome in May 1984. Thereafter, a series of special international conferences were organized on the subject: in Wiesbaden in 1986; Kuala Lumpur and Quito in 1987; and Washington, D.C. in 1989. These efforts resulted in the adoption of Article 12 of the 1988 Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (known as the Vienna Convention), establishing the foundation for international cooperation in chemical control. Also in 1988, the United States incorporated into its national controlled substances legislation the comprehensive Chemical Diversion and Trafficking Act (CDTA).
In 1990, the significance of chemical control was acknowledged at the Group of Seven (G-7) Houston Economic Summit in its mandate of a Chemical Action Task Force (CATF). The CATF's purpose was to develop effective procedures to ensure that precursor and essential chemicals are not diverted to manufacture illicit drugs. Results of the CATF's efforts included a recommendation that ten additional chemicals be added to the list of 12 in the Vienna Convention. Also, in December 1990, the European Community adopted a binding regulation on the commerce in listed chemicals, which was later modified and extended to include other chemicals as of January 1, 1993.
Additional chemical control action followed quickly in the 1990s. Thus, within a decade of the birth of the precursor and essential chemical diversion control concept, the legal framework for a concerted international control effort was firmly established.
Chemical Control in the United States
In the United States, chemical control measures strive to reach a balance between legitimate trade and law enforcement. U.S. chemical control requirements include the registration of List I chemical companies. Companies which handle above-threshold quantities of any Listed Chemicals are required to maintain transaction records for two years and must report suspicious transactions to the DEA. DEA monitors the import and export of Listed Chemicals and engages in the "Letter of No Objection" Program. In addition, the United States participates in multilateral chemical reporting and bilateral agreements with a number of countries through its chemical control program.
The first major chemical control law in the United States was the Chemical Diversion and Trafficking Act (CDTA) of 1988, which instituted a control system for 20 chemicals, including those listed in the Vienna Convention. The regulatory and enforcement framework for precursor control was further enhanced through the Crime Control Act of 1990. The subsequent Domestic Chemical Diversion Control Act of 1993 specifically targeted the illicit production of methamphetamine and the related drug methcathinone (which has virtually disappeared as a clandestine product). The 1993 amendment began to close the "legal drug exemption" that had allowed traffickers to avoid regulatory requirements by buying thousands of legal FDA-approved tablets. The bill brought over-the-counter, single-entity ephedrine products under DEA regulatory control, and permitted DEA to add other products by regulation. It also required the registration of handlers of List I chemicals, similar to the requirements for controlled substances.
In 1996, Congress enacted a major piece of methamphetamine-related legislation. The Comprehensive Methamphetamine Control Act (MCA) of 1996 broadened controls on listed chemicals used in the production of controlled substances and increased penalties for the trafficking and manufacture of methamphetamine and listed chemicals. This legislation removed the remaining CDTA-granted exemptions for combination ephedrine, pseudoephedrine (PSE) and phenylpropanolamine drug products. The Methamphetamine Penalty Enhancement Act of 1998, lowered certain quantity thresholds for mandatory minimum trafficking penalties. The recent Methamphetamine Anti-Proliferation Act of 2000 and Ecstasy Anti-Proliferation Act of 2000 enhanced the federal sentencing guidelines for these two substances.
Chemical Control in Canada
Canada is a signatory to, and has ratified, the Vienna Convention since November 1990. The Convention calls for all signatory countries to control the distribution and sale of certain chemicals used in the clandestine manufacture of synthetic drugs. Nine precursor chemicals are currently listed in Schedule VI of the 1997 Controlled Drugs and Substances Act (CDSA); however, the CDSA does not include regulations for the control of precursors and other substances nor is there an administrative system in place to satisfy Canada's international obligations/commitments and domestic requirements. The Canadian Government, led by Health Canada, is currently preparing such regulations that give effect to the provisions of Article 12 of the Convention. Canada will fulfill its obligation by establishing appropriate monitoring and control measures over the precursors and other substances listed in Table I and Table II of the Convention. These regulations are expected to come into force in 2002.
There are no legal controls to assist Canadian law enforcement agencies in the investigation of chemical diversion cases. In the absence of regulations, the RCMP instituted in 1995 the Chemical Diversion Reporting Program in an effort to liaise with, and educate, chemical industry representatives regarding suspicious transactions of chemicals and equipment which have possible application to clandestine drug manufacture. Overall, voluntary reporting and cooperation have been positive, although resources and the absence of legal measures have greatly limited investigative capabilities. Notwithstanding, Canadian law enforcement have continually responded to DEA investigative requests concerning chemical diversion. Private industry is willing to assist the police, but it is reluctant to become heavily involved in the absence of a legal structure or a code of conduct. In March 2000, the Federal Government approved funding for Health Canada to develop regulations and to establish a monitoring unit. The RCMP also received funding to set up five full-time positions to monitor suspicious chemical transactions. In addition to a national coordinator position at RCMP Headquarters in Ottawa, four positions are located in Montreal, Toronto, Edmonton and Vancouver.
As part of the recently established RCMP National Precursor Chemical Diversion Program, investigators will work closely with other RCMP personnel; domestic and foreign law enforcement agencies; Federal Government Departments such as Health Canada, the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), and the Canada Customs and Revenue Agency; and private industry to create a comprehensive national program that will focus on chemical diversion and clandestine laboratory investigations. DFAIT is responsible for issuing individual and general export permits under the Export Import Permits Act. In 1992, chemicals listed in Tables I and II of the 1988 Convention were, as an interim measure, placed on Group 8 of the Export Control List, according to categories determined by the CATF. Quantities in excess of chemical thresholds require individual permits to all non-U.S. destinations. Ephedrine and PSE require individual permits for all destinations. Other exports over indicated thresholds require a general export permit.(1) In reality, less than one dozen export permits have been issued since 1992. This further indicates the weak monitoring and control of chemical exports from Canada.
Many exporting countries require a permit from the importing country to verify that the company importing the chemical is conducting a legitimate transaction. In Canada, there are no regulations governing the issue of an import permit. In lieu of this, Health Canada issues a "Letter of No Objection" to the Canadian importer, who, in turn, sends the letter to the foreign supplier with a purchase order. Health Canada issued 116 letters for precursor chemicals in 2000 and 84 as of July 2001. There is no legal basis for this process; it is a courtesy to the industry, enabling the orderly importation of Table I substances. Health Canada also uses this process as a tracking mechanism to gather data on imports of these substances into Canada. Through this program, between 90 percent and 95 percent of the precursors entering Canada is traceable.
Health Canada's Notice of Intent appeared in the Canada Gazette, Part I of March 24, 2001: "The Drug Strategy and Controlled Substances Programme (DSCS) of Health Canada intend to develop a new regulatory framework and administrative system to control and monitor precursors and other substances frequently used in the clandestine production of controlled substances." The DCSC will identify affected clients and assess the scope of products containing precursors and other substances in Table I and Table II. Feedback has been sought from all potentially affected stakeholders through a policy discussion paper released in May 2001 and a Health Canada consultation workshop held in June 2001. The information received as a result of this process will be instrumental in preparing the new regulatory framework. Following publication of the proposed regulatory framework in Canada Gazette Part I, interested parties will be given another opportunity to provide further feedback.(2) The regulations will then be published in Canada Gazette Part II, followed by immediate implementation.
Chemical Situation
United States/Canada Chemical Origins (import/export)
The world's leading chemical producers include the United States, the People's Republic of China, India, Germany and the Czech Republic. Ephedrine and PSE, precursors for methamphetamine, however, are not produced in the United States or Canada. There are currently four countries that provide significant quantities of these chemicals to the international market: the Peoples' Republic of China, India, Germany, and the Czech Republic. Though Germany produces significant quantities of ephedrine and PSE, it maintains strict domestic controls of these substances, and has not been identified as a significant source country for these precursor chemicals in diversion investigations in the United States or Canada.
Four of the precursor chemicals potentially used for the production of Ecstasy (ethylamine, methylamine, nitroethane and piperonal) are produced in the United States, though not in significant quantities. These chemicals are regulated (List I) and domestic diversion is negligible. Imports and exports of these, and all List I chemicals, are monitored by the DEA Office of Diversion Control. The U.S. strategy toward international chemical diversion concentrates on chemicals destined for drug-producing regions.
While chemical products are manufactured domestically, imported products account for the bulk of precursor chemicals distributed to, and sold by, the Canadian chemical industry and other commercial outlets. In order to import commercial goods into Canada, clients report their goods, obtain release and submit customs accounting documents. Depending on the nature of the goods being imported, certain criteria must be met prior to the release of those goods. Most clients forward electronic data to Customs prior to the arrival of goods. Customs inspectors review the data and make release decisions or send the goods for inspection based on indicators.(3)
Canada Customs lacks the authority to seize or detain imported precursor chemicals unless they are not declared to Customs, or exceed the threshold limit as listed in Group 8 of the Export and Import Permits Act. However, despite the inability to seize imported goods, the Canada Customs Contraband and Intelligence Unit has been monitoring the movement of precursor chemicals into and out of the country for approximately two years. Information from international law enforcement agencies regarding serious suspicious shipments into and out of Canada has also helped the Unit to develop client profiles and to identify high risk exporters/importers. Canada Customs will ensure that a comprehensive monitoring and control program is implemented and ready to function once the pending regulations are sanctioned. (4)
Domestic Movement of Chemicals
Canada
Chemical company distributors are not the sole sources of precursor chemicals in Canada. Aromatherapy companies sell sassafras oil off the shelf or in multi-litre quantities through the Internet. Commercial substances that include chemicals such as sulfuric acid are marketed under various brand names of drain cleaners, for example, and are available in most hardware, home improvement or grocery stores. Decongestants (over-the-counter products containing PSE) are available without prescription from any drug or convenience store. Many legitimate distributors post their chemical catalogues on the Internet. At least one Canadian-based web-site has been selling complete gamma hydroxybutyric acid (GHB) kits. Purchasing chemicals in this manner simply involves sending the distributor a bank draft and having the material delivered to a designated address or post office box.
United States
Sources of supply in the United States for methamphetamine precursor chemicals include convenience stores, liquor stores, gas stations, pharmacies, grocery stores, discount department stores, home improvement stores, tack and feed stores and other retailers. Decongestants and bronchodilators are purchased in drug and convenience stores, but there is no indication that they have been purchased in Canada and shipped to the United States. PSE tablets are also sent to individuals at their residences by mail order distributors, which often involves companies taking orders via the Internet. Increasingly, larger methamphetamine laboratories in the United States use PSE tablets manufactured in Canada and smuggled into the United States, often by traffickers who can no longer obtain large amounts from domestic U.S. companies. U.S.-based aromatherapy companies, using safrole, benzaldehyde, isosafrole, etc. as end products, are not required to be registered with DEA as List I chemical handlers.
Diversion - Cross Border Issues
Without legal control measures in Canada, drug traffickers are able to purchase chemical products openly from legitimate distributors. Notwithstanding this, they take certain precautions such as using fictitious names, paying by cash and picking up the merchandise in rented vehicles. American-based traffickers have also taken advantage of absent regulations and have increasingly crossed the border to purchase chemicals from Canadian suppliers. Intelligence shows that some traffickers manufacture the drugs in Canada and then transport the finished products back to the United States.
The growing number of suspicious transactions in chemicals from legitimate suppliers is directly linked to increased domestic clandestine laboratory activity. PSE, sassafras oil, piperonal and gamma-Butyrolactone (GBL) are among the most frequently diverted precursor chemicals. Cash sales in Quebec for 2000 included 500 kilograms of piperonal (potential yield of 205 kilograms of MDA), 3000 kilograms of sassafras oil (potential yield of 960 kilograms of MDMA) and 2000 kilograms of cellulose (used to make tablets).(5) In Ontario, approximately 8,000 litres of GBL (potential yield of 66,000 litres of GHB is about 14,000,000 doses of GHB) have been sold for cash over the last two years.(6) Prior to 1997, commercial distributors received little or no demand for GBL, which is also used in the manufacture of cleaning products. A surge in cash sales of such chemical products has also occurred in British Columbia, where the greatest quantities of sassafras oil have been sold over the last five years. The expansion of methamphetamine production is clearly indicated by increased cash sales of chemicals such as ephedrine/pseudoephedrine, red phosphorous and hydriodic acid.
Pseudoephedrine (PSE)
PSE is the most common precursor used in North American methamphetamine production. The diversion of PSE from legitimate Canadian suppliers to the illicit market is reaching a critical level. Massive quantities are being smuggled into the United States for use in methamphetamine "super-labs" (methamphetamine laboratories capable of producing 10 pounds or more per batch or "cook"), notably in the State of California. Since late 1999, DEA has documented more than 20 PSE and/or methamphetamine cases in the United States demonstrating a Canadian nexus.
Historically, the vast majority of the PSE diverted to clandestine laboratories in the United States was tablet product manufactured or distributed by U.S. companies. California has been the center of methamphetamine production and trafficking in the United States. As law enforcement attention increased and strong state precursor control laws were instituted in the State of California, making it difficult to obtain sufficient amounts of PSE locally, traffickers turned to suppliers nationwide. Traffickers purchased PSE at relatively low prices on the U.S. East Coast and moved the product to California, where the black market price reached between US$3,500 and US$4,000 per case.(7) Nationwide networks of PSE suppliers, working together in loosely but not necessarily in identifiable hierarchies, provided ton quantities of PSE pill products to the market in California. These same operators also supplied distributors in other states who diverted product to local methamphetamine laboratories.
In response to the increasing diversion of PSE from U.S. sources, the MCA was enacted. When the provisions of the MCA went into effect in 1997, the ability of U.S.-based traffickers to acquire large amounts of PSE was curtailed, forcing the traffickers to find alternate sources of supply. During this time period, Canada began to emerge, on a small-scale, as a source of PSE for U.S.-based traffickers.
Through DEA's Operation MOUNTAIN EXPRESS, a nationwide investigation targeting PSE traffickers, investigators learned that wholesalers in Colorado, Florida, Michigan, Kentucky, Ohio, Texas, Arkansas, Illinois and New York were shipping multi-ton quantities of PSE tablets that ended up in California for the production of methamphetamine. The take down of this criminal network resulted in the arrests of more than 140 individuals in eight cities and enforcement actions against at least 35 others. More than US$8 million, 10 metric tons of PSE tablets, 83 pounds of finished methamphetamine, two PSE extraction laboratories, one methamphetamine laboratory, and 136 pounds of chemical solvents and reagents were seized. DEA served administrative orders to revoke the registrant status of at least 20 major PSE distributors, and executed administrative inspection warrants and notices of inspection to examine records of numerous additional PSE distributors.
Following the culmination of Operation MOUNTAIN EXPRESS in August 2000, opportunities for diversion at the wholesale distribution level in the United States were further reduced, forcing traffickers to vigorously seek alternative sources of supply for PSE. Canada, which currently has no legal chemical controls, has become the favored source of supply.
Although sporadic incidences of PSE entering the United States have been reported over the course of the 1990s, large-scale smuggling of the precursor was not noted until the close of the decade. Shipments are generally smuggled across the U.S.-Canada border through border ports of entry in cities such as Detroit, Michigan, and moved through the United States destined for methamphetamine laboratories in the West and Southwest, primarily California. In recent years, DEA has documented the involvement of ethnic Middle Eastern chemical smuggling organizations in methamphetamine precursor smuggling in both the United States and Canada.
The amount of PSE imported into Canada has increased exponentially. Between 1999 and 2000 alone, the amount of PSE imported rose by 500 percent. One factor that may have impacted increased PSE importation is the replacement of PPA (phenylpropanolamine) preparations by products containing PSE. In November 2000, Health Canada issued an advisory warning that PPA would be removed from the Canadian market. While all PPA-containing products were legally removed as of May 30, 2001, it appears that suppliers had already begun the voluntary withdrawal of PPA based on the Health Canada warnings. Notwithstanding this, it is clear that the removal of PPA-containing products does not account significantly for the dramatic increases in the amount of imported PSE observed over the last several years.
Imports* by Country of Origin for Pseudoephedrine
Country of
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
ORIGIN
Quantity
Quantity
Quantity
Quantity
Quantity
CH (Switzerland)
2
7
7
9
5
CN (China) 500 1,000 500 14,257 20,496
DE (Germany) 14,171 7,567 11,010 44,052 428,189
GB (Great Britain) 1 2 0 0 0
IN (India) 646 1,325 1,100 3,300 32,043
USA (United States) 14,514 20,987 75,479 47,720 30,751
Totals
* in kilograms
Source: Canada Customs
The following are some current U.S. examples detailing the smuggling of Canadian PSE.
In January 2001, more than 5 million tablets of PSE (1000 count bottles) were seized in California. Packaging information indicated Canadian origin.
In January 2001, approximately 74 kilograms of PSE were seized in New Mexico. Labels indicated Canadian origin.
In January 2001, authorities in the State of Missouri seized approximately 1 million PSE tablets pursuant to a traffic stop. Label information indicated a Canadian manufacturer.
In April 2001, U.S. authorities seized more than 42 million 60-mg tablets of PSE (1000 count bottles) from an individual entering the United States at the Detroit, Michigan port of entry. This quantity of PSE had the potential to produce more than 5,000 pounds of methamphetamine. This was the largest seizure of Canadian PSE effected in the United States to date.
In May 2001, U.S. authorities seized approximately 6 million 60-mg tablets of PSE (1000 count bottles) from an individual entering the United States at the Detroit, Michigan port of entry.
In May 2001, U.S. authorities in the State of Oklahoma seized approximately 9 million 60-mg tablets of PSE (1000 count bottles) pursuant to a vehicle stop. Packaging label indicated Canadian origin.
In addition to overland smuggling, illegal mail order sales of precursor chemicals to the United States have been documented for at least a decade. In most instances, shipments seized by the U.S. Customs Service (USCS) have involved small numbers of bottles shipped to individuals. In several cases, however, U.S. law enforcement has intercepted much larger postal shipments from Canadian sources. The sale of precursor chemicals on the Internet magnifies the risk of diversion. As the popularity of the Internet continues to grow, and more commerce is conducted via the Internet, new opportunities for diversion become increasingly apparent. Below are specific examples of large-scale chemical diversion encountered from Canadian mail order and Internet sources of supply.
In September 1999, DEA received information from counterparts in Canada about a shipment of 20 kilograms of sassafras oil to a customer in Chicago. A controlled delivery of the precursor led investigators to an MDMA laboratory in the subject's residence. It was later determined that the sassafras oil had been ordered from an Internet distributor based in Canada.
In August 2000, pursuant to a controlled delivery of a mail parcel, more than one million tablets of PSE (1000 count bottles) were seized in California. Labels on the bottles indicated a Canadian manufacturer.
Synthetic Drug Situation
Situation Report - Canada
The trafficking and use of MDMA/Ecstasy has significantly raised the level of threat of the synthetic drug trade in Canada. Although domestic illicit production occurs, the bulk of Ecstasy available in the North American market is imported mostly from Western Europe. Dutch-based and Israeli-based crime groups continue to hold a monopoly on the international MDMA market, although it is likely that international traffickers of other drug commodities will become more extensively involved in the Ecstasy trade.
Canadian traffickers of Ecstasy range from individual entrepreneurs to organized criminals, including outlaw motorcycle gangs, as well as Asian-based (notably in British Columbia and Ontario) and Italian-based groups. Intelligence indicates that mid-level U.S. traffickers have increasingly crossed the border to purchase MDMA from Canadian sources. At the higher level, American-based organized crime groups are using Canadian cities as transit points for Ecstasy shipments destined for the United States.
The attraction of MDMA originates from the Rave movement. The drug's continuing popularity and demand remain contingent on the widely available supply. The amount of Ecstasy seized has soared from 1,000 tablets in 1996, to about 10,000 in 1997, 70,000 in 1998, 400,000 in 1999, and more than two million in 2000. The importation flow continues unabated, with traffickers introducing new and different transportation modes and concealment methods in attempts to evade detection by law enforcement. The couriers who import Ecstasy as air passengers have changed from being mostly foreign nationals to being predominantly Canadian citizens. Air passengers have employed more diverse methods of concealment, including hollowed-out books, picture frames, stuffed toys, children's games and videotapes. Ecstasy smuggling via postal service accounted for almost half of all shipments intercepted by Canada Customs in 2000. Marine containers and air cargo were used to import large-scale MDMA shipments into Canada. In August and December 2000, 311,200 Ecstasy tablets hidden in mag wheels and 202,000 tablets concealed amongst rolls of textiles, respectively, were seized from marine containers at the Port of Montreal. In May 2001, almost 860,000 tablets of Ecstasy were seized from an air cargo shipment declared as bed sheets.
Clandestine laboratory activity appears to be increasing in Canada, and involves a greater number of poly-drug laboratories. Eight clandestine labs were involved in the production of MDMA in 2000. As in previous years, most of the labs uncovered in 2000 involved the production of methamphetamine. Methamphetamine is a North American drug staple and will likely remain a dominant drug of abuse. Other amphetamine-based drugs, notably MDA, also have been more frequently encountered, usually sold as MDMA. Illicit MDA production has increased, with several large capacity labs detected in 2000. The trend of larger, more sophisticated MDMA and MDA lab operations continues to be observed in 2001.
GHB and ketamine, by-products of the Rave and youth-oriented drug culture, have become a growing concern for Canadian authorities. The availability of GHB is more widespread through Canada, facilitated by the simple process required to produce the drug. This is exacerbated by the fact that GBL ingested on its own will convert to GHB in the body. Ketamine is procured either through diversion of pharmaceutical supply or by importation, mostly from Southeast Asia.
Situation Report - United States
The production, trafficking and abuse of synthetic drugs affects all Americans. DEA's strategy to combat the problem includes not only aggressive international, national and local law enforcement efforts, but also domestic and international precursor chemical controls and interdiction.
Methamphetamine
Over the last decade, methamphetamine has become a significant drug threat facing the United States. The production, trafficking and abuse of the drug, coupled with the violence associated with all aspects of the trade, are concerns for U.S. policy-makers and law enforcement. The rise in production and trafficking of methamphetamine has resulted in expansion of abuse from the West and Southwest, to the Midwest and portions of the Eastern United States.
Prior to the 1990s, methamphetamine production and trafficking in the United States was primarily controlled by outlaw motorcycle gangs, including the Hells Angels. Mexican traffickers first became involved in methamphetamine production and distribution in the early 1990s, resulting in a significant increase in high-purity supplies of the drug. The growing popularity of the Internet also contributed to the accessibility of methamphetamine "recipes," resulting in a dramatic increase in the number of small-scale, or "mom-and-pop," laboratories throughout the United States.
According to the El Paso Intelligence Center's (EPIC) National Clandestine Laboratory Seizure System (NCLSS), during 2000, approximately 6,700 clandestine methamphetamine laboratory sites were seized by DEA and state/local law enforcement, compared to 6,782 seized during 1999.(8) The States of California and Washington reported the greatest number of laboratory seizures during 2000. The majority of the laboratories, approximately 95 percent, seized in the United States are considered "mom and pop" laboratories, capable of producing ounce quantities of methamphetamine. The remaining five percent are considered "superlabs," capable of producing 10 or more pounds of methamphetamine in a single cook. The majority of the "superlabs" are believed to be tied to Mexican criminal groups and are located primarily in the State of California.
The supply of those chemicals needed to produce high-quality methamphetamine has been reduced through international chemical control efforts such as "Letters of No Objection" (LONO). DEA started issuing LONOs in 1995 to countries that require a letter stating that there is no objection to the export before allowing it to proceed. As a result of these efforts, the national purity level for methamphetamine, as well as amphetamine, has gone down dramatically. The average purity of methamphetamine exhibits seized by DEA dropped from 72 percent in 1994 to 31 percent in 1999. The average purity of amphetamine exhibits seized by DEA dropped from 41 percent in 1994 to only 21 percent in 1999. Emergency room mentions and overdose deaths involving methamphetamine show an analogous decrease. During 2000, however, there was a slight increase in the purity of methamphetamine to 35 percent and a slight decrease in the purity of amphetamine to 20 percent.
In addition, law enforcement efforts targeting both components of the methamphetamine trade, Mexican national organizations and "mom-and-pop" laboratory operators, have produced record arrests and seizures of methamphetamine, amphetamine and clandestine laboratories. In 2000, the Federal Drug Seizure System indicated seizures totaling 3,163 kilograms of methamphetamine, an increase from 2,774 kilograms in 1999.
3,4-Methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA/Ecstasy)
In the United States, the 1990s have been marked by unprecedented growth in the demand for MDMA/Ecstasy. The Rave phenomenon served as the primary vehicle for the perpetuation of the drug.
Approximately 80 percent of the Ecstasy seized in the United States is produced in the Netherlands, and to a lesser extent, Belgium. Small-scale production is, however, reported in the United States. During 2000, according to the EPIC's NCLSS, DEA seized six MDMA laboratories and state/local authorities seized two compared to 1999, with DEA reporting 13 MDMA laboratory seizures and state/local authorities reporting six.
International MDMA smuggling, according to DEA reporting, is largely controlled by ethnic Israeli drug trafficking organizations. The DEA Brussels Country Office (BCO), for example, reports clearly established links to Israeli groups in 12 of the 39 Ecstasy cases initiated by the BCO between 1998 and 2000.
Ecstasy seizures in the United States have steadily increased over the course of the 1990s, from 11,913 tablets seized by DEA in 1996 to more than 3 million tablets in 2000. Several large seizures of Ecstasy during 2000 propelled totals far beyond 1999 levels. In July 2000, DEA and the USCS in Los Angeles effected a record seizure of more than 2 million Ecstasy tablets in an air freight shipment arriving from France. In November 2000, DEA, USCS, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, in conjunction with state and local law enforcement authorities in Florida, seized approximately 635,000 Ecstasy tablets and arrested three Hungarian nationals. Also during November 2000, DEA authorities in New York seized approximately 600,000 Ecstasy tablets.
Air couriers, mail parcels and air cargo shipments are the primary smuggling methods utilized by traffickers transporting Ecstasy shipments to the United States. New York, Miami and Los Angeles are the primary ports of entry for couriers arriving from both major and secondary European airports. Newark, Buffalo, Boston, Atlanta, Chicago, Detroit, Houston and San Diego are gaining popularity with Ecstasy traffickers as ports of entry into the United States. In Canada, Toronto and Montreal are increasingly utilized as transit points for MDMA entering the United States.
As both trafficking organizations and law enforcement become increasingly sophisticated, routes are likely to diversify. INTERPOL reports for 1999 noted a movement away from the major European airports by international Ecstasy smugglers. Increasingly, couriers are utilizing secondary, or less heavily traveled, regional airports with direct connections to the United States, which include airports in Belgium, Germany, France, Spain, the Czech Republic and Iceland. During 2000, several Ecstasy seizures have been effected from couriers arriving at U.S. ports of entry from Iceland. These couriers obtained the Ecstasy and initiated travel in the Netherlands.
The use of maritime containers and air cargo will likely increase as traffickers move larger quantities of Ecstasy from the source countries to destinations throughout the world. With Europe's sophisticated transportation networks and access to maritime commerce through the numerous container ports, these methods are likely to be frequently exploited in the future.
Paramethoxyamphetamine (PMA)
PMA, also known as 4-methoxyamphetamine, is an illicit, synthetic hallucinogen that has stimulant effects similar to other clandestinely manufactured amphetamine derivatives like MDMA. Until recently, illicit abuse of PMA was briefly encountered during the early 1970s in the United States. However, since February 2000, PMA has reemerged in Florida, Illinois, Michigan, Virginia, and internationally. Since May 2000, PMA ingestion has been associated with more than 20 deaths internationally, including three in Chicago and seven in central Florida. In Canada, small amounts of PMA have been encountered over the last several years. At least one drug-related death in the Greater Toronto area was linked to PMA use.
Like MDMA, PMA is currently distributed in the United States at Rave parties and clubs. Dealers may be unaware that they are buying or selling PMA rather than other club drugs such as MDMA.
Gamma-hydroxybutyrate (GHB)
GHB has grown in popularity in the United States in recent years, especially among young adults active in the Rave and nightclub scene. According to the EPIC's NCLSS, during 2000, DEA seized seven clandestine GHB laboratories compared to five the previous year. GHB laboratory seizures by state/local agencies also demonstrated an increase during 2000, with 12 laboratory seizures reported, compared to eight during 1999. Access to recipes on the Internet has contributed to increased local production of GHB. The primary distributors of GHB are young adult Caucasian males, college students in particular.
Ketamine
Ketamine, or "Special K", is an anesthetic in human and veterinary medicine. The Special K trip is touted as better than lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD) or phencyclidine (PCP) because it lasts only about 30 to 60 minutes as opposed to several hours. As with GHB, ketamine has grown in popularity in recent years, becoming a staple at Rave parties and within the nightclub scene. Ketamine is not manufactured in the United States, but is imported as a bulk powder. Once in the United States, it is converted into injectable dosage forms by U.S. firms. Illicit supplies are generally diverted from licit sources, with burglaries of veterinary clinics being the most frequently reported source. Increasingly, tablets containing amounts of ketamine have been seized in locations throughout the United States, including the states of Michigan, California and New York. These tablets are often sold as Ecstasy.
Lysergic Acid Diethylmide (LSD)
The popularity of the Rave and nightclub scene has also given rise to a resurgence in the popularity of hallucinogens such as LSD. LSD is primarily produced in California, and more recently in the Midwest. Manufacture remains arduous and time-consuming, and is limited by federal chemical controls on the primary precursor chemicals, ergotamine tartrate, lysergic acid and lysergic acid amide. Other limitations include the high price of the precursor chemicals and the high degree of skill required for the manufacture of the drug.
Environmental and Public Health Hazards
The threat to public safety from explosion, fire, poison gas, groundwater contamination, and hazardous by-products associated with clandestine laboratories is likely to increase with the proliferation of synthetic drug production in the United States and Canada. These dangers affect the safety and well-being of the public and the law enforcement personnel involved in the dismantling of these laboratories.
A growing number of children are present at clandestine laboratory sites in the United States. During 1999, approximately 974 children were present at laboratory sites - 189 were exposed to toxic chemicals and 12 were injured. During 2000, the numbers increased, with 1,870 children present at laboratory sites - 296 exposed to toxic chemicals, 12 injured, and three killed. As of June 2001, the number of children reported at laboratory sites was 738, with 271 exposed to toxic chemicals and 8 injured.
In response to this trend, a variety of policy and public safety approaches have emerged in the United States. The State of California, Office of Criminal Justice Planning, initiated the Drug Endangered Children (DEC) Response Teams in 1993. According to the Crime Prevention Coalition of America, the primary goals of the inter-agency DEC Response Teams are to "improve the safety and health of children endangered by drug manufacturing, distribution, and use environments by providing appropriate services; improve the community's response to drug endangered children by establishing a multidisciplinary team; and establish a consistent response from law enforcement and social services."
The risk of explosion and fire at clandestine laboratory sites is of great concern to the public and governmental agencies. Data from EPIC's NCLSS demonstrates that the instance of explosion or fire at laboratory sites in the United States has remained fairly constant over the past several years. Reported incidents include 114 laboratory explosions and 65 laboratory fires during 1999, 97 explosions and 78 fires during 2000, and 37 explosions and 40 fires as of June 2001. In Canada, reported incidents include one explosion and three fires in 1999 and one explosion and two fires in 2000.
The environmental degradation caused by the dumping of toxic by-products resulting from methamphetamine production places heavy financial burdens on law enforcement agencies and all levels of government. On average, five to six pounds of toxic waste are produced for every pound of methamphetamine produced. DEA data demonstrate that the average cost of laboratory cleanup ranges from US$3,100 to US$3,400. In Canada, clean-ups can range from CAN$1,500 to CAN$30,000, depending on the state and size of the site at the time of seizure. In 2000, a clandestine lab-related fire destroyed a house in rural Ontario, resulting in significant environmental damage. The cost for this cleanup was about CAN$450,000.
The following chart depicts the funding sources for remediation of clandestine laboratory sites in the United States. Funding for the cleanup of DEA-seized laboratories is derived from several sources, including DEA appropriated funding (and during FY2000, DOJ supplemental funding) and the Asset Forfeiture Fund (AFF). Community Oriented Policing Service (COPS) funding as well as DEA appropriated funding are used for cleanups of state/local/tribal seizures. Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) "Hot Spots" funds are appropriated for cleanup in specific areas. In accordance with a 1989 agreement between DEA and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, DEA clean up of laboratory sites includes the removal and disposal of the chemicals and apparatus used for illegal drug manufacturing. Remediation of the sites, such as removal of contaminated soils or appliances, is the responsibility of the landowner or the local/state environmental or health agencies.
FY 95 FY 96 FY 97 FY 98 FY 99 FY 00 FY 01
Cleanup Funding 1
AFF $2.0 $4.0 $6.8 $9.6 $6.9 $5.8 $6.1
COPS $5.0 $5.0 $20.0
DEA
Appropriated $4.1 $4.1 $4.1
DOJ
Supplemental $5.0
BJA (Hot Spots) $3.8
Number of Cleanups 2
AFF 325 738 1,383 1,302 1,017 1,158 500
COPS 608 2,832 3,305 3,837
1 Funding shown is in millions of dollars.
2 Cleanups for FY 01 are as of May 31, 2001.
In addition to the chemical and/or fire threat to the health and safety of the officers involved in the dismantling of the clandestine laboratories, these sites often contain additional dangers such as blasting caps, dynamite, explosive booby-traps, explosives, grenades, pipe bombs and plastic explosives.
Recommendations/Outlook
There is an urgent need for Canada to adopt a flexible regulatory and administrative framework for precursor chemicals as a dynamic response to a rapidly changing illegal synthetic drug environment, dominated by the production of methamphetamine and MDMA and its analogs in Canada and the United States. The expansion of synthetic drug production is clearly indicated by increased cash sales of precursor chemicals in Canada and an increase in precursor chemical cases in the United States demonstrating a Canadian nexus.
Without legal control measures in Canada, drug traffickers from both countries are able to purchase chemical products openly from distributors. The diversion of PSE, for example, from legitimate Canadian suppliers to the illicit market is reaching a critical level. An industry code of good practices can contribute significantly to minimize chemical diversion between our countries, particularly when complemented by an effective regulatory framework. This framework can be used to ensure compliance by the small portion of firms which neither belong to associations nor implement codes of practice.
There are no legal controls to assist Canadian law enforcement agencies in the investigation of chemical diversion cases. New opportunities for diversion of precursor chemicals are becoming apparent, as seen by the increasing sales over the Internet. In the absence of regulations, the RCMP instituted a program in an effort to liaise with, and educate, chemical industry representatives about suspicious chemical transactions. Voluntary cooperation has been positive. Close cooperation among Canadian authorities and legitimate producers and distributors of chemicals is a critical factor to the success of precursor control and monitoring.
Despite the lack of controls enabling Canada Customs to seize or detain imported precursors, information from international law enforcement agencies regarding suspicious shipments into and out of Canada has helped Canada Customs identify high risk exporters/importers. Continued cross-border cooperation on chemical diversion cases would be enhanced by comprehensive chemical control regulations in Canada.
Clandestine laboratory activity appears to be increasing in Canada, involving a greater number of poly-drug laboratories. Canadian law enforcement should consistently report clandestine laboratory seizures as an integral part of their comprehensive efforts for precursor control and monitoring.
Consideration should be given to charges of public endangerment relative to the clandestine production of synthetic drugs. The threat of public safety from explosion, fire, poison gas, groundwater contamination and hazardous by-products associated with clandestine laboratories is likely to increase with the proliferation of synthetic drug production in the United States and Canada.
Excellent cooperation involving all drug enforcement issues continues between DEA and the RCMP. One of the primary strategies for combating the proliferation of synthetic drugs is the control and monitoring of precursor chemicals required to manufacture these substances. The impending chemical control regulations by the Canadian Government will impact significantly on chemical diversion activities in both Canada and the United States.
1 Health Canada, Discussion Document, "Control of Precursors and Other Substances Frequently used in the Clandestine Production of Controlled Substances," 2001
2 Health Canada, Healthy Environments and Consumers Safety Branch, Drug Strategy and Controlled Substances Programme, 2001
3 Canada Customs, "Canadian Trade of Illicit Drug Precursor Chemicals", April 2000
4 Health Canada, Discussion Document, "Control of Precursors and Other Substances Frequently Used in the Clandestine Production of Controlled Substances", 2001.
5 Potential yield is defined as a practical yield, that which a reasonably skilled chemist would obtain. A potential yield is calculated using the Drug Yield Calculator Program. The program, developed by the RCMP and Health Canada, assists law enforcement investigators and chemists in determining approximate yields and in supplying basic information for intelligence purposes.
6 In Canada, the common form of GHB available in the illicit market is as a solution in water, while in the United States it is commonly distributed as the solid.
7 One case of PSE pills (14,400 tablets) produces one pound of methamphetamine. The base cost of one case of PSE tablets is approximately US$450.
8 Statistics based on data reported to EPIC and entered into CLSS as of June 18, 2001. Clandestine laboratory statistics include data on labs only.
http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/
DEA report on international drug trafficking and terrorism – November 2002 DEA congressional testimony on international drug trafficking and terrorism
Published by U.S. Department of Justice - Tuesday 19 November, 2002
Copyright: Drug Enforcement Administration
Statement by: Asa Hutchinson. Administrator Drug Enforcement Administration
House Government Reform Committee Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources
Date: October 3, 2001
Executive Summary
DEA employs a global approach to attacking drug organizations that fuel the terror network. In 2000, Afghanistan produced 70 percent of the world’s opium supply and 80 percent of the opiate products destined for Europe. Unlike their counterparts in Colombia, the terrorists in Afghanistan enjoy the benefits of a trafficker-driven economy that lacks even a recognized national government.
DEA intelligence confirms the presence of a linkage between Afghanistan’s ruling Taliban and international terrorist Osama Bin Laden. Although DEA has no direct evidence to confirm that Bin Laden is involved in the drug trade, the sanctuary enjoyed by Bin Laden is based on the Taliban’s support for the drug trade, which is a primary source of income in Afghanistan. Credible DEA source information indicates ties between the Taliban and the drug trade. The Taliban directly taxes and derives financial benefits from the opium trade. They even provide receipts for their collected drug revenues.
In 2001, Afghanistan produced approximately 74 metric tons of opium, a substantial reduction from the 3,656 metric tons produced in 2000. Despite this significant decrease and the Taliban’s claims of lab destructions, DEA has seen no decrease in availability, and no increase in the price of Southwest Asian Heroin in the United States and European consumer countries. This indicates that significant amounts of opiates still remain available. According to the United Nations, up to 60% of Afghanistan’s opium crop is stored for future sales. Since the Taliban’s opium ban of July 2000, the kilogram price of opium has skyrocketed from US $44 to over US $400. This price increase, which was limited to the immediate region and did not resonate to international markets, appeared to be a means for the Taliban to capitalize on a rise in the price of a commodity over which they exercise nearly total control.
DEA will continue to aggressively identify and build cases against drug trafficking organizations contributing to global terrorism. In doing so, we will limit the ability of drug traffickers to use their destructive goods as a commodity to fund malicious assaults on humanity and the rule of law.
Chairman Souder and Ranking Member Cummings, it is a pleasure for me to appear before you and the other members of this Subcommittee for the first time in my capacity as the Administrator of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). I know that all of DEA deeply appreciates this Subcommittee’s leadership and support in our fight against international drug trafficking, and I look forward to continuing our very successful and productive relationship.
I appear before you today to testify on the connection between international drug trafficking and terrorism. As the tragic events in New York, Pennsylvania, and Washington, D.C. so horrifyingly demonstrate, terrorist violence is indeed a threat to the very national security of the United States. Accordingly, the degree to which profits from the drug trade are directed to finance terrorist activities, as well as the extent to which both types of organizations rely upon the same money laundering and smuggling facilitators or systems, is of paramount concern to the DEA.
DEA’s mission is to target the powerful international drug trafficking organizations that operate around the world, supplying drugs to American communities, employing thousands of individuals to transport and distribute drugs. Some of these groups have never hesitated to use violence and terror to advance their interests, all to the detriment of law-abiding citizens. We see in these groups today a merger of international organized crime, drugs, and terror. While DEA does not specifically target terrorists, per se, we can and will target and track down drug traffickers involved in terrorist acts, wherever in the world we can find them.
As a law enforcement agency, DEA aims to gather evidence sufficient to arrest, indict, and convict criminals. When DEA operates in foreign posts, we work within the legal systems of our host nations, and of course within the structures of the U.S. legal system, in cooperation with our host nation police agency counterparts. Our evidence must be usable in a court of law, and it must withstand intense scrutiny at every level of the criminal justice process. With that in mind, my testimony will be limited to presenting DEA’s view from a law enforcement perspective of the threats resulting from drug trafficking and terrorism. DEA’s interest in terrorism and insurgencies is based on three considerations: National Security, Force Protection, and Foreign Intelligence.
National Security – DEA views information on potential acts of terrorism directed against United States interests as a matter of the highest importance for national security and will naturally share any such information with the appropriate officials and agencies. Clearly, international criminal organizations smuggling drugs into the United States pose a threat to national security. International drug trafficking that threatens to undermine governments friendly to the United States, or countries that have strategic interest to the United States, is also a matter of national security concern.
Force Protection – DEA’s need to protect our own personnel, both domestically and abroad, is crucial to the successful implementation of DEA operations. In particular, DEA must be constantly vigilant for any developing situations that could lead to threats to DEA operations or personnel, or to our foreign counterparts with whom we conduct combined operations. DEA’s interest in force protection from potential terrorists or guerilla action is most acutely focused on those instances when we are participating in operations against concrete, specific counterdrug targets. We do not participate in operations designed to exert control over a general area unless there is a specific counterdrug focus.
Foreign Intelligence – DEA maintains 400 personnel in 56 countries to support its worldwide investigations and cooperative efforts. As a law enforcement agency, DEA does not have a counter-terrorism or counter-insurgency mission. However, when DEA does acquire relevant information from its active drug investigations and drug intelligence collection programs, we share that information with the appropriate U.S. agencies – ones that do have counter-terrorism responsibilities. DEA passes specific threat information on to the FBI in domestic cases and to the foreign intelligence community in overseas cases.
AFGHANISTAN
Afghanistan is landlocked and drug traffickers must rely on land routes to move morphine base and heroin out of the country. Opiates are consumed regionally, as well as smuggled to consumers in the west. It is estimated that 80 percent of opiate products in Europe originate in Afghanistan.
Morphine Base: The primary market for Afghan morphine base is traffickers based in Turkey. Morphine base is transported overland through Pakistan and Iran, or directly to Iran from Afghanistan, and then into Turkey. Shipments of Afghan-produced morphine base are also sent by sea from Pakistan’s Makran Coast. Routes north through the Central Asia Republics, then across the Caspian Sea and south into Turkey are also used.
Heroin: Heroin is trafficked to worldwide destinations by many routes. Traffickers quickly adjust heroin smuggling routes based on political and weather-related events. Reports of heroin shipments north from Afghanistan through the Central Asian States to Russia have increased. Tajikistan is a frequent destination for both opium and heroin shipments, although Tajikistan serves mostly a transit point and storage location rather than a final destination. While some of the heroin is used in Russia, some also transits Russia to other consumer markets. Heroin transits India en route to international markets. Heroin also continues to be trafficked from Afghanistan through Pakistan. Seizures are frequently reported at Pakistan’s international airports. Heroin is also smuggled by sea on vessels leaving the port city of Karachi. Heroin produced in Afghanistan continues to be trafficked to the United States, although generally in small quantities.
Given our mission responsibilities, DEA remains fully engaged in participating, with the rest of the U.S. Government, in understanding the connection between drugs and terrorism. DEA brings useful information to the table for the use of other agencies, and benefits from the expertise of our counterparts.
The recent attacks perpetrated on our Nation graphically illustrate the need to starve the financial base of every terrorist organization and deprive them of the drug proceeds that might otherwise be used to fund acts of terror. Unlike their counterparts in Colombia, the terrorists in Afghanistan enjoy the benefits of a trafficker-driven economy that lacks even a recognized national government.
Sadly, the profits of the drug trade help fund this chaos and perpetuate human suffering. The cells of terrorists are dispersed beyond the geographic boundaries of Afghanistan, much in the same manner as other international narcotics syndicates. Accordingly, DEA’s approach to both the drug trade and the terror network must be equally global in scope.
Afghanistan, The Taliban, and Osama Bin Ladin
The DEA has not maintained a presence in Afghanistan since January 1980, when the office was closed for security reasons as a result of the Soviet invasion in December 1979. Following the withdrawal of Soviet troops 10 years later, civil strife has ensued in Afghanistan. Consequently, DEA covers Afghanistan from its two offices in Pakistan: The Islamabad Country Office and the Peshawar Resident Office. In addition to Pakistan and Afghanistan, the DEA Islamabad Country Office also includes in its area of responsibility Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, the United Arab Emirates, and Oman.
THE TALIBAN
Background
Afghanistan has been at war since 1979, the year that the Soviet Union invaded. Afghan resistance fighters, the Mujahedeen, fought the Soviets for 10 years. After the Soviets withdrew in 1989, the various Afghan factions began fighting one another for control of the country. This led to a general lawlessness throughout the countryside. The Taliban is a fundamentalist Islamic movement that began in the summer of 1994. Mullah Mohammed Omar, leader of the Taliban, was reportedly a religion student (or “talib”) and a former guerilla commander during the Soviet occupation. Omar became outraged when two young women from his village were kidnapped and raped by Mujahedeen and he led a successful attack on the Mujahedeen encampment. The group quickly gained support and was joined by entire units of Mujahedeen, who brought military skills and weapons. This force was known as the Taliban and their stated goal was to disarm all Afghans and establish an Islamic government would be elected when all Afghan refugees had returned and the country was at peace. Although the Taliban now control much of the country, they continue to battle opposition forces (a loose-knit coalition called the “Northern Alliance”) for territory. No elections have been held in Taliban-controlled territory, and the Taliban continue to be led by Mullah Omar, who is assisted by a council of religious leaders. Islamic law has been instituted in Taliban-controlled territory.
Composition
The Taliban are primarily composed of Sunni Muslims belonging to Afghanistan’s ethnic Pashtun majority, while those opposed to the Taliban represent other ethnic groups or include Shiite Muslims. [Note: Sunni and Shiite Muslims represent the two primary religious divisions in Islam. Shiites regard Ali, the son-in-law of Mohammed, as his legitimate successor and ignore the three caliphs who actually did succeed Mohammed. Sunnites consider the first three successors of Mohammed to be legitimate.] Afghanistan remains essentially divided along tribal lines with some local areas and entire provinces controlled by tribal leaders. Their support is necessary to rule the country effectively, but for any single leader that support is difficult to obtain.
DEA intelligence confirms the presence of a linkage between Afghanistan’s ruling Taliban and international terrorist Osama Bin Laden. The al-Qa’ida organization, which is recognized as a terrorist entity by the U.S. Department of State, is openly led by Bin Laden. Although DEA has no direct evidence to confirm that Bin Laden is involved in the drug trade, the relationship between the Taliban and Bin Laden is believed to have flourished in large part due to the Taliban’s substantial reliance on the opium trade as a source of organizational revenue. While the activities of the two entities do not always follow the same trajectory, we know that drugs and terror frequently share the common ground of geography, money, and violence. In this respect, the very sanctuary enjoyed by Bin Laden is based on the existence of the Taliban’s support for the drug trade. This connection defines the deadly, symbiotic relationship between the illicit drug trade and international terrorism.
The Islamic State of Afghanistan is a major source country for the cultivation, processing and trafficking of opiate and cannabis products. Afghanistan produced over 70 percent of the world’s supply of illicit opium in 2000. Morphine base, heroin and hashish produced in Afghanistan are trafficked worldwide. Due to the warfare-induced decimation of the country’s economic infrastructure, narcotics are the primary source of income in Afghanistan, a country dependent on agricultural production where opium is the most profitable cash crop. As the country is landlocked, drug traffickers must rely on land routes to move morphine base and heroin out of the country. Opiates are consumed regionally, as well as smuggled to consumers in the west. It is estimated that 80 percent of opiate products in Europe originate in Afghanistan. Afghanistan is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, but the Taliban does not implement the country’s international obligations.
AFGHAN OPIUM PRODUCTION: (metric tons)
2001 2000 1999 1998 1997 1996
USG 74 3,656 2,861 2,340 2,184 2,099
UNDCP N/A 3,276 4,581 2,102 2,804 2,248
The Taliban is not recognized as the national government in Afghanistan and opposing factions continue to battle for control of the country. In addition, intelligence indicates that corruption is widespread within the Taliban, and among the senior leadership. Even if the current political attitude in Afghanistan should change, little or no enforcement activity can be expected in the future, since the Taliban authorities lack the political will to interdict and investigate.
The Taliban, a fundamentalist Islamic group enforcing a rigid social code, now controls roughly over 90 percent of Afghanistan, while a loose coalition of opposition forces (referred to as the Northern Alliance) maintains control of portions of northeast and central Afghanistan.
DEA possesses credible source information indicating ties between the drug trade and the Taliban. Current indicators suggest that the Taliban derives a significant amount of income from the opiate trade. Acting as the defacto-government of Afghanistan, the Taliban taxes all aspects of the opium trade. DEA intelligence reveals that taxation is institutionalized, but not standardized. It is even institutionalized to the point that the Taliban provides receipts for collected revenues. While the current tax rate for cultivated opium appears to be ten percent, processing and transportation of the product is sporadic and taxed at varying rates.
According to the official U.S. Government estimate for 2001, Afghanistan produced an estimated 74 metric tons of opium from 1,685 hectares of land under opium poppy cultivation. This is a significant decrease from the 3,656 metric tons of opium produced from 64,510 hectares of land under opium poppy cultivation in 2000.
The Taliban reportedly banned the cultivation of cannabis in October 1996, and in late 1997, banned opium poppy cultivation. In 1999, the Taliban decreed that opium poppy cultivation would be reduced by one-third in 1999-2000. However, as illustrated by the chart above, there have been steady increases in opium production between 1996 and 2000. The Taliban did report that opium poppies were destroyed in Qandahar and Helmand Provinces. This eradication effort was apparently in response to an agreement with the United Nations Drug Control Program (UNDCP), which agreed to fund alternative development projects on the condition that cultivation be reduced in Qandahar. In fact, there was a 50 percent reduction in the three UNDCP target districts in Qandahar, but there was not a one-third reduction overall, as promised by the Taliban.
Taliban officials claim to have destroyed a large number of heroin processing labs in Nangarhar Province in the spring of 1999. However, reports suggest that heroin processing continues in Nangarhar. Laboratories are located throughout Afghanistan, with a significant number of conversion laboratories located in Helmand Province. Taliban officials also reportedly destroyed two heroin conversion laboratories in Helmand Province in October 2000.
On July 28, 2000, Taliban leader Mullah Omar, recognizing the importance of world opinion, issued a decree banning future opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan. The decree states that the Taliban will eradicate any poppy cultivation found in the 2001 growing season in areas under their control. Reportedly, this ban applies to any territory seized from the Northern Alliance. In February 2001, the UNDCP declared that the opium poppy cultivation ban was successful and that the 2001 crop was expected to be negligible. This marks the first real effort by the Taliban to reduce opium production. According to press reports dated August 31, 2001, Taliban leader Mullah Omar extended the opium poppy cultivation ban for another year, to the 2001-2002 growing season.
The Empty Promises of the Taliban:
Despite the Taliban’s claims of opium eradication and lab destruction, DEA has seen no decrease in the amount of Southwest Asian Heroin availability and no increase in prices in the United States and European consumer countries. This suggests that significant amounts of opiates remain available. According to UNDCP reporting, up to 60% of each year’s opium crop has traditionally been stored for future sale, suggesting that significant amounts of opium are still available.
Prior to the imposed ban in July 2000, the price of a kilo of opium was US $44. Until recently, prices of opium ranged from US $350 to $400 per kilo. The price increase, which was limited to the immediate region and did not resonate to international markets, appeared to be a means for the Taliban to capitalize on a rise in the price of a commodity over which they exercise nearly total control.
The Taliban maintains effective control of nearly all of the opium poppy growing areas in the country, even though they are not internationally recognized as the official Government of Afghanistan, and do not control the entire country. Islamic law (Shari’a) has been imposed in territory controlled by the Taliban, and local Shari’a courts have been established throughout the country. In 1997, the Taliban reactivated the State High Commission for Drug Control, which was originally established in 1990 by the legitimate interim government. Prior to the UNDCP reports indicating that implementation of the 2000-2001 opium poppy cultivation ban has been effective and the release of the U.S. Government estimate indicating a dramatic reduction in opium production, the Taliban made only token gestures toward anti-drug law enforcement. As a result, Afghanistan, under the Taliban, has during the past decade emerged as a vital hub of the Southwest Asian illicit drug trade.
Heroin Processing:
Laboratories in Afghanistan convert opium into morphine base, white heroin, or one of three grades of brown heroin, depending on the order received. Large processing labs are located in southern Afghanistan. Smaller laboratories are located in other areas of Afghanistan, including Nangarhar Province. In the past, many opium processing laboratories were located in Pakistan, particularly in the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP). These laboratories appear to have relocated to Afghanistan, both to be closer to the source of opium and to avoid law enforcement actions by the Government of Pakistan.
Heroin is trafficked to worldwide destinations by many routes. Traffickers quickly adjust heroin smuggling routes based on political and weather-related events. Reports of heroin shipments north from Afghanistan through the Central Asian States to Russia have increased.
Tajikistan is a frequent destination for both opium and heroin shipments, although Tajikistan serves mostly as a transit point and storage location rather than a final destination. While some of the heroin is used in Russia, some also transits Russia to other consumer markets. Heroin transits India en route to international markets. Heroin also continues to be trafficked from Afghanistan through Pakistan. Seizures are frequently reported at Pakistan’s international airports. Heroin is also smuggled by sea on vessels leaving the port city of Karachi, Pakistan. Heroin produced in Afghanistan continues to be trafficked to the United States, although generally in small quantities.
Morphine Base:
Morphine base is usually produced for traffickers based in Turkey. The morphine base is then shipped to Turkey, where it is converted to heroin prior to shipment to European and North American markets. The primary market for Afghan morphine base is traffickers based in Turkey. Morphine base is transported overland through Pakistan and Iran, or directly to Iran from Afghanistan, and then into Turkey. Shipments of Afghan-produced morphine base are also sent by sea from Pakistan’s Makran Coast. Routes north through the Central Asia Republics, then across the Caspian Sea and south into Turkey are also used.
Cannabis:
Cannabis, or marijuana, grows wild and is also cultivated in Afghanistan. Afghanistan is a major producer of cannabis, much of which is processed into hashish. According to INTERPOL, Afghanistan and Pakistan together produce about 1000 MT of cannabis resin each year, with Afghanistan producing the bulk of the product.
Hashish:
Hashish originating in Afghanistan is trafficked throughout the region, as well as to international markets. Although the bulk of the hashish intended for international markets is routed through Pakistan and Central Asia and sent by sea, train or truck, hashish has also been smuggled in air freight in the past.
Precursor Chemicals:
Afghanistan produces no essential or precursor chemicals. Acetic anhydride (AA), which is the most commonly used acetylating agent in heroin processing, is smuggled primarily from Pakistan, India, the Central Asian Republics, China, and Europe. For example, according to the World Customs Organization, China seized 5,670 metric tons of AA destined for Afghanistan in April 2000. The AA was reportedly found in 240 plastic boxes concealed in carpets.
Drug-Related Money Laundering:
As the unsophisticated banking system that previously existed in Afghanistan has been damaged by years of war, money laundering activity is completely unregulated. It is likely that the informal banking system used extensively in the region, usually referred to as the hawala or hundi system, is also used by drug traffickers. This system is an underground, traditional, informal network that has been used for centuries by businesses and families throughout Asia. This system provides a confidential, convenient, efficient service at a low cost in areas that are not served by traditional banking facilities. The hawala or hundi system leaves no “paper trail” for investigators to follow.
Prices:
The cost for raw opium, heroin, hashish and precursor chemicals have traditionally been relatively low in Afghanistan. As stated earlier, the initiation of the Taliban’s opium cultivation ban in July 2000 has prompted a nearly tenfold increase in the kilogram price of opium. The price of heroin in Afghanistan also increased dramatically during the same time period, from US $579 in July 2000 to $4564 in August 2001.
According to DEA sources, however, the regional price of a kilogram of opium was as high as US $746 on September 11, 2001. In the wake of the recent mass exodus from Afghanistan, opium wholesalers were reportedly dumping their stocks of opium for as low as US $95 per kilogram, apparently in anticipation of military intervention in the region.
Key Observations:
At this point, drug trafficking in the Golden Crescent appears to be heavily dependent on the Taliban. Although they have reportedly now banned opium poppy cultivation, the Taliban have long relied on drug trafficking for financial support to prosecute the war in Afghanistan.
In order to gain international recognition as the legitimate government of Afghanistan, the Taliban must make a convincing effort to halt drug trafficking activities. Roadblocks to international support for the Taliban remain even if the opium ban is proved successful, due to concern about harsh treatment of women, human rights abuses, and, of course, support for extremist organizations.
Opium production may resume if the Taliban believe that the international response to their opium ban is inadequate, domestic circumstances necessitate the need for additional revenues, or domestic unrest against the poppy ban persuades the Taliban to relent on eradication efforts.
Recent press accounts report that the Taliban has threatened to lift the ban on opium cultivation in the event that Afghanistan is subjected to military action by the United States.
Drug Traffickers and Terrorists: The Need for Perpetual Vigilance
By way of conclusion, we can and should continue to identify and build cases against the leaders of criminal groups involved in drug trafficking and terrorism wherever they may be found. These criminals have already moved to make our task more difficult by withdrawing from positions of vulnerability and maintaining a much lower profile than their predecessors. As they have not refrained from using violence to protect their interests, the partnership of the drug trade and the terror network will necessitate our perpetual vigilance against the threats that they present.
The DEA remains committed to our primary goal of targeting and arresting the most significant drug traffickers in the world today. In particular, we continue to work with our partners around the world to improve our cooperative efforts against international drug smuggling, and to cut off drug money as a support for international terrorism. The ultimate test of success will come when we bring to justice the drug lords who control their vast empires of crime that bring misery to the nations in which they operate. They must be arrested, tried and convicted, and sentenced in their own countries to prison terms commensurate with their crimes, or, as appropriate, extradited to the United States to face American justice. Their assets and infrastructure must be seized and forfeited. In doing so, we will limit the ability of drug traffickers to use their destructive goods as a commodity to fund malicious assaults on humanity and the rule of law.
http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/
DEA India drug intelligence briefing – November 2002 India drug intelligence briefing
Published by U.S. Department of Justice - Tuesday 19 November, 2002
Copyright: Drug Enforcement Administration
Drug Intelligence Brief
INDIA COUNTRY BRIEF - MAY 2002
STATUS IN INTERNATIONAL DRUG TRAFFICKING
India is the world’s largest producer of licit opium; however, a portion of the licit opium poppy crop is diverted to the illicit market. Opium, obtained both through diversion and from illicit poppy cultivation, is processed into heroin in India. Heroin is most often found in the form of a crudely refined heroin base called “brown sugar,” although white heroin hydrochloride (HCl) is also produced.
India’s large chemical industry produces a wide variety of precursor and essential chemicals, including acetic anhydride (AA), potassium permanganate (PP), ephedrine, pseudoephedrine, and other chemicals used to produce amphetamine-type stimulants.
India serves as a minor source country for heroin, and also serves as a transit country for Southwest Asian (SWA) heroin from Afghanistan that often enters India from Pakistan. The transit of Southeast Asian (SEA) heroin from Burma is not believed to be significant at this time. Heroin from Burma is found primarily within the addict population of northeastern India.
India’s large population includes a significant number of drug abusers, although precise estimates are not available. Heroin, hashish, and pharmaceutical drugs are readily available and widely abused. Brown sugar heroin is primarily produced for domestic heroin users, since there is little market for this type of heroin outside of India.
DRUG CULTIVATION AND PROCESSING
Opium
India is the largest producer of opium for the world’s pharmaceutical industry. In 2001, India produced 726 metric tons of opium from 19,393 hectares planted with opium poppy. This amount fell short of the targeted 900 metric tons, reportedly due to severe drought conditions. In 2000, India produced 1,302 metric tons of opium gum, which was an increase from the 970 metric tons produced in 1999. India is the only country that permits the legal extraction of opium gum rather than using the concentrate obtained from the poppy straw (CPS) processing method. 1 The traditional method of collecting opium gum allows for the extraction of thebaine, an alkaloid used to produce the pain reliever oxycodone. Since thebaine is not present in CPS, other morphine-producing countries were effectively excluded from the thebaine market. However, the synthetic production of thebaine has become commercially viable in recent years.
In 1981, the United States applied the “80-20 rule” to guarantee that India and Turkey (also a traditional opium producer) have a combined 80-percent share of the U.S. pharmaceutical market’s annual purchases of morphine. The 80-20 rule reflected the realities of the morphine market, as in 1981 when Australia, France, and other licit opium producers were considered new or nontraditional producers and provided less than 20 percent of global production. While India and Turkey still share 80 percent of the U.S. market, they now share closer to half of the global market. The 80-20 rule will remain in effect until January 2006, at which time it may be extended, modified, or discontinued.
Licit opium poppy cultivation is a labor-intensive and geographically dispersed industry in India, with opium poppy cultivation permitted under government control in the States of Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, and Uttar Pradesh. The Central Bureau of Narcotics (CBN), which is part of the Department of Revenue, is responsible for all facets of the opium industry. In addition to monitoring the industry to prevent diversion, the CBN each year determines the number of licensed growers and areas of cultivation, collects opium gum from farmers, and operates two processing centers, one in Madhya Pradesh and the other in Uttar Pradesh, where the opium is purified, dried, weighed, and packaged. Farmers, if found to have diverted opium to the illicit market, lose their licenses to cultivate opium and are subject to fines and imprisonment.
The exact amount of opium diverted to the illicit market is unknown; however, the most frequently reported estimates are that from 10 to 30 percent of the licit crop may be diverted. Using these estimates, diversion from the 2000 crop may have ranged from 130 to 390 metric tons, which means more illicit opium was available in India than in other heroin-producing countries, such as Colombia, Mexico, or Laos. The United States and India are collaborating on a study that will enable the Government of India (GOI) to better estimate the amount of diversion. A joint licit opium poppy survey is expected to provide a scientific basis for determining a minimum-qualifying yield, which is the figure that farmers must meet when turning in opium gum to the GOI. Should the minimum qualifying yield not be met, the GOI will have a basis for investigating the discrepancy. However, the large size and geographic scope of opium cultivation hampers enforcement efforts.
Illicit opium cultivation also occurs in India. The GOI began eradication efforts in northeast India in 1996 due to concern about increased illicit cultivation. Reportedly, illicit cultivation occurs in the States of Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, and Himachel Pradesh, as well as Arunachal Pradesh and other parts of northeastern India. Indian officials continue to pursue detection and destruction of illicit opium crops and the prosecution of illicit cultivators. Indian officials reported that 378 hectares of illicit opium poppy plants were destroyed in 2000.
Cannabis
Cannabis cultivation is illegal, yet widespread, in India. No estimates as to the size of this illicit cultivation are available. Both marijuana and hashish are processed in India. The Kullu Valley in Himachel Pradesh is known to produce marijuana with a high THC content, which makes it attractive to foreign hash ish buyers. However, the majority of Indian-produced marijuana/hashish is likely for domestic use, although a percentage is destined for the international market.
Illicit Drug Production
Opium is processed into heroin in illicit laboratories located in India. These laboratories generally produce a low-quality brown heroin base (referred to as brown sugar). Based on seizures and intelligence reports heroin HCl, including export-quality white heroin, is also produced in India. According to recent reporting of multikilogram seizures of white heroin, it appears that Indian drug traffickers may be producing a greater amount of white heroin than in the past.
Chemicals and Pharmaceutical Drugs
Chemicals such as AA, N-acetylanthranilic acid (N-AAA), ephedrine, pseudoephedrine, ergonavine, PP, methylendioxyphenyl-2-propanone (MD2P2), phenyl acetone (P2P), and other chemicals are legally manufactured in India. Indian officials fully control access to a number of chemicals (such as AA, N-AAA, ephedrine, and pseudoephedrine), but do not control all 22 chemicals listed in the annex of the 1988 U.N. Convention. The GOI will consider controls on additional chemicals when evidence is presented that locally produced chemicals are being diverted. India is an active participant in DEA’s Operation TOPAZ and Operation PURPLE, which are international initiatives designed to prevent the diversion of AA and PP.
Both ephedrine and pseudoephedrine produced in India are legally exported to many countries, including the United States, Canada, Germany, and Mexico. Ephedrine and pseudoephedrine can also be used for the illicit production of methamphetamine. In 1999, Indian law was amended to include controls on ephedrine. In most cases, ephedrine is diverted for illicit use from pharmaceutical companies, as opposed to licensed producers or wholesalers in India.
There are at least 12 legal producers of AA in India. AA is used to produce licit pharmaceutical drugs and is also used in the textile industry. It is the most commonly used chemical to convert morphine into heroin, and can be used to synthesize the methaqualone precursor N-AAA and the methamphetamine and amphetamine precursor, 1-phenyl-2-propanone. Despite GOI controls, Indian-produced AA continues to be seized both en route to Afghanistan’s heroin laboratories and to Burma’s methamphetamine and heroin laboratories.
India is the world’s largest producer of illicit methaqualone. Methaqualone is one of three categories of depressants, and is usually marketed under the brand name Mandrax. Large seizures of Mandrax are not uncommon. For example, in September 2000, over 2 metric tons of Mandrax powder was seized near Hyderabad. In February 2001, 1.4 metric tons of Mandrax tablets were seized in Bombay. A serious Mandrax abuse problem exists in South Africa and, although methaqualone laboratories and tableting operations have been seized in South Africa, India remains the source for a substantial amount of the Mandrax abused in South Africa.
A wide range of pharmaceutical drugs are legally produced in India, including phensidyl (a cough medicine containing codeine), buprenorphine (a narcotic), and diazepam (a sedative), all of which are widely abused throughout India.
TRAFFICKING
The United States remains a very minor market for heroin from India, whether it has been produced or has transited through India. Heroin produced in India is trafficked to international locations, although the total amount is negligible compared to the quantities of heroin produced in Burma, Afghanistan, or Colombia. The most common type of heroin produced in India, brown sugar, has only a limited market outside of the region. However, seizures of shipments en route to and within Sri Lanka suggest that there is a market for heroin produced in India.
India is both a transit country and a destination for heroin and hashish originating in neighboring Nepal, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. Although the border is closely monitored, and tensions remain high between India and Pakistan, opiates continue to enter India overland from Pakistan. Sea and air routes are also used to bring heroin from southern Pakistan. An unknown percentage of this heroin remains in India, but some also transits India en route to international destinations, especially from New Delhi or Bombay by couriers traveling on commercial airliners. Little information is available on heroin and hashish smuggling by sea, although this is believed to occur.
Hashish, produced in India, is also smuggled to North America, although the destination is generally reported as Canada and not the United States. In August 2000, 2 metric tons of hashish from Nepal were seized in India; this hashish was reportedly destined for the United States.
TRAFFICKING GROUPS
Trafficking groups operating in India include nationals from India, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Nepal. Even though India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh are no longer combined into one country (as they were prior to 1947), family connections remain strong in the region, and provide a network of contacts that facilitate cross-border trafficking.
Nigerian traffickers are present in India, particularly in Delhi. In some instances, Nigerian-controlled couriers transit through India enroute to international destinations. This is apparently an effort to avoid law enforcement authorities at the destination airport, as passengers arriving from major drug-producing or transit countries are subject to greater scrutiny. Pakistani officials continue to arrest couriers, who are ticketed to India, at airports in Lahore, Karachi, and Islamabad. In other cases, West African traffickers reside in India and primarily sell heroin and hashish in-country to other Africans and Indians.
There are only two authorized border crossings on India’s northeastern border with Burma, but the border is fairly porous. This region is connected to the rest of India by only a 32-kilometer strip of land, while bordered by Bangladesh, Bhutan, and Burma. This region is home to a number of insurgent groups and reporting suggests that, while these groups are not involved in drug production or drug trafficking, they may profit from some aspects of the drug trade. For example, several groups in Nagaland, including the Isaac-Muivah and Khaplang factions of the National Socialist Council of Nagaland, reportedly tax and extort money from traffickers in return for protection or the right to conduct traffic in drugs. These groups in Nagaland are of Tibeto-Burmese ethnic origin, with Nagas 2 living in remote parts of northwest Sagaing District in Burma, and in the State of Nagaland in India. The People’s Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak, a leftist group headquartered in Manipur, and the All Tripura Tribal/Tiger Force in Triura are other groups that reportedly profit from extortion and may facilitate cross-border drug trafficking.
Ethnic Tamils in the southern India State of Tamil Nadu are involved in trafficking between India and Sri Lanka, an independent island off the southern coast of India. Heroin destined for Sri Lanka is regularly seized in India and in the Gulf of Mannar between India and Sri Lanka. Some reports suggest that the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), a Sri Lankan separatist group, receives funding from drug trafficking, although no direct nexus between the LTTE and drug trafficking has been confirmed.
Organized Indian crime syndicates, such as the organization headed by the well-known Indian criminal Dawood Ibrahim, are also reportedly involved in drug trafficking and money laundering activities.
DRUG-RELATED MONEY LAUNDERING
India is not considered an international or regional financial center, but money laundering does occur in the country. The banking system is likely used to some extent, especially as anti-money laundering legislation has not moved beyond draft form. However, the primary means used to transfer and launder drug proceeds is the informal banking system known as hawala. The hawala system is an underground banking network composed of businesses that engage in international commerce. Through these companies, large sums of money can be transferred internationally with little paperwork and no physical movement of funds.
DRUG ABUSE AND TREATMENT
The exact number of drug abusers in the country is not known. India is the second most populous country in the world with an estimated population of over 986 million people (1999 National Geographic estimate). Drug abuse is widespread throughout the country. The GOI and the U.N. Drug Control Program are conducting a nationwide study on narcotics addiction and initial results are soon to be released.
Cannabis, heroin, and Indian-produced pharmaceutical drugs are the most frequently abused drugs in India. Cannabis products, often called charras, bhang, or ganja, are abused throughout the country. In fact, crushed marijuana (bhang) is used to season foods and spice drinks during religious ceremonies and on festival days in some parts of India. Cocaine, LSD, and MDMA are available, but not widely used due, in part, to their high cost.
Heroin is readily available in India. Most users smoke a locally processed heroin called brown sugar by breathing in the smoke (known as, “chasing the dragon”.) In the northeast, high-purity, low-cost heroin from Burma dominates. Intravenous drug use is highest in northeastern India. In addition to heroin abuse, the intravenous injection of proxyvon is also a problem in the States of Manipur and Mizoram. Proxyvon is a legally produced analgesic and opium derivative. Users inject a suspension of proxyvon powder and water, which leads to a very short yet intense high. Other pharmaceutical drugs are also abused. Morphine derivatives, such as buprenorphine, diazepam, and codeine can be obtained relatively easily from pharmacies, even though prescriptions are technically required. Phensidyl is heavily abused in the Indian State of West Bengal.
Burmese-produced methamphetamine tablets appear to be a relatively minor problem in India; however, seizures do occur. For example, in September 2000, 1,985 tablets were seized from two Indian males as they were crossing the border from Burma into India. In another incident, in September 2000, 75 amphetamine tablets were seized from a Burmese male who crossed the border at Moreh, India.
DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES/LEGISLATION
The Narcotics Control Bureau (NCB), established in 1986, is the primary drug law enforcement agency and is responsible for coordinating antidrug activities of all of India’s law enforcement agencies. The NCB is currently under the Ministry of Finance, but the NCB will be transferred to the Home Ministry in April 2002. The CBN, staffed with approximately 1,600 personnel, is responsible for all aspects of the opium industry and is responsible for preventing illicit trafficking in precursor chemicals. The Directorate of Revenue Intelligence is also part of the Ministry of Finance and responsible for information relating to smuggling of goods—including drugs—into or out of India. The Customs Commission has a wide variety of drug law enforcement tasks and falls under the Ministry of Finance’s Central Board of Excise and Customs. The Border Security Force, under the Home Ministry, is a paramilitary force that controls India’s land borders and frequently interdicts drug shipments.
In October 2001, the GOI amended the Narcotics Drug and Psychotropic Drug Act of 1985. The most significant amendments include changing the law to allow for sentencing to be based on the size of the drug seizure and to formally authorize controlled deliveries inside and outside of India. Prior to this change, individuals found with small amounts of illicit drugs were subject to the same penalties as large-scale drug traffickers.
Drug Seizures
1998 1999 2000 2001
Heroin (kilograms) 655 861 1,236 813
Morphine (kilograms) 19 36 37 23
Opium (kilograms) 2,031 1,635 2,540 2,321
Hashish (kilograms) 10,106 3,391 4,936 5,164
Marijuana (kilograms) 68,221 40,113 96,6827 75,943
Sources: 1998-1999: Department of State's International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR)
2000-2001: DEA's New Dehli Country Office
TREATIES AND CONVENTIONS
India has bilateral agreements on drug trafficking with 13 countries, including Pakistan and Burma. Prior to 1999, extradition between India and the United States occurred under the auspices of a 1931 treaty signed by the United States and the United Kingdom, which was made applicable to India in 1942. However, a new extradition treaty between India and the United States entered into force in July 1999. A Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty was signed by India and the United States in October 2001. India also is signatory to the following treaties and conventions:
1961 U.N. Convention on Narcotic Drugs
1971 U.N. Convention on Psychotropic Substances
1988 U.N. Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances
2000 Transnational Crime Convention
India is a member of the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), and the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC).
KEY JUDGMENTS
Indian authorities must continue to control diversion of the licit opium crop. This situation is dependent, to some extent, on events in Afghanistan, previously the world’s largest producer of illicit opium. If opium poppy cultivation remains low in Afghanistan, it would be more lucrative for Indian traffickers to process opium diverted from their licit or illicit markets. Additionally, enhanced border controls may reduce the amount of Afghan heroin available in India. However, due to geographic proximity, India will definitely continue to be a transit country for SWA heroin originating in Afghanistan.
Indian heroin production may increase if tensions between India and Pakistan lead to even closer control of the traffic of people and commodities on the border between the two countries, which would reduce the amount of SWA heroin smuggled through Pakistan into India.
India will continue to be a major supplier of chemicals diverted to the illicit market. India actively seeks to control diversion and cooperates effectively with other countries. However, chemical traffickers are expected to find ways to evade law enforcement authorities, which may require enhanced monitoring of the large chemical industry.
India’s large population is at risk for increased drug abuse due to easy availability and low cost of both domestically produced drugs and drugs smuggled into the country from Burma, Nepal, Afghanistan, and Pakistan.
1 In the CPS process, poppy pods are dried on the stalk in the fields, and then crushed in order to remove the seeds. The seeds are used for a food product and the crushed pods are processed in a factory in order to extract the alkaloids. In India, however, farmers lance poppy pods in the fields in order to remove opium. Farmers then turn in the collected opium gum to the government.
2 The term Naga is used for the many tribes living in this region, who speak different and mutually unintelligible dialects.
This report was prepared by the DEA Intelligence Division, Office of International Intelligence, Europe, Asia, Africa Strategic Unit. This report reflects information received prior to May 2002. Comments and requests for copies are welcome and may be directed to the Intelligence Production Unit, Intelligence Division, DEA Headquarters.
http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/
DEA Pakistan drug intelligence briefing – November 2002 Pakistan drug intelligence briefing
Published by U.S. Department of Justice - Tuesday 19 November, 2002
Copyright: Drug Enforcement Administration
PAKISTAN: COUNTRY BRIEF March 2002
STATUS IN INTERNATIONAL DRUG TRAFFICKING
The Islamic Republic of Pakistan serves principally as a major transit country for opiates and cannabis. Opium poppy is illicitly grown in Pakistan; however, due to eradication efforts in recent years, the amount of opium production has been greatly reduced. Opium products, often processed into morphine base or heroin in Afghanistan, are then shipped through Pakistan to world markets by Pakistan-based traffickers.
DRUG CULTIVATION AND PROCESSING
Opium
Prior to 1996, annual production estimates ranged between 140 and 180 metric tons of opium. Opium production has been greatly reduced, due in large part to eradication efforts by the Government of Pakistan (GOP).
Opium poppy cultivation occurs primarily in the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) of Pakistan. Mohmand, Bajaur, and Khyber Agencies are in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of the NWFP. The tribal areas of the NWFP are fairly autonomous as the central government has limited involvement in local affairs. Some areas of the Dir District, which is not a FATA, also grow opium.
Estimated Opium Production in Metric Tons
2001 2000 1999 1998 1997 1996 1995
5 11 37 65 85 75 155
The GOP conducted aggressive crop eradication programs in poppy growing regions. In past years, the Dir District accounted for most of the opium produced in Pakistan. However, since 1999, the primary area of poppy cultivation has been the Bara River Valley in the Khyber Agency, which borders Afghanistan’s Nangarhar Province. This is a closed area within the FATA of Khyber, which means access to the area is limited and the political agent has less direct authority. In 2001, most of the opium produced in Pakistan was cultivated in Khyber Agency.
It is recognized that alternative crops and/or alternative income sources must continue to be developed for farmers as a substitute for opium poppy cultivation. The United Nations Drug Control Program (UNDCP) and the U.S. Government both fund alternative development/poppy reduction programs in Pakistan that finance crop substitution, road construction, electrification, and water schemes.
Cannabis
Cannabis grows wild throughout the region and is also deliberately cultivated. No estimates of Pakistan’s marijuana/hashish production are available, although INTERPOL reports that Pakistan and Afghanistan together produce about 1,000 metric tons of hashish each year. INTERPOL also reports that over 85 metric tons of cannabis were seized in Pakistan during 1999, and although Afghanistan produces the bulk of the product, much of the hashish from land-locked Afghanistan still transits Pakistan, with an increasing amount routed north through the Central Asian Republics.
PROCESSING
Although opiate conversion laboratories were once common in Pakistan, all laboratory activity moved to Afghanistan in the mid-to late-1990s. It is believed that traffickers relocated in order to be closer to the abundant supply of raw opium in Afghanistan, as well as to avoid law enforcement action in Pakistan. In the past, the following areas of Pakistan were locations for opiate processing: the Khyber, Mohmand, and Bajaur Agencies of the NWFP; the Chagai Hills Division, Baluchistan; and the Ribat area at the western tip of Pakistan. In 1999, the GOP destroyed two laboratories: one located in Quetta, the second in Rawalpindi.
Southwest Asian heroin conversion laboratories, currently located in Afghanistan, can produce several types or grades of heroin depending on the order received. Brown heroin and white heroin are produced for export to the international market, and a low-quality brown heroin is made for local and regional consumption. The DEA’s Special Testing and Research Laboratory has analyzed samples of heroin produced in the region. This analysis has demonstrated that laboratories in the region are capable of producing extremely high-quality white heroin that is comparable to heroin from Burma and Colombia.
TRAFFICKING
Trafficking groups based in Pakistan smuggle multiton shipments of morphine base to processing sites in Turkey. Kilogram quantities of heroin are smuggled from Pakistan to Europe and the United States. Regional drug traffickers represent a diverse ethnic and tribal cross section. Couriers from drug trafficking groups centered in other regions smuggle drugs out of Pakistan through the international airports, from Pakistan’s Makran Coast and the Port of Karachi, and overland through Iran and the Central Asian States. The following are the general routes for smuggling Afghan-produced opiates from Pakistan:
• Overland from Pakistan’s Baluchistan Province through to Iran’s Northwestern Region, which is inhabited by the Kurds, and then smuggled into conversion laboratories located in Turkey;
The shipments transiting Pakistan may be broken down into smaller shipments once in Iran. Iran is both a transit country and a destination country for opium products. Iranian domestic production is believed to be quite low and unable to supply domestic demand. Opiates not intended for the Iranian domestic market transit Iran to Turkey, where the morphine base is converted to heroin. Heroin and hashish are delivered to buyers located in Turkey. The drugs are then shipped to the international market, primarily Europe.
• Overland to the Makran Coast, where the drugs are transported by small coastal vessels to waiting vessels off the coast of Pakistan;
Large quantities of morphine base and hashish are transported through mountainous terrain to the Makran Coast by four-wheel-drive vehicles or pack animals. Camel caravans can avoid drug enforcement officials since the camels are capable of traveling over very rugged terrain. Small coastal craft deliver heroin and hashish to ships anchored off the Makran Coast. The ships then deliver opiates and hashish to the Middle East and Turkey.
• By road, rail, and plane from Afghanistan to Pakistan’s major cities, where opiates are routed by sea or air to Europe, North America, Africa, and other worldwide destinations;
The Port of Karachi is one of the largest and busiest in the region, moving containerized cargo, as well as bulk goods, into and out of Pakistan. Drug smugglers have long recognized the benefit of using containerized cargo to move drugs. Heroin and hashish are both moved through the country by road and rail to the seaport and concealed in legitimate shipments.
Specially constructed suitcases are available that incorporate illicit substances such as heroin into the structure. Couriers also saturate clothing, books, and other absorbent products with heroin solutions. Drug smuggling through the airports usually involves shipments of rom 1 to 2 kilograms that are concealed on couriers’ bodies, or in personal luggage. International connections take passengers in any direction, and to any destination.
West African traffickers have been present in Southwest Asia for many years. Heroin smuggled by these traffickers has been produced in laboratories located in Afghanistan’s Nangarhar Province, and usually obtained from sources in Pakistan’s NWFP. A common smuggling method used by these couriers is to ingest large quantities of heroin-filled capsules. Often, these capsules are inserted into the courier’s body cavities, as part of the same smuggling venture. These couriers travel to destinations in Africa, often via the United Arab Emirates or other locations with air connections to Pakistan. Other worldwide destinations,
including Russia and cities in Southeast Asia, are also frequently used by couriers working for West Africans.
• By road or rail to India, primarily for local consumption, but with a portion shipped on to Europe and the United States;
India, as well as other countries in the region, has a large opiate abuser population. While diversion from India’s licit production feeds the addict population, it is not always sufficient to satisfy the demand. Opiates from Afghanistan and Pakistan are smuggled to India, and essential chemicals are smuggled from India to Afghan opiate conversion laboratories.
• Heroin is also smuggled to worldwide destinations using letters and parcel post. DEA reporting indicates that a number of organizations have used the Pakistani mail system to send heroin to the United States. Both heroin-saturated letters and parcels containing heroin have been seized. In addition, heroin is also smuggled in parcels via express mail companies. While the amount smuggled per incident is fairly low, the total smuggled by individuals or organizations can be significant.
Acetic anhydride (AA), an essential chemical in the manufacture of heroin, transits Pakistan en route to Afghan conversion laboratories. There have been no significant seizures of AA in Pakistan since September 1998, when a 10- metric-ton shipment originating in Hungary was intercepted. AA is legitimately used in large quantities by the textile and leather tanning industries. The GOP has established control over AA, and mandates import only by licensed industrial consumers. AA is imported from European countries, as well as Japan and India. Only one Pakistani company is known to have produced AA, and it could only meet a quarter of the total legitimate requirement; according to U.S. State Department reporting, this company was closed in 1998. Smuggling AA is a criminal offense, punishable by up to 14 years in prison.
DRUG-RELATED MONEY LAUNDERING
Pakistan is not considered a major center for international money laundering activity. However, Pakistan-based traffickers are extensively involved in the production and transportation of opiates and hashish. This suggests that drug proceeds are laundered within the country. The Control of Narcotics Substances Act empowers the Anti-Narcotics Force (ANF) to investigate suspicious banking transactions—including foreign currency accounts. The ANF has also been empowered to freeze accounts, and can require financial institutions to report suspicious transactions.
While some drug-related money finds its way into the Pakistani banking system, conventional wisdom dictates that the majority of the profits are invested in Pakistani real estate. In addition, the widespread use in South Asia and the Middle East of the informal financial sector, referred to as Hundi or Hawala system, is still used extensively as a means to move money in and out of the country. This informal banking system relies on trust between client and broker and provides a service that is confidential, convenient, efficient, international in scope, and inexpensive. While this system is used extensively by legitimate businesses and individuals to transfer funds, especially in remote areas not served by conventional banking facilities, it is also exploited by criminals who want to bypass legal banking procedures and practices to transfer large sums of money without official scrutiny. This practice makes it difficult to estimate the amount of drug-related money that may be in Pakistan.
DRUG ABUSE AND TREATMENT
Drug abuse has grown dramatically in Pakistan; in 1980, there were virtually no heroin addicts in Pakistan, but by 1982 there were an estimated 30,000 addicts. The most recent drug abuse survey was conducted in 1993-1994, and estimated that there were 1.5 million heroin addicts in a drug abuser population of 3 million. However, the total addict population is now believed to be near 4 million, with approximately 50 percent of that population addicted to heroin. Pakistani addicts prefer to smoke heroin, which is called “chasing the dragon,” but an increasing number of addicts are injecting heroin and generally share needles. According to U.S. Department of State reporting, 126 metric tons of opium are required each year to meet the needs of Pakistani opiate users. Thus, opium illicitly produced in Pakistan does not satisfy even domestic demand, and opiates must be smuggled in from Afghanistan to meet the needs of the country’s many users.
Hashish users are the second largest group of drug abusers. Hashish use is common and an accepted practice in some areas. The official and public attitude toward opium and hashish use has been one of benign tolerance. However, the dramatic increase in heroin abuse has caused attitudes to change. There are 29 government-operated drug treatment centers in Pakistan and 44 private drug treatment and rehabilitation centers. Treatment facilities have had good success with treating opium users, but are much less successful with heroin users. The recidivism rate is extremely high for chronic heroin addicts—especially for treatment that involves only physical detoxification.
Demand reduction is a part of Pakistan’s drug control policy. The ANF’s Drug Abuse Prevention and Resource Center coordinates demand reduction programs in the four provinces. Religious leaders are educated about drug abuse and included in demand reduction activities, and workshops are planned to sensitize the medical community about drug laws and drug availability and to encourage appropriate prescribing of psychotropic drugs. The GOP initiated a 5-year drug control master plan, which addresses demand reduction, but the program is underfunded.
DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES/LEGISLATION
Many agencies have drug law enforcement responsibilities in Pakistan, but the ANF is the primary antidrug law enforcement agency. Established in July 1994, the ANF incorporated members from the Anti-Narcotics Task Force and sections of the disbanded Pakistan Narcotics Control Board. The ANF is responsible for developing and implementing Pakistan’s overall drug control policy. Since October 1999, following a military coup, Pakistan has been under military rule. This has not impacted the narcotics law enforcement structure established by the previous government. A particularly successful area of cooperation between the U.S. Government and the GOP has been the ANF’s Special Investigative Cell. This is a specially trained unit that targets major violators.
Pakistani Customs agents are assigned at all airports, border points, and the Port of Karachi with all the responsibilities normally assigned to Customs officials.
The Pakistani Coast Guard is responsible for patrolling the Makran Coast and the Port of Karachi. The Coast Guard has jurisdiction extending for 12 nautical miles to sea and for 50 miles inland. For example, in 1999, the Coast Guard seized 248 kilograms of heroin, 600 kilograms of hashish, and 22 kilograms of opium in the coastal village of Hub, which is in the Baluchistan Province.
The Frontier Constabulary and Frontier Corps serve as law enforcement agencies for the NWFP and the FATA. Their mandate covers the broad spectrum of offenses that includes intercepting drug shipments moving by caravan or by vehicle through their territory.
Other agencies include the Pakistan Rangers (the paramilitary group patrolling the India-Pakistan border), the Airport Security Force, the Federal Investigation Agency (responsible for extradition requests, INTERPOL, and corruption investigations), the departments of police and taxation in the four provinces, and tribal militia groups.
In 1995, two antidrug ordinances were passed. They were converted into law in 1997. The Anti-Narcotics Force Act established the ANF as the lead antidrug agency. The Control of Narcotics Substances Act criminalized all drug-related activities, which brought Pakistan into compliance with the 1988 U.N. Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs. Provisions of this law make money laundering a crime and establish procedures for asset forfeiture and for participating in mutual legal assistance requests. A total of US$5.8 million in trafficker assets have been frozen since the law was passed. In 1998, a court decision, based on the defendant’s conviction for drug trafficking in the United States, marked the first time that frozen assets were forfeited to the GOP. In 1998, the GOP extended the ANF Act and the Control of Narcotic Substances Act to Pakistan’s FATAs in the NWFP. For the first time, federal antidrug laws could be fully enforced in tribal areas. Special Narcotics Courts were established in 2000 and 2001 to speed drug prosecutions in Peshawar, Lahore, Karachi, Islamabad, and Quetta. In addition, Pakistani courts have imposed the death penalty approximately 130 times for drug trafficking offenses; to date, no executions have been carried out.
TREATIES AND CONVENTIONS
• 1961 U.N. Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs
• 1971 U.N. Convention on Psychotropic Drugs
• 1988 U.N. Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs
• INTERPOL
• South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) Narcotics Control Committee
Eleven countries have drug liaison officers stationed in Pakistan and conduct active counterdrug programs in the areas of law enforcement and demand reduction. Pakistan has drug-related bilateral agreements with a number of countries, including the United States, the United Arab Emirates, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, China, and India.
Drug Seizures (metric tons)
Year Opium Heroin Cannabis
1995 215.52 18.04 534.58
1996 8.08 4.05 201.55
1997 8.10 4.20 108.53
1998 5.02 3.33 65.33
1999 16.32 4.98 81.46
2000 8.78 9.40 128.72
*2001 4.80 7.66 65.05
Sources: 1995 - 1996: Pak1istani Anti-Narcotics Force
1997: AMEMBASSY, Islamabad, December 1998
1998: AMEMBASSY, Islamabad, December 1999
1999: Subcommission on Illicit Drug Traffic and Related Matters in the Hear and Middle East, June 2000, Country Report by Pakistan to the UNDCP
2000: AMEMBASSY, Islamabad, January 2002
*2001: Figures are for only the first 11 months of 2001 (January - November)
Extradition between the United States and Pakistan occurs under the auspices of a 1931 treaty signed by the United States and the United Kingdom. This treaty was made applicable to India in 1942 and has been continued by Pakistan.
Note: The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) has two offices in Pakistan, the Islamabad Country Office and the Peshawar Resident Office. DEA Pakistan’s area of responsibility also includes Afghanistan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates.
KEY JUDGMENTS
Since September 2001, the political situation in Afghanistan has been changing rapidly. It is possible that traffickers will view Afghanistan as an unfriendly environment for opium poppy cultivation and processing and may begin to relocate to Pakistan. The GOP must continue aggressive action against cultivation and processing to prevent any re-emergence within the country.
Should Afghanistan remain a significant source country for opiates, Pakistan will remain a major transit point for opiates intended for traffickers based in Turkey. The bulk of the morphine base and heroin base destined for Turkey, usually smuggled in multiton loads, will continue to transit Pakistan. Because Afghanistan and the Central Asian Republics have no direct access to the ocean, Pakistan’s Makran Coast remains an attractive venue for maritime smuggling.
Traffickers will continue to exploit Pakistan’s extensive air links with other countries in South Asia, the Middle East, Africa, Southeast Asia, and Europe to smuggle opiates, but may increase use of third countries in an attempt to conceal travel to and from Pakistan.
This report was prepared by the DEA Intelligence Division, Office of International Intelligence, Europe/Asia/Africa Strategic Unit. This report reflects information received prior to December 2001. Comments and requests for copies are welcome and may be directed to the Intelligence Production Unit, Intelligence Division, DEA Headquarters.
http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/
LSD use, trafficking and manufacture in the United States – November 2002 LSD in the United States
Published by U.S. Department of Justice - Tuesday 19 November, 2002
Copyright: Drug Enforcement Administration
Executive Summary
The availability of d-lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD) has increased in the United States in the last 2 to 3 years; the hallucinogen is available in at least retail quantities in virtually every State. The sources of supply for most of the LSD available in the United States are believed to be centered in northern California.
At the wholesale production and trafficking levels, LSD remains tightly controlled by relatively small, fraternal California-based organizations that have evaded drug law enforcement operations successfully for over two decades. Mid-level distribution networks generally are comprised of individuals who have known each other through long years of association and common interests.
Over the past several years, an increasing number of individuals have attempted to manufacture LSD. Many of these individuals are not associated with the traditional northern California groups that are believed to have produced most of the LSD available in the United States since the late 1960’s.
Compared with methamphetamine, PCP, and other domestically manufactured illicit drugs, few LSD laboratories have been located or seized. Six clandestine LSD synthesis laboratories have been confiscated by DEA since 1981; however, there have been no seizures since 1987. This is due primarily to the shifting of law enforcement resources to target and dismantle the escalating number of cocaine trafficking and distribution organizations established during the crack epidemic that began during the mid-1980’s and continues into the present.
Public and private mail systems appear to be the primary means used for the transportation and distribution of wholesale and retail quantities of LSD.
LSD is relatively inexpensive with an average street dosage unit or “hit” costing approximately $5 and often as little as $1 or $2. Retail-level doses are available primarily in paper form; microdot tablets and gelatin squares also have been encountered.
Current LSD potency ranges from 20 to 80 micrograms per dosage unit. This potency is considerably below levels reported during the 1960’s and early 1970’s, when potency ranged from 100 to 200 micrograms (or higher) per dosage unit.
The National Household Survey on Drug Abuse for 1993 estimated that 13.2 million Americans 12 years of age or older have used LSD at least once in their lifetime compared to 8.1 million in 1985.
According to the 1993 Monitoring the Future Study, sponsored by the National Institute on Drug Abuse, lifetime, past-year, and past-month use of LSD among seniors in the class of 1993 increased to the highest level since 1985. Moreover, the survey revealed that LSD use has increased significantly in every frequency category except daily use at every grade level.
Reporting from the Drug Abuse Warning Network (DAWN) indicates that the number of LSD-related hospital emergencies remains low compared to other major illegal drugs of abuse. This low number most likely is due to the fewer adverse reactions generated by the low-potency LSD that has been produced since the late 1970’s. As a result, the DAWN figures do not reflect the increases in LSD use measured by other indicators such as the National Household Survey on Drug Abuse and the Monitoring the Future Survey.
LSD: The Drug
Background D-lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD) is the most potent hallucinogenic substance known to man. Dosages of LSD are measured in micrograms, or millionths of a gram. By comparison, dosages of cocaine and heroin are measured in milligrams, or thousandths of a gram. Compared to other hallucinogenic substances, LSD is 100 times more potent than psilocybin and psilocin and 4,000 times more potent than mescaline.
The dosage level that will produce an hallucinogenic effect in humans generally is considered to be 25 micrograms. Over the past several years, the potency of LSD obtained during drug law enforcement operations has ranged between 20 and 80 micrograms per dosage unit. The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) recognizes 50 micrograms as the standard dosage unit equivalency.
LSD is classified as a Schedule I drug in the Controlled Substances Act of 1970. As a Schedule I drug, LSD meets the following three criteria: it is deemed to have a high potential for abuse; it has no legitimate medical use in treatment; and, there is a lack of accepted safety for its use under medical supervision.
LSD was synthesized in 1938 by a chemist working for Sandoz Laboratories in Switzerland. It was developed initially as a circulatory and respiratory stimulant. However, no extraordinary benefits of the compound were identified and its study was discontinued. In the 1940’s, interest in the drug was revived when it was thought to be a possible treatment for schizophrenia. Because of LSD’s structural relationship to a chemical that is present in the brain and its similarity in effect to certain aspects of psychosis, LSD was used as a research tool in studies of mental illness.
Sandoz Laboratories, the drug’s sole producer, began marketing LSD in 1947 under the trade name “Delysid” and it was introduced into the United States a year later. Sandoz marketed LSD as a psychiatric cure-all and “hailed it as a cure for everything from schizophrenia to criminal behavior, ‘sexual perversions,’ and alcoholism.” In fact, Sandoz, in its LSD-related literature, suggested that psychiatrists take the drug themselves in order to “gain an understanding of the subjective experiences of the schizophrenic.”
In psychiatry, the use of LSD by students was an accepted practice; it was viewed as a teaching tool in an attempt to understand schizophrenia. From the late 1940’s through the mid-1970’s, extensive research and testing were conducted on LSD. During a 15-year period beginning in 1950, research on LSD and other hallucinogens generated over 1,000 scientific papers, several dozen books, and 6 international conferences, and LSD was prescribed as treatment to over 40,000 patients. Although initial observations on the benefits of LSD were highly optimistic, empirical data developed subsequently proved much less promising.
As enthusiasm for the untested assumptions became tempered by the findings of actual experiments—and as less scrupulous professionals in the industry relaxed supervision and control of experiments—LSD emerged as a drug of abuse in certain, primarily medical, circles. Some psychiatric and medical professionals, acquainted with LSD in their work, began using it themselves and sharing it with friends and associates.
During the early 1960’s, this first group of casual LSD users evolved and expanded into a subculture that extolled the mystical and pseudo-religious symbolism often engendered by the drug’s powerful effects. The personalities associated with the subculture, usually connected to academia, and the propaganda they circulated soon attracted a great deal of publicity, generating further interest in LSD.
During the late 1960’s and early 1970’s, the drug culture adopted LSD as the “psychedelic” drug of choice. The infatuation with LSD lasted for a number of years until considerable negative publicity emerged on “bad trips”— psychotic psychological traumas associated with the LSD high—and “flashbacks,” uncontrollable recurring experiences. As a result of these revelations and effective drug law enforcement efforts, LSD dramatically decreased in popularity in the mid-1970’s. Scientific study of LSD ceased circa 1980 as research funding declined.
As a casual drug of abuse, LSD has remained popular among certain segments of society. Traditionally, it has been popular with high school and college students and other young adults. LSD also has been integral to the lifestyle of many individuals who follow certain rock music bands, most notably the Grateful Dead. Older individuals, introduced to the hallucinogen in the 1960’s, also still use LSD.
LSD most often is found in the form of small paper squares or, on occasion, in tablets. On occasion, authorities have encountered the drug in others forms—including powder or crystal, liquid, gelatin square, and capsule—and laced on sugar cubes and other substances. LSD is sold under more than 80 street names including acid, blotter, cid, doses, and trips, as well as names that reflect the designs on sheets of paper (see Appendix 1). More than 200 types of LSD tablets have been encountered since 1969 and more than 350 paper designs have been acquired since 1975. Designs range from simple five-point stars in black and white to exotic artwork in full four-color print. Inexpensiveness (prices range from $2 to $5 per dosage unit or “hit,”; wholesale lots often sell for as little as $1 or less), ready availability, alleged “mind-expanding” properties, and intriguing paper designs make LSD especially attractive to junior high school and high school students.
LSD has been available—at first legally, then on the illicit market—for over 40 years. Its use in scientific research has been extensive and its use has been widespread. Although the study of LSD and other hallucinogens increased the awareness of how chemicals could affect the mind, its use in psychotherapy largely has been debunked. It produces no aphrodisiac effects, does not increase creativity, has no lasting positive effect in treating alcoholics or criminals, does not produce a “model psychosis,” and does not generate immediate personality change.
However, drug studies have confirmed that the powerful hallucinogenic effects of this drug can produce profound adverse reactions, such as acute panic reactions, psychotic crises, and flashbacks, especially in users ill-equipped to deal with such trauma.
LSD Use and Effects
Use
LSD is ingested orally. A microdot tablet or square of the perforated LSD paper is placed in the user’s mouth, chewed or swallowed, and the chemical is absorbed from the individual’s gastrointestinal system. Paper squares are the preferred medium because their small size makes them easy to conceal and ingest. Also, because LSD is not injected or smoked, paraphernalia are not required.
The National Household Survey on Drug Abuse data for LSD are limited to estimates of lifetime use, defined as the use of LSD at least once in a person’s lifetime. During 1993, 13.2 million Americans, 12 years of age and older, reported having used LSD at least once compared to 8.1 million in 1985, an increase of more than 60 percent. In addition to the steady increase in LSD use since 1990, the data reveal two significant expansions in the number of lifetime users of LSD; one expansion occurred from 1985 to 1988 and the other from 1990 to 1991.
According to the 1994 Monitoring the Future Study, lifetime, past-year, and past-month use of LSD among seniors in the class of 1994 increased to the highest level since at least 1985. Moreover, the survey revealed that LSD use has increased in every category (except daily use) at every grade level. In addition, the proportions of students associating great risk with the use of LSD and other drugs have been declining significantly.
The Drug Abuse Warning Network (DAWN) indicates that the number of LSD-related hospital emergencies remains low compared to those related to cocaine, heroin, marijuana, methamphetamine, phencyclidine, and other major illicit drugs of abuse. For example, over the past 5 years, the number of LSD-related hospital emergencies has not exceeded 3,900 in any given year while the number of cocaine-related hospital emergencies has approached 125,000 per year during that same time frame. The low number of LSD-related hospital emergencies most likely is due to the fewer adverse reactions generated by the low-potency LSD that has been produced since the late 1970’s. As a result, the DAWN figures do not reflect the increases in LSD use measured by other indicators such as the National Household Survey on Drug Abuse and the Monitoring the Future Survey.
DAWN data also reveal that the majority of LSD abusers are in their late teens and early twenties and usually are white males. This general profile of LSD users has been a common characteristic associated with the drug since it became popular as a substance of abuse and, for the most part, has been unchanged since at least 1989. In 1993, LSD-related emergency room episodes ranked fourth among youths aged 6 to 19, after alcohol in combination with other drugs, marijuana, and cocaine.
Effects
LSD generates a wide variety of effects, the intensity of which are related to the size of the dose ingested, the mental state of the user, and the setting in which it is used. Although the minimum dose required to induce effects is considered to be 25 micrograms, a dose of as little as 10 micrograms can relax inhibitions and produce mild euphoria. As the dosage is increased, the effects become more pronounced and more prolonged. The LSD high is uncontrollable once the drug has been ingested because there is no antidote.
LSD is absorbed easily from the gastrointestinal tract, and rapidly reaches a high concentration in the blood. It is circulated throughout the body and, subsequently, to the brain. LSD is metabolized in the liver and is excreted in the urine in about 24 hours.
Several factors provide LSD with a virtually inherent governor to its regular use, meaning that the drug will never become as frequently abused as other drugs, most notably, crack cocaine. First, the duration of the effects, which may persist for up to 12 hours or more, ensures that the user will not need to purchase the drug on a rapidly recurring basis. Second, tolerance to the drug develops rapidly if used daily, rendering its repeated ingestion useless, and cannot be overcome by ingestion of increased dosages. Third, the uncertain and mixed effects, especially adverse reactions, lead to erratic instances of LSD use. Finally, the extremely powerful and intense hallucinations often prompt users to abstain from LSD ingestion as they require periods of reorientation.
Physical Effects
LSD use can produce a number of physical changes: mydriasis (prolonged dilation of the pupil of the eye), raised body temperature, rapid heartbeat, elevated blood pressure, increased blood sugar, salivation, tingling in fingers and toes, weakness, tremors, palpitations, facial flushing, chills, gooseflesh, profuse perspiration, nausea, dizziness, inappropriate speech, blurred vision, and intense anxiety. Death caused by the direct effect of LSD on the body is virtually impossible. However, death related to LSD abuse has occurred as a result of the panic reactions, hallucinations, delusions, and paranoia experienced by users.
LSD distorts electrical messages sent to and from various parts of the brain, primarily those pertaining to visual information. Messages from any of the senses can be perceived as merged together, creating a sensation known as “synesthesia.” This most commonly is represented as “hearing colors” or “seeing sounds.”
LSD also affects moods and emotions and suppresses memory centers and other higher cerebral functions, such as judgment, reason, behavior control, and self-awareness. The combination and intensity of these factors create the profound mental effects most closely associated with LSD.
Mental Effects
The mental effects most commonly associated with LSD use, particularly at high doses, are visual images or hallucinations, often involving simulated philosophical or religious connotations. It is this artificial imagery which has been advocated erroneously as providing true psychological insight and benefit.
The cause of most LSD-related problems is the intense visual illusions triggered that seem real and become overpowering, prompting the user to want to withdraw from the drug state immediately. Initially, at lower dosage levels, the visual images are intensified in color or flashes of light are seen. The visual images progress to brightly colored geometric designs and become distorted. At higher dosages, images appear as distortions of reality or as completely new visual images and can be seen with the eyes open or closed.
Hallucinations also take other forms: thoughts become dreamlike or free-flowing, perception of time can become slowed or distorted, and out-of-body experiences may occur or the perception that one’s body has merged with another person or object.
Emotional responses to the vivid hallucinations can be wide-ranging, from euphoria and contentment to disturbing feelings of confusion, fear, and despair. Moods can change profoundly in a short period of time, from excitability to tranquility.
The consequences of LSD use can be deleterious, not merely benign as is commonly perceived. Powerful hallucinations can lead to acute panic reactions when the mental effects cannot be controlled and when the user wishes to end the drug-induced state. While these panic reactions more often than not are resolved successfully over time, prolonged anxiety and psychotic reactions have been reported. The mental effects can cause psychotic crises and compound existing psychiatric problems.
Flashbacks
Flashbacks are one of the most dangerous side effects of LSD use. They are recurrences of images or effects that were experienced during a previous LSD administration and they can vary in frequency and duration. Flashbacks can occur spontaneously or they can be spurred by the use of other drugs (particularly marijuana or hashish), emotional stress, fatigue, or movement from a light to a dark environment. These flashbacks can last from a few seconds to several hours. Ironically, some experienced LSD users do not consider flashbacks to be an adverse consequence of LSD use and actually enjoy the renewed perceptions or images as a “free trip.”
LSD Manufacture
Illegal LSD Production
LSD has been manufactured illegally since the 1960’s. A limited number of chemists, probably less than a dozen, are believed to be manufacturing nearly all of the LSD available in the United States. Some of these manufacturers probably have been operating since the 1960’s.
LSD manufacturers and traffickers can be separated into two groups. The first, located in northern California, is composed of chemists (commonly referred to as “cooks”) and traffickers who work together in close association; typically, they are major producers capable of distributing LSD nationwide. The second group is made up of independent producers who, operating on a comparatively limited scale, can be found throughout the country. As a group, independent producers pose much less of a threat than the northern California group inasmuch as their production is intended for local consumption only.
Drug law enforcement officials have surmised that LSD chemists and top echelon traffickers form an insider’s fraternity of sorts. They successfully have remained at large because there are so few of them. Their exclusivity is not surprising given that LSD synthesis is a difficult process to master. Although cooks need not be formally trained chemists, they must adhere to precise and complex production procedures. In instances where the cook is not a chemist, the production recipe most likely was passed on by personal instruction from a formally trained chemist. Further supporting the premise that most LSD manufacture is the work of a small fraternity of chemists, virtually all the LSD seized during the 1980’s was of consistently high purity and sold in relatively uniform dosages of 20 to 80 micrograms.
LSD commonly is produced from lysergic acid, which is made from ergotamine tartrate, a substance derived from an ergot fungus on rye, or from lysergic acid amide, a chemical found in morning glory seeds. Although theoretically possible, manufacture of LSD from morning glory seeds is not economically feasible and these seeds never have been found to be a successful starting material for LSD production. Lysergic acid and lysergic acid amide are both classified in Schedule III of the Controlled Substances Act. Ergotamine tartrate is regulated under the Chemical Diversion and Trafficking Act.
Ergotamine tartrate is not readily available in the United States, and its purchase by other than established pharmaceutical firms is suspect. Therefore, ergotamine tartrate used in clandestine LSD laboratories is believed to be acquired from sources located abroad, most likely Europe, Mexico, Costa Rica, and Africa. The difficulty in acquiring ergotamine tartrate may limit the number of independent LSD manufacturers. By contrast, illicit manufacture of methamphetamine and phencyclidine is comparatively more prevelant in the United States because, in part, precursor chemicals can be procured easily.
Only a small amount of ergotamine tartrate is required to produce LSD in large batches. For example, 25 kilograms of ergotamine tartrate can produce 5 or 6 kilograms of pure LSD crystal that, under ideal circumstances, could be processed into 100 million dosage units, more than enough to meet what is believed to be the entire annual U.S. demand for the hallucinogen. LSD manufacturers need only import a small quantity of the substance and, thus, enjoy the advantages of ease of concealment and transport not available to traffickers of other illegal drugs, primarily marijuana and cocaine.
Cooking LSD is time consuming; it takes from 2 to 3 days to produce 1 to 4 ounces of crystal. Consequently, it is believed that LSD usually is not produced in large quantities, but rather in a series of small batches. Production of LSD in small batches also minimizes the loss of precursor chemicals should they become contaminated during the synthesis process.
LSD crystal produced clandestinely can be as much as 95- to 100-percent pure. At this purity—and assuming optimum conditions during dilution and application to paper—1 gram of crystal could produce 20,000 dosage units of LSD. However, analysis of LSD crystal seized in California over the past 3 years revealed an average purity of only 62 percent. Moreover, LSD degrades quickly when exposed to heat, light, and air and is most susceptible to degradation during the application process and once it is in paper form. As a result, under less than optimal, real-life conditions, actual yields are significantly below the theoretically possible yield: 1 gram of LSD crystal genarally yields 10,000 dosage units of LSD, or approximately 10 million dosage units per kilogram.
Over the past 30 years, the traditional dilution factor for manufacturing LSD has been 10,000 doses per 1 gram of crystal. Therefore, dosage units yielded from high-purity (95- to 100-percent pure) LSD crystal would contain 100 micrograms. However, dosages currently seen contain closer to 50 micrograms. This discrepancy stems in part from production impurities: during the sythesis process, manufacturers generally fail to perform a final “clean-up” step to remove by-products, thereby lowering the crystal’s purity. Further, though average purity of tested LSD crystal samples is, as noted, 62 percent, the average potency of doses analyzed is approximately 50 micrograms rather than 62 micrograms, as would be expected. The diminished potency can be attributed to distributors who, when applying the crystal to paper, often “cheat” by diluting 1 gram of crystal to produce up to 15,000 or more dosage units.
Pure, high-potency LSD is a clear or white, odorless crystalline material that is soluble in water. It is mixed with binding agents, such as spray-dried skim milk, for producing tablets or is dissolved and diluted in a solvent for application onto paper or other materials. Variations in the manufacturing process or the presence of precursors or by-products can cause LSD to range in color from clear or white, in its purest form, to tan or even black, indicating poor quality or degradation. To mask product difficiencies, distributors often apply LSD to off-white, tan, or yellow paper to disguise discoloration.
At the highest levels of the traffic, where LSD crystal is purchased in gram or multigram quantities from wholesale sources of supply, it rarely is diluted with adulterants, a common practice with cocaine, heroin, and other illicit drugs. However, to prepare the crystal for production in retail dosage units, it must be diluted with binding agents or dissolved and diluted in liquids. The dilution of LSD crystal typically follows a standard, predetermined recipe to ensure uniformity of the final product. Excessive dilution yields less potent dosage units that soon become unmarketable.
LSD crystal usually is converted into tablet form (“microdots” that are 3/32 inch or smaller in diameter), thin squares of gelatin (“window panes”), or applied to sheets of prepared paper (blotter paper—initially used as a medium—has been replaced by a variety of paper types). LSD most frequently is encountered in paper form, still commonly referred to as blotter paper or blotter acid. It consists of sheets of paper soaked in or otherwise impregnated with LSD. Often these sheets are covered with colorful designs or artwork and are usually perforated into one-quarter inch square, individual dosage units.
LSD Trafficking
Evolution of Illicit LSD Trafficking
Throughout the history of LSD trafficking, supplies have mirrored the demand for the drug. The illicit drug market has never experienced a serious shortage or glut of LSD and the overall supply of the drug has remained relatively constant since 1980. Over the years, investigations throughout the country have established that LSD sources of supply are located primarily in northern California’s San Francisco Bay area.
Initially, LSD was supplied by small groups that obtained limited quantities of ergotamine tartrate on the commercial market. By the end of the 1960’s, a single group—securing significant amounts of ergotamine tartrate from Mexican and Costa Rican sources—emerged as the principal supplier of LSD in the United States. With the immobilization of this group in the early 1970’s, another organization took over as the principal source of supply, purchasing virtually all of its ergotamine tartrate through front companies from legitimate domestic suppliers. The neutralization of this organization wiped out the large-scale production and distribution of LSD within the United States. Immediately following this drug law enforcement effort, the number of LSD dosage unit removals from the illicit drug market decreased dramatically.
By 1976, however, another organization, centered in the San Francisco Bay area, had assumed the primary role in the production and distribution of LSD. The organization operated at least one clandestine laboratory in northern California and was believed to have managed virtually the entire LSD market through its control over the illicit importation of ergotamine tartrate and through its franchising of LSD production rights. Ergotamine tartrate was secured, indirectly, from legitimate European chemical firms: the firms supplied the precursor to European criminal organizations that, in turn, smuggled it through American middlemen to the San Francisco organization. (Since 1976, there have been no known significant diversions of ergotamine tartrate from legitimate sources in the United States.)
During the late 1970’s, virtually all LSD tablets analyzed by DEA’s Special Testing and Research Laboratory exhibited the same chemical composition and a roughly proportional presence of diluents. The finding suggests a possibility that a single organization manufactured the raw granulated material used in LSD tablet presses nationwide. More probably, however, the analyses indicate that LSD crystal cooks merely have passed on a single recipe for producing the tablets.
Due to the variety of shapes and sizes seen among seized tablets, it would seem that sizable amounts of the LSD crystal were distributed to specific tablet press operators. Press operators changed tablet punches and metal dies partly as a security measure and partly due to extreme wear on the non-case-hardened steel dies.
The San Francisco organization also shipped LSD in liquid form to individual conversion operations located in areas in the United States where LSD demand was greatest and to foreign, primarily English-speaking, nations. The LSD liquid was applied to paper either by using syringes to dispense LSD onto individual paper squares or by immersing sheets of paper squares in a less concentrated LSD liquid solution.
Paper emerged as the most popular means of distributing LSD. Paper distribution does not entail use of expensive pill presses. Also, pill press operations require a higher level of skill and security than paper application operations. The paper squares and sheets are easy to conceal and transport. Unique designs can be applied to the paper to make the drug more appealing to young users and to serve as brand identification. The paper designs also can be changed regularly to stimulate demand. Unlike the administration of other drugs, particularly the injection of heroin, the method of LSD ingestion (oral) is unobtrusive. In addition, the paper dosages are not readily associated by users with drugs or medicine, allowing the sellers to portray it as “natural” or unlike other drugs. Moreover, the “noncommercial social philosophy of the environment surrounding LSD use and sales makes it difficult for young people to view LSD as a dangerous drug.”
In contrast to the trafficking of other drugs, in which profit is the sole motivating factor, LSD trafficking has assumed an ideological or crusading aspect. The influence of—and probable distribution by—certain psychedelic generation gurus has created a secretiveness and marketing mystique unique to LSD, particularly at the higher echelons of the traffic. Their belief in the beneficent properties of LSD has been, over the years, as strong a motivating factor in the production and distribution of the drug as the profits to be made from its sale.
Large amounts of LSD have been seized by drug law enforcement authorities during the last several years, and numerous distributors have been arrested and convicted. Those at the upper echelon, however, continue to evade the law. These individuals appear to run an efficient and profitable operation that is difficult to penetrate.
Current Trafficking and Distribution
DEA reporting indicates that LSD is available in at least retail quantities in virtually every State in the United States and that availability is increasing in a number of States. More than half of all DEA field divisions report increased availability of LSD within their respective jurisdictions, and the remaining field divisions report that LSD is readily available. Northern California appears to be the source of supply for most of the LSD available in the United States.
At the wholesale production and trafficking level, LSD is controlled tightly by California-based organizations that have operated with relative impunity for almost 20 years. Reporting also indicates that an increasing number of individuals or groups nationwide are manufacturing and distributing LSD, or attempting to do so, on a limited basis.
LSD traffickers sometimes supply or “front” consignments of LSD to distributors who have established an acceptable level of reliability; the traffickers are reimbursed once the LSD has been sold. For the most part, however, payment for consignments of LSD is made in advance by wire through Western Union or by postal money orders. Upon receipt of payment, LSD is shipped to the distributor. At the retail level, LSD is sold strictly on a cash-and-carry basis. Money laundering is not conducted on a sophisticated level, except by LSD traffickers with international connections.
Investigative intelligence reveals that major trafficking organizations are attempting to boost LSD sales through the extension of credit, especially to mid-level distributors and occasionally to low-level sellers. This suggests that competition at the highest levels of the traffic is increasing, possibly due to an increase in the number of LSD crystal manufacturers.
LSD traffickers have adapted their tactics to circumvent the mandatory minimum sentencing guidelines. For instance, an investigation in California revealed that one trafficker was unwilling to conduct transactions in excess of 9 grams of LSD crystal because the threshold of 10 grams triggers the mandatory minimum sentence of 10 years imprisonment.
LSD usually is transported in two ways from the San Francisco Bay area. First, overnight delivery services, including express mail, Federal Express, and DHL, are used extensively to transport large amounts of LSD throughout the United States. Second, LSD is shipped to major distributors in cities that host concerts of the “Grateful Dead” band. The concerts are used as a forum for large-scale LSD distribution, as well as low-level or retail sales. In addition, intelligence reveals that major transactions also are consummated at these events. Local police agencies have consistently reported that LSD use and arrests rise significantly prior to the concerts and persist for a period after the band leaves town.
Traditionally, retail-level LSD distribution networks in the United States have been comprised of individuals who have known each other through long association and common interests. This has facilitated not only hand-to-hand sales of the drug, but a proliferation of mail order sales.
Distribution of LSD usually occurs in one of three ways. First, an individual attends a rock concert, meets a source of supply, and exchanges telephone numbers. Typically, these purchases are for retail quantities of up to 100 doses. Second, individuals, who decide to continue distributing, call the source for additional amounts. Usually, the source has either continued on the concert tour or has returned home, which frequently is in northern California. If the source intends to stay on the tour—making subsequent communication difficult—the telephone number of an associate is provided for future orders. After the initial purchase, almost all transactions are made via the public and private mail systems. (Payments to a source of supply usually are made through legitimate money wiring services.) Third, some distributors travel directly to California to meet sources of supply.
The mail system is the primary means used to ship wholesale quantities of LSD to distributors located nationwide. Reporting indicates that shipment methods used to transport both large and small quantities of LSD are often similar. LSD frequently is concealed in greeting cards, in cassette tapes, or in articles of clothing that are mailed to a post office box established by the recipient. This post office box usually is listed under a fictitious name or business. Normally, no return address is provided on the package or envelope.
Packaging
LSD is sold in several forms, including crystal, liquid, tablets, gelatin, or applied to sheets of paper or sugar cubes. At the highest levels of the traffic, LSD is sold in crystal form. LSD in liquid form is destined for transfer to a paper medium, and commonly is associated with mid-level distribution. At the retail level, the vast majority of dosage units are in the paper form, although tablets can be purchased in several areas.
LSD, when diluted and applied to paper, begins to degrade quickly, necessitating a high rate of product turnover. As a result, “stash” houses containing large quantities of the drug, common in the traffic of cocaine and marijuana, seldom are encountered by drug law enforcement authorities.
LSD liquid and crystal generally are sold in plastic film canisters or, occasionally, in small, opaque plastic bottles to prevent oxidation, which turns the LSD darker than the preferred white or off-white color.
LSD in crystal or liquid form is applied to sheets of paper by traffickers who operate clandestine conversion laboratories located in the San Francisco Bay area or by distributors in mobile conversion laboratories. These conversion laboratories can be erected quickly and efficiently almost anywhere, usually in hotel or motel rooms in cities where rock concerts are scheduled or in recreational vehicles that follow certain rock bands on their concert tours, most notably the Grateful Dead Band.
Sheets of paper usually are prepared with colorful designs or artwork of many different characters or images. The designs often are applied commercially by printing companies using off-set lithography, screen printing, or silk screening. Photocopiers also can be used to reproduce distinctive designs onto sheets effectively. Otherwise, the designs can be applied by rubber stamps or hand-drawn.
The sheets are perforated to create small squares which represent a single dosage unit or “hit,” isolating one design per dosage unit or several designs per sheet. Some LSD paper samples contain only one elaborate design per sheet. Major traffickers use methods developed in the printing industry to perforate the paper sheets. However, smaller operations may employ cruder methods, such as razor blades, pizza cutters, or sewing tools (e.g., the “Dritz” pattern marking wheel). The sheets then are ready for the application of liquid LSD.
The printed sheets are dipped into shallow pans containing LSD crystal dissolved in methanol, ethanol, or other solvent (water can be used; however, its slower evaporation rate increases the likelihood of degradation) and then are laid out or hung up to dry. The printing inks generally are insoluble in the solvents to ensure that the image does not run. Because this production procedure is inexact, the potency of LSD can vary from sheet to sheet and even from square to square.
The LSD application process is performed in this order to minimize loss of product. If the LSD is applied to the sheets prior to adding the designs, the bloated sheets of paper could jam printing or photocopying machines, wasting the valuable drug-soaked paper. In addition, there is a certain amount of waste inherent in commercial printing or photocopying operations.
Once the paper sheets are printed, perforated, and impregnated with LSD, they are ready for distribution. The traffickers often communicate with local contacts to establish distribution outlets for the drug.
Price
LSD is relatively inexpensive. The average price is approximately $5 per retail dosage unit and less than $1 per dosage unit in wholesale lots of 1,000 or more. When compared with marijuana, which sells for $40 to $450 per ounce, LSD is perceived by many drug users as a bargain, especially considering the duration of its effects, which, in higher doses, can persist for up to 12 hours. Although LSD prices have fluctuated nationally during the past several years, overall prices remain relatively low.
The low cost of LSD has given rise to incidents where the drug is misrepresented as another illicit drug of abuse. While a small amount of liquid LSD will yield a certain number of individual dosage units for sale at from $1 to $10 each, the same amount of liquid can be applied to other substances and sold at significantly higher prices. For example, LSD can be applied to gourmet mushrooms to create ersatz psilocybin mushrooms that sell for $30 to $350 per ounce. It also can be applied to tablets and sold as 3,4 methylenedioxy-methamphetamine (MDMA) for $8 to $25 per dosage unit. This versatility allows the distributor to offer a variety of drugs for sale and provides him with the potential for increased profits.
Potency
LSD potency or strength is measured in micrograms. In the 1960’s and early 1970’s, LSD potency generally ranged from 100 to 200 micrograms per dosage unit or higher. Analysis of exhibits during the late 1970’s indicated an average potency in the 30- to 50-microgram range. From the mid-1980’s to the present, LSD potency has remained considerably below levels reported during the 1960’s and early 1970’s and generally has been in the range of 20 to 80 micrograms per dosage unit. As a result of this comparatively low dosage level, many users perceive LSD as “safe,” thus enhancing the drug’s attractiveness.
The production of lower potency LSD was a conscious marketing ploy passed down from an older generation of producers for two primary reasons. First, producing lower potency doses meant that the same volume of LSD liquid or crystal could be diluted into a larger number of dosage units, thereby boosting profits significantly. Second, lower potency doses yield fewer adverse reactions on the scale of those seen during the 1960’s and early 1970’s.
Lower potency doses probably have accounted for the relatively few LSD-related emergency room incidents noted during the past several years. However, there are several reasons why these incidents still occur. For example, users who seek a more intense hallucinogenic experience merely consume multiple dosage units at once. In addition, novices who are unaware that the effects of LSD may take up to 1 hour to develop are tempted to ingest additional dosage units and unwittingly increase the size of the dosage consumed.
http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/
DEA congretional testimony on international money laundering – November 2002 DEA congressional testimony on international money laundering
Published by U.S. Department of Justice - Tuesday 19 November, 2002
Copyright: Drug Enforcement Administration
Statement by: Edward M. Guillen: Chief of Financial Operations, Drug Enforcement Administration
Before the: House Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources
Date: June 23, 2000
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: I appreciate the opportunity to appear before the Subcommittee today on the subject of International Money Laundering. My comments will be limited to an objective assessment of the law enforcement issues involving drug trafficking and money laundering with specific attention devoted to the challenges that today's organized crime syndicates from Colombia and Mexico present to our law enforcement efforts.
It is important to understand the threat posed by international drug organizations and why cooperative law enforcement programs in the domestic as well as the international arena are necessary to successfully counter drug trafficking and money laundering within the United States. The leaders of these drug trafficking organizations command powerful organized crime syndicates that control virtually all of the heroin, cocaine and methamphetamine sold in the United States today.
Today's organized crime leaders are strong, sophisticated, and destructive and have the capability of operating on a global scale. They are callous individuals who send their surrogates to direct the distribution of the poison they ship to the United States. These organizational leaders have at their disposal airplanes, boats, vehicles, radar, communications equipment, and weapons in quantities that rival the capabilities of some legitimate governments.
Whereas previous organized crime leaders were millionaires, the Colombian drug traffickers and their counterparts from Mexico are billionaires. They have learned to exploit a variety of weaknesses in order to protect their drug profits, which are the lifeblood of these organizations. Their ultimate purpose is to amass large sums of money in order to maintain their obscene and lavish lifestyle free from the boundaries or confines of the law.
Overview:
As you are well aware, money laundering is the process used by drug traffickers to convert bulk amounts of drug profits into legitimate money. The need to launder conspicuously large amounts of small denomination bills renders the traffickers vulnerable to law enforcement interdiction. Tracking and intercepting this illegal flow of drug money is an important tool in identifying and dismantling international drug trafficking organizations.
Illegal narcotic sales in the United States generate billions of dollars annually, most of it in cash. Efforts to legitimize or "launder" this cash by the Colombian drug cartels are subject to detection because of intense scrutiny placed on large financial transactions by U.S. banks. To avoid detection, the cartels have developed a number of money laundering systems in attempts to avoid financial transaction reporting requirements and manipulate facets of the economy unrelated to the traditional financial services industry.
For organizational purposes all the various money laundering methods utilized in today's financial world can be reduced to four categories: bulk movement, the use of financial institutions, the use of commercial businesses, and finally, the movement through the underground banking system. However, an organization may use several of these methods in a chain to arrive at its goal: the integration of drug money into the economy as licit profits.
Colombia:
Despite the rise to power by the Mexican crime syndicates and their increasing influence on the drug trade in the U.S., Colombian traffickers still control the manufacture of the vast majority of cocaine in South America and a majority of the wholesale cocaine market in the eastern United States. They move cocaine from their clandestine laboratories in the jungles of southeast Colombia to Mexico and through the Caribbean, using commercial maritime vessels, go-fast boats, containerized cargo, and private aircraft. The methods are varied and traffickers frequently alter both their routes and their modus operandi to thwart interdiction efforts.
The Colombian trafficking organizations influence in the Caribbean is now overwhelming. DEA has identified several major organizations based on the North Coast of Colombia that have established command and control functions in Puerto Rico and the Dominican Republic. These drug traffickers use the Caribbean Basin to funnel tons of cocaine to the U.S. each year and they direct networks of transporters that oversee the importation, storage, exportation, and wholesale distribution of cocaine destined for the continental United States. Seizures of 500 to 2,000 kilos of cocaine are now common in and around Puerto Rico, the Dominican Republic, and the Bahamian Island chain.
The Dominican trafficking groups, already firmly entrenched as low-level cocaine and heroin wholesalers in the larger Northeastern cities, were uniquely placed to assume a far more significant role in the multi-billion dollar cocaine and heroin trade. From Boston, Massachusetts to Charlotte, North Carolina, well organized Dominican trafficking groups are, for the first time, controlling and directing the sale of multi-hundred kilogram shipments of cocaine and multi-kilogram quantities of heroin. This change in operations somewhat reduces profits for the syndicate leaders; however, it succeeds in reducing their exposure to U.S. law enforcement.
Due to geographical considerations, Colombian traffickers face many difficulties during the initial placement phase of the money laundering process that Mexican syndicates do not encounter. Colombian drug organizations have in the past relied on a multi-faceted collection process. They have amassed currency in strategic locations, used a variety of methods-- including smuggling and bribery-- to introduce the cash into the U.S. banking system, and subsequently transferred it to Colombia. In an effort to avoid the high risks associated with direct deposits in U.S. or European banks, many Colombian drug traffickers have returned to the simplest of money laundering methods, the bulk movement of cash. Currently, the vast majority of U.S. currency bound for the bank accounts of the Colombian drug lords leaves the United States either through air cargo or commercial cargo freighters. Due to the enormous amount of commercial trade the United States has with Colombia, this method makes the traffickers operations not only less complicated, but also less vulnerable to discovery by law enforcement.
In addition, Colombian drug trafficking will exploit any means possible to safely launder their drug proceeds. One such form of money laundering is known as the Black Market Peso Exchange (BMPE). The BMPE is a complex system currently used by drug trafficking organizations to launder billions of dollars of drug money each year utilizing the advantages of Panama's Colon Free Zone (CFZ), which serves as an integral link in the Colombian money laundering chain.
Mexico:
Mexico is not only a major drug transshipment and producer nation, it is also a conduit and repository for the laundering of drug proceeds generated in the United States. The 2,000 mile U.S./ Mexico border, close working relationships between Colombian and Mexican drug trafficking organizations, widespread corruption, and the relative ease with which large amounts of U.S. currency can be absorbed into the Mexican financial systems make Mexico an ideal target for money laundering organizations.
Laundering drug proceeds for Mexican crime syndicates is commonly accomplished by relatively simple and direct means-- the bulk shipment of currency back to Mexico. Tractor trailers and cars with hidden compartments are frequently used to smuggle drugs out of Mexico into the U.S. and then these same vehicles are packed with the proceeds from the street sale of the drugs and returned to Mexico. Drug traffickers based in Colombia also move the proceeds from their operations in the U.S. to Los Angeles, New York and Miami for bulk shipment out of the United States. Both the Colombians and the Mexicans frequently use vehicles with hidden compartments to carry large quantities of U.S. currency. The bulk movement of U.S. cash to Mexico has resulted in significant increases of financial seizures along U.S. roadways. During calendar year 99, U.S. law enforcement seized over $69.4 million dollars on U.S. highways. From January 2000 to March 31st of this year, law enforcement agencies have seized over $19.2 million dollars. It is estimated that most of the currency seized was destined for drug trafficking organizations operating out of Mexico.
Once the U.S. currency arrives in Mexico, a variety of alternatives for laundering are available. The U.S. currency transported to Mexico is generally in small denomination bills, such as tens and twenties. Money Service Businesses (MSBs) which include wire remittance services, cashier check companies, and casas de cambio (money exchange house) systems are readily available for the transfer and exchange of dollars, in these small denominations, to pesos. The MSBs function as a parallel banking system in Mexico, which in addition to ability to exchange currency, have the capability of transferring funds into any banking system worldwide. They provide currency conversion, exchanges and money movement services for a fee. Legitimate businesses as well as drug trafficking organizations seek the services provided by the MSBs. For example, Mexican immigrants have traditionally used wire remittance services to send American earned dollars back to Mexico to support their families.
DEA Initiatives:
In order to effectively respond to the threat of money laundering, the DEA is actively involved in a host of joint initiatives with all of the organizations represented by panel members here today. These initiatives are designed to target the money laundering capabilities of major trafficking organizations operating in the United States. Our operations have resulted in the arrests of 373 individuals and over $72.7 million in currency and assets, 9,399 kilos of cocaine, 30 kilos of heroin and 140 kilos of marijuana. DEA additionally, continues to support a number of interdiction programs that target the bulk shipment of illicit funds across our nation's highways.
The U.S. National Money Laundering Strategy (NMLS), issued by the Department of Treasury and Justice in September of 1999, and further refined and expanded in February 2000, prescribes a wide range of laundering control measures that affect public and private entities in the U.S. and abroad. DEA actively participates on several of the target specific work groups responsible for developing new enforcement/regulatory strategies and initiatives.
In compliance with the NMLS, the DEA has initiated a cooperative partnership with the regulatory and private sectors of the financial community. This initiative, identified as "Operation Contact," provides for an open dialogue between the private financial sector and DEA in regards to suspected drug money laundering activity. As a result, the DEA has participated in a variety of forums in order to educate the financial community's ability to identify and protect their institutions from illicit money laundering activity.
Conclusion:
For several decades, Colombian and Mexican drug trafficking organizations have been adaptable, persistent, and savvy in the ways they have met drug market dynamics. The Governments of Colombia and Mexico must be vigilant in their maintenance of relentless law enforcement pressure against major drug trafficking organizations. Unless tough law enforcement measures are in place so that law enforcement may arrest, prosecute and imprison major traffickers, seize and forfeit their assets, and halt money laundering, Colombia and Mexico will continue to suffer from the violence and corruption generated by the drug trafficking operations of international organized crime syndicates.
Cooperation between law enforcement and the banking community is growing. Law enforcement's approach to the financial industry is less confrontational and many financial institutions have established their own compliance programs. Moreover, these financial institutions are cooperating more in the field of suspicious activity reporting.
DEA remains committed to our primary goal of targeting and arresting the most significant drug traffickers in the world today. We will continue to work with our law enforcement partners to improve our cooperative efforts against international drug trafficking. The ultimate measure of success will come when we dismantle the drug trafficking organizations that bring misery to the nations in which they operate.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for inviting me to appear before the Subcommittee today, I will be happy to answer any questions that you might have at this time.
http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/
DEA southwest Asian drug intelligence briefing – November 2002 Southwest Asian drug intelligence briefing
Published by U.S. Department of Justice - Tuesday 19 November, 2002
Copyright: Drug Enforcement Administration
Drug Intelligence Brief
SOUTHWEST ASIAN HEROIN-SELECTED DATA - March 2002
Southwest Asian (SWA) heroin was the dominant type of heroin sold to drug users in the eastern United States in the 1970s and 1980s; however, it currently accounts for only a small portion of the U.S. heroin supply. The number of street purchases of SWA heroin has declined in recent years, but the purity of heroin from this region remains high.
Heroin from Southwest Asian sources is smuggled directly to the United States by maritime and air routes. Often air couriers are controlled by Nigerian/West African drug trafficking organizations, as well as by Pakistani, Lebanese, Nepalese, and, in New York, occasionally by Russian and East European trafficking groups. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and Canadian intelligence sources identify Vancouver, British Columbia, a significant entry point for Asian-source heroin—primarily from Southeast Asia, but also including SWA heroin—and Montreal, Canada, as source cities for North America’s eastern heroin markets.
FOREIGN CULTIVATION
Opium poppy has been cultivated in the Golden Crescent Region of Southwest Asia and the Middle East for thousands of years. SWA heroin has dominated the world supply of heroin since 1997, and accounted for 72 percent of the world supply in 2000, according to U.S. Government (USG) sources. Europe remains the primary market for heroin from this region.
Cultivation is centered primarily in Afghanistan, but opium poppy also is cultivated in Pakistan and Lebanon, although at greatly reduced levels that do not currently have an impact on the global heroin supply. Recently released USG estimates indicate that opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan declined severely in 2001. The decline resulted primarily from the ban on opium poppy cultivation decreed in July 2000 by then Taliban leader Mullah Omar for the 2000-2001 growing season. Nonetheless, continuing recent seizures of SWA heroin in Southwest Asia and Europe, including 480 kilograms seized in January 2002 in the Netherlands, indicate that opium stockpiles remain sufficient to meet consumer demand.
POTENTIAL SOUTHWEST ASIAN OPIUM PRODUCTION IN METRIC TONS
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Afghanistan 685 950 1250 2099 2184 2340 2861 3656 74
Pakistan 140 160 155 75 85 66 37 11 5
Source: US Goverment
Since the July 2000 ban on cultivation, prices for opium, morphine base, and heroin have continued to increase in SWA source areas. In the Nangarhar Province of Afghanistan, the source of most of the SWA heroin seized in the United States, the price of white heroin increased from $579 1 per kilogram in July 2000, to $4,011 per kilogram in April 2001—an increase of nearly 700 percent. Kilogram prices through year’s end were fluid but remained in the $4,000 to $5,000 range. Over the same period, the price of brown heroin, historically the dominant form produced in Afghanistan, also increased in Nangarhar Province from $385 to $2,245 per kilogram.
Media reporting in September 2001, however, indicated that the Taliban told farmers in Afghanistan that they were now free once again to grow opium poppy. While large-scale cultivation could resume, the amounts reaching the market may be impacted by recent, ongoing military actions in the region.
PURITY
Heroin purities at the wholesale and retail levels of the U.S. heroin trade are compared in the chart that follows. The data are derived from two DEA trafficking indicator programs: the Heroin Signature Program (HSP) and the Domestic Monitor Program (DMP).2
SOUTHWEST ASIAN HEROIN PURITY: 1998-2000 (Percent pure)
1998 1999 2000
Wholesale-Heroin Signature Program 76 73 77
Retail-Domestic Monitor Program 32 44 40
The HSP looks at the wholesale level of the trade as heroin is smuggled into and throughout the United States, while the DMP focuses on the retail or street level of the drug market. Under the DMP, heroin is purchased quarterly in open-air drug markets in 23 locations around the United States. According to preliminary DMP data, in 2000, street purchases of SWA heroin were made in Atlanta (5), Detroit (5), Washington, DC (5), Chicago (4), New York (3), Baltimore (1), Miami (1), and Newark (1).
A comparison of purity levels of heroin available on the U.S. drug market from the four major heroin source areas reveals that SWA heroin purities are comparable to those for Southeast
Asian (SEA) heroin at both the wholesale and retail levels, but remain consistently below South American heroin purities. Street-level purity of SWA heroin declined in 1998 below that of Mexican heroin, which traditionally has had the lowest purity of all source areas. In 1999, SWA heroin purity exceeded that of both SEA and Mexican-source heroin.3
COMPARISON OF HEROIN PURITY BY SOURCE AREA: 1998-2000 (Percent pure)
Heroin Source Area 1998 1999 2000
HSP DMP HSP DMP HSP DMP
South America 79 53 78 51 79 52
Southwest Asia 76 32 73 44 77 40
Southeast Asia 72 36 73 42 72 27
Mexico 42 34 42 27 36 25
Source: Drug Enforcement Administration
Researchers at the DEA Special Testing and Research Laboratory classify heroin from Southwest Asia by three production signatures. All three are free-flowing granular powders, but of varying colors and solubility. SWA-A heroin is medium dark brown in color and nearly always in water-insoluble free-base form; it is ingested by smoking or, when mixed with an acid such as lemon juice, by injection. It is of particular interest that the 50 kilograms of heroin seized by the Queens Borough Narcotics officers, New York Police Department, on September 10, 2001, in Queens, New York, was identified as SWA-A heroin with a purity of 53 percent. SWA-B heroin, by contrast, is highly refined, often pure white or light cream in color and virtually always found in the water-soluble hydrochloride salt form, which can be readily injected or snorted. SWA-C heroin is a tan powder that is sold in either the free base form or the water-soluble hydrochloride salt form.
Most SWA heroin seized in the United States is SWA-B, refined primarily in Afghanistan. Moreover, about half of the recent samples seized at New York’s John F. Kennedy International Airport from drug couriers originating in Bangkok, Thailand, have been identified as SWA-B heroin. Investigators at the Baltimore-Washington International (BWI) Airport are seeing more seizures of SWA-B heroin; associated evidence indicates that Chicago and Detroit were the final destination for the majority of the shipments.
PRICES
Reporting from the DEA Peshawar, Pakistan Resident Office for Fiscal Year (FY) 2001, indicates that the average price of heroin in Afghanistan increased significantly over the past year. For example, the price of white heroin more than quadrupled from $1,200 in October 2000, to more than $5,100 per kilogram in September 2001, while the price of brown heroin jumped from approximately $750 to nearly $3,300 per kilogram during the same period. Similar price increases were noted in Pakistan, whereas heroin prices in Turkey remained stable.
SOUTHWEST ASIAN HEROIN PRICES PER KILOGRAM: FY2001
Source Area White Heroin Brown Heroin
1st Quarter 4th Quarter 1st Quarter 4th Quarter
Afghanistan Nangarhar Province $1,209 $5,103 $758 $3,280
Pakistan Islamabad/Rawalpindi $1,920 $6,200 $1,000 $4,100
Turkey N/A N/A $4,000-$7,500 $4,000-$7,500
Nonetheless, intelligence resources indicate that Nigerian/West African heroin traffickers travel from their bases of operation in Bangkok to Pakistan to acquire SWA heroin for $2,000 to $4,000 per kilogram—a price far below the $10,000 to $12,000 per kilogram price in Thailand for SEA heroin of comparable purity.
U.S. price information for SWA heroin is very limited; only the New York Division—which encompasses the nation’s major heroin consumption and distribution center—identified heroin prices by source region. In New York, the price of SWA heroin ranged from $65,000 to $90,000 per kilogram for the period April through June 2001; the average selling price was $70,000 per kilogram. The New York Division reported that Pakistani traffickers now offer wholesale kilogram prices in the $70,000 range, and in some cases in the $60,000 range. A recent controlled delivery involved 3 kilograms of SWA heroin for $144,000; the $48,000 per kilogram average price was significantly lower than any Colombian heroin price.
CURRENT DOMESTIC SITUATION
DEA field divisions recently reported that heroin trafficking from Southwest Asia to the United States remains a focus of investigations. Nigerian and West African drug organizations are identified as major traffickers of Asian heroin, most often smuggling the drug via air courier or, increasingly, by mail.
New York Division FY2001 reporting indicated that increased SWA heroin trafficking activity, coupled with decreasing prices and high purity levels, may impact New York wholesale markets, which have been dominated for the past 8 years by Colombian-source heroin. While Pakistani traffickers are the principal SWA heroin traffickers in New York, Russian and East European traffickers increasingly are involved in the SWA heroin trade, with smuggling routes that extend from Southwest Asia and the Middle East through the Balkan countries and Europe. Indian and Nepalese nationals also are involved in SWA heroin trafficking. Additionally, in New York, traditional organized crime groups are involved in the mid-level wholesale distribution of heroin directly from Southwest Asian sources.
The Detroit Division identifies Canada, Lebanon, India, and Pakistan as the source areas for SWA heroin in their area of responsibility. SWA heroin often is smuggled directly into the Detroit area via international commercial air from Nigerian sources in Bangkok and Antwerp utilizing body carriers, via mail from Thailand, and overland from Chicago, New York, and Los Angeles. Small quantities of heroin reportedly are smuggled regularly from Canada into the United States.
In June 2001, the Domestic Heroin Unit (NDAH) surveyed DEA field intelligence elements regarding the status of current investigations that focus on trafficking groups and/or heroin sources of supply connected with Southwest and Southeast Asia. The following chart compares the survey results of SWA investigations with street-level SWA heroin purchases made through the DMP. Of particular interest is the increase in SWA heroin purchases between 1999 and 2000; only nine SWA heroin purchases were made in 1999 compared to 25 in 2000.
SOUTHWEST ASIAN HEROIN PURCHASES AND INVESTIGATIONS
Field Division DMP Heroin Purchases 1 Current Cases 2
to June 2001
1999 2000
Atlanta 1 5 0
Boston 0 0 0
Caribbean 0 0 0
Chicago 1 4 0
Dallas 0 0 1
Denver No Response --- --- ---
Detroit 4 5 2
El Paso 3 0 0 0
Houston 0 0 4
Los Angeles 0 0 3
Miami 0 1 1
Newark 0 1 3
New Orleans 0 0 0
New York 0 3 7
Philadelphia 1 0 1
Phoenix 0 0 1
San Diego 0 0 0
San Francisco 0 0 3
Seattle 0 0 0
St. Louis 0 0 0
Washington, DC 2 6 2
TOTAL 9 25 26
1 In 1999, heroin from Southwest Asia comprised 1 percent of qualified samples purchased through the DMP. By contrast, 3 percent of DMP 2000 samples were identified as SWA. On average, the DMP collects approximately 700 to 800 qualified samples per year.
2 Cases involving SWA heroin trafficking organizations reported to NDAH in response to June 2001 survey of DEA Field Divisions.
3 The El Paso Field Division joined the DMP in mid-1999.
An example of a major operation targeting Middle Eastern heroin traffickers is Operation MAGIC CARPET. This 4-year, multiagency SWA heroin investigation was initiated by the Detroit Field Division and is judicially pending. The Lebanese violators were responsible for transporting, trafficking, and smuggling multiple kilogram quantities of SWA heroin into the United States from Lebanon in religious prayer rugs. In July 2000, 34 targets of the investigation were indicted in Detroit. A takedown occurred in August 2000 that resulted in the arrest of 21 targets. The remaining indicted targets reside in foreign countries with the exception of two individuals who were extradited from Canada on October 4, 2001.
CONCLUSION
Heroin from Southwest Asia will remain a potent factor in the world drug market. Opium poppy cultivation and opium and heroin production may increase as production in Afghanistan resumes. Should the current military actions and continued international presence within the country effectively reduce opium poppy cultivation in future years, cultivation and production may migrate to countries bordering Afghanistan. Europe will remain the primary retail market for SWA heroin. At the same time, U.S. heroin trafficking groups will seek to acquire high-purity material, including that from Southwest Asian sources, at low cost in order to maximize their profits. Decreasing prices, high purity, and increased trafficking of SWA heroin in New York may affect Colombian domination of heroin markets in the area.
1 Unless otherwise noted, all prices are expressed in U.S. dollars.
2 Heroin signature analysis is conducted through DEA’s Special Testing and Research Laboratory. Through this program, heroin samples are subjected to in-depth chemical analysis to determine, among other things, the purity and geographic source area of the heroin. DEA chemists are able to associate the sample with a heroin production process, or signature, unique to a particular geographic source area.
This report was prepared by the Domestic Heroin Unit (NDAH), Office of Domestic Intelligence, in coordination with DEA Divisional Intelligence Groups, the Domestic Strategic Intelligence Unit, and the Europe, Asia, Africa Strategic Unit, Office of International Intelligence. The information in this report is current as of January 2002. Comments and requests for copies are welcome and may be directed to the Intelligence Production Unit, Intelligence Division, DEA Headquarters, at (202) 307-8726.
http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/
Russian authorities struggle to hold back a rising tide of drugs – November 2002 Russian authorities struggle to hold back a rising tide of drugs
By Yahoo News - Monday October 28, 2002
Copyright: Yahoo News
MOSCOW - Hidden inside cabbages, hollowed walnuts, even the bellies of desperately poor pregnant women, Afghan heroin steadily flows into Russia, joining a stream of illegal drugs that officials warn is a growing threat to the nation's stability.
Over the past half decade, Russia has become a major way station on the trafficking route from Afghanistan ( news - web sites) to European markets.
After a monthlong lull at the start of the war in Afghanistan last fall, the trade has picked up again, Russian police say. They report seizing a half ton of heroin so far this year, along with more than 940 kilograms (2,068 pounds) stopped on the border between Afghanistan and the former Soviet republic of Tajikistan.
"We expect a flood of drugs, which are now growing in Afghanistan, in the second half of the year," said Oleg Kharichkin, deputy director of the Russian Interior Ministry's narcotics division.
Afghanistan isn't the only culprit. Traffickers use organized crime channels to ship cocaine from Latin America through Russian seaports to Europe and the United States. Peddlers bring in ephedrine from China. Amphetamines and other synthetic drugs come from Europe, especially Poland. Ukrainians, Lithuanians and Belarusians smuggle in poppy straw.
But it is Afghan heroin that has become the narcotic of choice for addicts in Russia, where more than 3 million people are estimated to be hooked on drugs. That is nearly 2.1 percent of the population, which compares to 1.6 percent in the United States, as estimated by the U.S. Office of National Drug Control Policy.
Just as worrisome, the heroin trade finances numerous militant groups along Russia's restive southern flank, threatening security within Russia and its neighbors.
"Extremists need a lot of cash. For them, drugs are fast, easy, good money," said Lt. Gen. Konstantin Totsky, chief of Russia's border guards.
Carried by donkeys and human couriers across the Pyandzh River and the rugged Pamir Mountains, which form Afghanistan's northern border with Tajikistan, heroin is then smuggled over the mountains of Uzbekistan or Kyrgyzstan into Kazakhstan, and from there across the sparsely patrolled, 7,000-kilometer (4,435-mile) frontier with Russia. The U.S.-Mexican border is half as long and "10 times less rugged," an American embassy official says.
Russia has 10,700 border guards monitoring the Tajik-Afghan border, along with 10,000 Russian soldiers. Hardly a day goes by without a skirmish. Some drug couriers are killed, while others escape back into Afghanistan, abandoning their precious cargos for the troops to burn.
"At present, on the border of Afghanistan and Tajikistan, there are about seven tons of opium and almost two tons of heroin already warehoused and ready for transport to Russia and Europe," said Kharichkin, the Interior Ministry official.
Russia is seeking money from the United Nations ( news - web sites) and Western nations to beef up security on the drug routes. Negotiations also are under way to provide satellite imaging information on poppy cultivation to the Afghan government, said Lt. Gen. Alexander Sergeyev, chief of the Interior Ministry's anti-trafficking department.
In the meantime, smugglers are spreading drugs across Russia. Besides selling in Moscow, St. Petersburg and other large transport hubs, heroin gangs concentrate on cities in the oil and gas regions of Siberia and the Far North, where salaries are higher and potential markets richer.
One major crossroads in the trade is the Ural Mountains city of Yekaterinburg, about 220 kilometers (135 miles) north of the Kazakh border and a gateway between Asia and the more densely populated European part of Russia. The city is a magnet for seasonal workers from Central Asia, and police say they run drug-smuggling businesses out of the city's wholesale produce market. Men, women and children take part.
"More and more we're seeing women in early stages of pregnancy carrying drugs. For 500 dollars they're prepared to carry heroin in their abdominal cavities," said Fyodor Anikeyev, an officer in the Yekaterinburg narcotics squad. "Seeing their pale, unhealthy look, agents (at the airport) naturally pick them out, but doctors refuse to X-ray them so the babies won't be harmed."
Official corruption also plays a role. Nazir Salimov, head of the Yekaterinburg squad, said two top Tajik police officials were arrested in the city in June for trying to sell a large consignment of heroin.
The same month, in Tajikistan, a former deputy defense minister was charged with drug trafficking after allegedly ordering use of a military helicopter to drop off 80 kilograms (176 pounds) of opium and 0.5 kilograms (1 pound) of heroin.
Activists working with addicts allege Russian officials are deeply involved, too.
"There's a huge level of corruption in law enforcement agencies at all levels in Russia," said Father Anatoly Berestov, a neuropathologist and Russian Orthodox monk who runs a drug treatment center at the 17th century Krutitskoye church in central Moscow.
Interior Ministry officials deny the charge.
Berestov and others also complain that the main police effort appears aimed at punishing drug addicts, not traffickers.
People charged with possessing even a small amount of marijuana face up to the three years in prison. If they help a friend get the drug, they can be sentenced to seven to 15 years for distribution.
"Why is there enough money to maintain these prisoners but not enough for real anti-drug campaigning?" said Anna, a 23-year-old former heroin addict who works at the Krutitskoye center.
Prevention programs are nearly nonexistent, and the decade following the collapse of the Soviet Union has seen the steady closure of government-funded youth clubs and recreation centers that kept many children and teenagers out of trouble.
Seventy percent of Russia's 450,000 officially registered addicts are 25 and younger, and most start using drugs at age 14 or 15.
Experts and addicts alike say the spiritual crisis and particularly the permissiveness that gripped the country after the Soviet collapse — including an explosion of pornography, movie and TV violence, and unfettered teenage drinking — have fueled the problem.
"This atmosphere of 'everything is permitted' has overwhelmed everyone," said Anna, who declined to give her last name. "Plus there's the situation at home, where parents are running around trying to figure out how to make enough money to feed their children."
Rehabilitation programs are few, and patients must pay for treatment in almost all of them, in contrast to the Soviet era, when alcohol and drug treatment were not only free but also mandatory.
The program at Berestov's 4-year-old center, which is financed entirely by donations, includes psychological and medical counseling, work at the center or a nearby monastery, and a heavy regimen of prayer. He claims an 80 percent cure rate for the 3,000 addicts treated.
Traveling widely throughout Russia, Berestov appears often on television and radio, prompting a stream of tearful mothers dragging hollow-eyed children to the Krutitskoye center.
"They're all former criminals, even murders," the monk said matter-of-factly. "But I'm not a police officer. I'm a priest, and my role is to repair."
The police say their interdiction efforts are beginning to bear fruit. Heroin is becoming harder to get, and its price is rising — reaching about 935 rubles (dlrs 30) per gram (0.04 ounces) in Moscow, three times the price in 1999.
Doctors say that the number of newly registered drug users 18 and under fell by about a third last year and that deaths by overdose, arrests of suspects in a drug-induced state and drug-provoked psychoses are also down.
But Berestov, who gets new patients every day, says he hasn't seen any letup. If anything, he and other experts say, young people are just turning to different substances, including strong over-the-counter medicines as well as Russia's traditional addiction — alcohol.
http://news.yahoo.com/
We use cookies to ensure that we give you the best experience on our website. If you continue to use this site we will assume that you are happy with it.
You can revoke your consent any time using the Revoke consent button.
